39 ideas
| 11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
| Full Idea: Two ways to see 'all horses are animals' are as picking out all the horses (so that it is a 'horse-quantifier'), ..or as ranging over lots of things in addition to horses, with 'horses' then restricting the things to those that satisfy 'is a horse'. | |
| From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 2) | |
| A reaction: Jubien says this gives you two different metaphysical views, of a world of horses etc., or a world of things which 'are horses'. I vote for the first one, as the second seems to invoke an implausible categorical property ('being a horse'). Cf Idea 11116. |
| 11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
| Full Idea: Being a physical object (as opposed to being a horse or a statue) really is our most fundamental category for dealing with the external world. | |
| From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 2) | |
| A reaction: This raises the interesting question of why any categories should be considered to be more 'fundamental' than others. I can only think that we perceive something to be an object fractionally before we (usually) manage to identify it. |
| 11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
| Full Idea: Properties of 'being such and such specific entity' are often called 'haecceities', but this term carries the connotation of non-qualitativeness which I don't favour. | |
| From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 2) | |
| A reaction: The way he defines it makes it sound as if it was a category, but I take it to be more like a bare individual essence. If it has not qualities then it has no causal powers, so there could be no evidence for its existence. |
| 11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
| Full Idea: I suggest that the de re is to be analyzed in terms of the de dicto. ...We have a case of modality de re when (and only when) the appropriate property in the de dicto formulation is an object-essence. | |
| From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 5) |
| 7803 | Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then' [Lewis,CI, by Girle] |
| Full Idea: C.I.Lewis began his groundbreaking work in modal logic because he was concerned about the unreliability of the material conditional as a translation of 'If ... then' conditionals. | |
| From: report of C.I. Lewis (Symbolic Logic (with Langford) [1932]) by Rod Girle - Modal Logics and Philosophy 12.3 | |
| A reaction: Compare 'if this is square then it has four corners' with 'if it rains then our afternoon is ruined'. Different modalities seem to be involved. We even find that 'a square has four corners' will be materially implied if it rains! |
| 11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
| Full Idea: Where modal propositions may once have seemed to transcend the actual, they now seem only to transcend the concrete. | |
| From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 4) | |
| A reaction: This is because Jubien has defended a form of platonism. Personally I take modal propositions to be perceptible in the concrete world, by recognising the processes involved, not the mere static stuff. |
| 11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
| Full Idea: The possibility of your having been a playwright has nothing to do with how people are on other planets, whether in our own or in some other realm. It is only to do with you and the relevant property. | |
| From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1) | |
| A reaction: I'm inclined to think that this simple point is conclusive disproof of possible worlds as an explanation of modality (apart from Jubien's other nice points). What we need to understand are modal properties, not other worlds. |
| 11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
| Full Idea: Typical modal truths are just facts about our world, and generally facts about very small parts of it, not facts about some infinitude of complex, maximal entities. | |
| From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1) | |
| A reaction: I think we should embrace this simple fact immediately, and drop all this nonsense about possible worlds, even if they are useful for the semantics of modal logic. |
| 11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
| Full Idea: Any other realms that happened to exist would just be scattered parts of the actual world, not entire worlds at all. It would just happen that physical reality was fragmented in this remarkable but modally inconsequential way. | |
| From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1) | |
| A reaction: This is aimed explicitly at Lewis's modal realism, and strikes me as correct. Jubien's key point here is that they are irrelevant to modality, just as foreign countries are irrelevant to the modality of this one. |
| 11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
| Full Idea: If all of the possible worlds happened to include stars, how plausible is it to think that if this is how things really are, then we've just been wrong to regard the existence of stars as contingent? | |
| From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1) |
| 11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
| Full Idea: In the world theory, what passes for 'necessity' is just a bunch of parallel 'contingencies'. The theory provides no basis for understanding why these contingencies repeat unremittingly across the board (while others do not). | |
| From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1) |
| 11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
| Full Idea: The suspicion is that the necessity doesn't arise from how worlds are, but rather that the worlds are taken to be as they are in order to capture the intuitive necessity. | |
| From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1) | |
| A reaction: It has always seemed to me rather glaring that you need a prior notion of 'possible' before you can start to talk about 'possible worlds', but I have always been too timid to disagree with the combination of Saul Kripke and David Lewis. Thank you, Jubien! |
| 11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
