85 ideas
16604 | Philosophy consists of choosing between Plato, Aristotle and Democritus [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The history of philosophy consists in a series of choices between three primordial rivals: Plato, Aristotle and Democritus. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 05.1) | |
A reaction: Pasnau's point is that the importance of Democritus is not usually appreciated. As far as I can see, Democritus may have been the greatest of all philosophers, but most of his works are lost. His fragments are the best fragments. |
16606 | Original philosophers invariably seek inspiration from past thinkers [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Philosophers almost never strike out on wholly new ground, without the historical inspiration of some figure or other. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 05.1) |
16586 | The commentaries of Averroes were the leading guide to Aristotle [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The commentaries of Averroes on virtually the whole Aristotelian corpus became by far the most important scholastic guide to the interpretation of Aristotle. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 03.1) |
16568 | Modernity begins in the late 12th century, with Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: I tend to think of modernity as coming in the late twelfth century, with Averroes's magisterial commentaries on Aristotle. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 1.1) | |
A reaction: A rather quirky use of 'modernity', but this seems to be a huge landmark. Note that it comes from the Islamic Arab world, not from Europe. |
16653 | Once accidents were seen as real, 'Categories' became the major text for ontology [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Originally you count substances for ontology. Once there is the doctrine of real accidents (in the 14th cent) the list of ten categories begins to look like an inventory of the kinds of things there are, and 'Categories' looks like the fundamental text. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 12.1) | |
A reaction: Prior to this development, 'Categories' was treated as a mere beginner's text, once the major corpus of Aristotle had been rediscovered in the 13th century. The result of this development is sortal essentialism, which I don't like. |
16704 | In 1347, the Church effectively stopped philosophy for the next 300 years [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The year 1347 is a great milestone in the history of philosophy, because then the route to modern philosophy was blocked by Church authorities, and effectively put on hold for almost 300 years. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 19.3) | |
A reaction: It is interesting that it was 100 years after the Reformation before philosophy got going again, and then only thanks to one man. Islam stopped philosophy earlier. |
16605 | After c.1450 all of Plato was available. Before that, only the first half of 'Timaeus' was known [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: From the mid-fifteenth century forward, for the first time, the whole Platonic corpus was available in Ficino's Latin translation. Before then, only the first half of the 'Timaeus' had widely circulated in Latin. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 05.1) |
16607 | Renaissance Platonism is peripheral [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The fabled phenomenon of Renaissance Platonism is peripheral. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 05.3) | |
A reaction: The point is that only a few Italians pursued the Platonic line. Pasnau suggests Cartesian dualism as a possible influence from Plato. |
16715 | Plato only made an impact locally in 15th century Italy [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: In certain limited circles in Italy, Plato made an impact in the fifteenth century, but his influence never came close to challenging Aristotle's. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 20.2) |
16610 | Philosophy could easily have died in 17th century, if it weren't for Descartes [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: As scholasticism collapsed in the 17th century, it might easily have happened is that philosophy simply died. That this did not happen is due in large part to René Descartes. …It is remarkable that this brilliant man insisted on still doing philosophy. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 05.5) | |
A reaction: The alternative view is, of course, that you just can't stop people from thinking philosophically (except by totalitarian education). Are there philosophers in North Korea, or among the Taliban? |
16781 | The 17th century is a metaphysical train wreck [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The seventeenth century is a metaphysical train wreck. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 26.6) | |
A reaction: This is, roughly, because the corpuscularian philosophy lacked the resources to answer all the problems dealt with by substantial forms. |
13395 | If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien] |
Full Idea: An analysis of a concept tells us what the concept is by telling us what its constituents are and how they are combined. ..The features of the concept are present in the analysis, making it surprising the 'reductive' analyses are sought. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 4.5) | |
A reaction: He says that there are nevertheless reductive analyses, such as David Lewis's analysis of modality. We must disentangle conceptual analysis from causal analysis (e.g. in his example of the physicalist reduction of mind). |
16677 | Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The Anti-Razor says 'whenever an affirmative proposition is truly stated, if one thing does not suffice to account for its truth, then one must posit things, and if two do not suffice then three, and so on to infinity'. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 14.3) | |
A reaction: This is quoted from an anonymous logic text of 1325. Apparently Ockham himself articulated the idea more than once. |
9565 | Zermelo made 'set' and 'member' undefined axioms [Zermelo, by Chihara] |
Full Idea: The terms 'set' and 'is a member of' are primitives of Zermelo's 1908 axiomatization of set theory. They are not given model-theoretic analyses or definitions. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (works [1920]) by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 7.5 | |
A reaction: This looks like good practice if you want to work with sets, but not so hot if you are interested in metaphysics. |
3339 | For Zermelo's set theory the empty set is zero and the