| Full Idea: As soon as we start talking about 'possible world', we beg the question of their relevance to our prior notion of possibility. For all we know, there are just two such realms, or twenty-seven, or uncountably many, or even set-many. | |
| From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1) |
| 11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
| Full Idea: Suppose there happen to be no other concrete realms. Would we happily accept the consequence that we exist necessarily? | |
| From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1) |
| 11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
| Full Idea: If someone similar to Humphrey won the election, that nicely establishes the possibility of someone's winning who is similar to Humphrey. But we mustn't confuse this possibility with the intuitively different possibility of Humphrey himself winning. | |
| From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1) |
| 17979 | Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: Goldstone's research has shown how learning concepts can change perceptual units. For example, perceptual discrimination is heightened along category boundaries. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: [Goldstone 1994, 2000] This is just the sort of research which throws a spanner into the simplistic a priori thinking of many philosophers. |
| 18690 | Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: Most theories of induction claim that it should depend primarily on the similarity of the categories involved, but then the type of property should not matter, yet research shows that it does. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be good empirical support for Gilbert Harman's view that induction is really inference to the best explanation. The thought (which strikes me as obviously correct) is that we bring nested domains of knowledge to bear in induction. |
| 17980 | The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The three main theories of concepts under consideration are the exemplar, the prototype and the knowledge approaches. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) |
| 17969 | The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The early psychological approaches to concepts took a definitional approach. ...but this view does not have any way of distinguishing typical and atypical category members (...as when a trout is a typical fish and an eel an atypical one). | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: [pp. 12 and 22] Eleanor Rosch in the 1970s is said to have largely killed off the classical view. |
| 17973 | The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: It has been extremely difficult to find definitions for most natural categories, and even harder to find definitions that are plausible psychological representations that people of all ages would be likely to use. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) |
| 17970 | Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The classical view of concepts has been tied to traditional logic. 'Fido is a dog and a pet' is true if it has the necessary and sufficient conditions for both, ...but there is empirical evidence that people do not follow that rule. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: Examples given are classifying chess as a sport and/or game, and classifying a tree house (which is agreed to be both a building and not a building!). |
| 17971 | Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The classical view of concepts explains hierarchical order, where categories form nested sets. But research shows that categories are often not transitive. Research shows that a seat is furniture, and a car seat is a seat, but it is not furniture. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Murphy adds that the nesting of definitions is classically used to match the nesting of hierarchies. This is a nice example of the neatness of the analytic philosopher breaking down when it meets the mess of the world. |
| 17972 | The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: A problem with the revised classical view is that the concept core does not seem to be an important part of the concept, despite its name and theoretical intention as representing the 'real' concept. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: Apparently most researchers feel they can explain their results without reference to any core. Not so fast, I would say (being an essentialist). Maybe people acknowledge an implicit core without knowing what it is. See Susan Gelman. |
| 17975 | There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: Is there really an 'ideal bird' that could represent all birds? ...Furthermore a single prototype would give no information about the variability of a category. ...Compare the incredible variety of dogs to the much smaller diversity of cats. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: The point about variability is particularly noteworthy. You only grasp the concept of 'furniture' when you understand its range, as well as its typical examples. What structure is needed in a concept to achieve this? |
| 17976 | Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: In the prototype view the entire category is represented by a unified representation rather than separate representations for each member, or for different classes of members. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: This is the improved prototype view, as opposed to the implausible idea that there is one ideal exemplar. The new theory still have the problem of how to represent diversity within the category, while somehow remaining 'unified'. |
| 18691 | The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: Nothing in the prototype model says the shape of an animal is more important than its location in identifying its kind. The theory does not provide a way the features can be constructed, rather than just observed. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: This makes some kind of mental modelling central to thought, and not just a bonus once you have empirically acquired the concepts. We bring our full range of experience to bear on even the most instantaneous observations. |
| 17983 | The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The prototype view has no trouble with either hierarchical structure or explaining categories. ...Meaning and conceptual combination provide strong evidence for prototypes. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: Prototypes are not vague, making clearer classification possible. A 'mountain lion' is clear, because its components are clear. |
| 17985 | Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: Our theory of concepts must be primarily prototype-based. That is, it must be a description of an entire concept, with its typical features (presumably weighted by their importance). | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: This is to be distinguished from the discredited 'classical' view of concepts, that the concept consists of its definition. I take Aristotle's account of definition to be closer to a prototype description than to a dictionary definition. |
| 17986 | Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: My proposal is that people attempt to form prototypes as part of a larger knowledge structure when they learn concepts. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: This combines theory theory (knowledge) with the prototype view, and sounds rather persuasive. The formation of prototypes fits with the explanatory account of essentialism I am defending. He later calls prototype formation 'abstraction' (494). |
| 17974 | The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototype or exemplar theories that are strongly unclassical. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 2) |
| 17977 | The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: In the exemplar view of concepts, the idea that people have a representation that somehow encompasses an entire concept is rejected. ...Instead a person's concept of dogs is the set of dogs that the person remembers. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: [The theory was introduced by Medin and Schaffer 1978] I think I have finally met a plausible theory of concepts. When I think 'dog' I conjure up a fuzz of dogs that exhibit the range I have encountered (e.g. tiny to very big). Individuals come first! |
| 17987 | The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: We don't have one concept of birds formed by learning from exemplars, and another concept of birds that is used in induction. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: In other words exemplar concepts break down when we generalise using the concept. The exemplars must be unified, to be usable in thought and language. |
| 17982 | Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The exemplar view has trouble with hierarchical classification and with induction in adults. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: To me these both strongly support essentialism - that you form the concept 'dog' from seeing some dogs, but you then extrapolate to large categories and general truths about dogs, on the assumption of the natures of the dogs you have seen. |
| 17981 | Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The findings showing that children use knowledge and may be essentialist about category membership do not comport well with the exemplar view. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: Tricky, because Gelman persuaded me of the essentialism, but the exemplar view of concepts looks the most promising. Clearly they must be forced to coexist.... |
| 17984 | Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The exemplar accounts of conceptual combination are demonstrably wrong, because the meaning of a phrase has to be composed from the meaning of its parts (plus broader knowledge), and it cannot be composed as a function of exemplars. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch.13) | |
| A reaction: This sounds quite persuasive, and I begin to see that my favoured essentialism fits the prototype view of concepts best, though this mustn't be interpreted too crudely. We change our prototypes with experience. 'Bird' is a tricky case. |
| 17978 | We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: The knowledge approach argues that concepts are part of our general knowledge about the world. We do not learn concepts in isolation, ...but as part of our overall understanding of the world. Animal concepts are integrated with biology, behaviour etc. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: This is one of the leading theories of concepts among psychologists. It seems to be an aspect of the true theory, but it needs underpinning with some account of isolated individual concepts. This is also known as the 'theory theory'. |
| 18687 | Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: A concept's content influences how easy it is to learn. If the concept is grossly incompatible with what people know prior to the experiment, it will be difficult to acquire. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: This is a preliminary fact which leads towards the 'knowledge' theory of concepts (aka 'theory theory'). The point being that the knowledge involved is integral to the concept. Fits my preferred mental files approach. |
| 18688 | Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: Some kinds of knowledge are probably directly incorporated into the category representation and used in normal, fast decisions about objects. Other kinds of knowledge, however, may come into play only when it has been solicited. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: This is a summary of empirical research, but seems to fit our normal experience. If you see a hawk, you have some instant understanding, but if you ask what the hawk is doing here, you draw more widely. |
| 18689 | People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy] |
| Full Idea: People tend to positively categorise items that are consistent with their knowledge and to exclude items that are inconsistent, sometimes even overruling purely empirical sources of information. | |
| From: Gregory L. Murphy (The Big Book of Concepts [2004], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: The main rival to 'theory theory' is the purely empirical account of how concepts are acquired. This idea reports empirical research in favour of the theory theory (or 'knowledge') approach. |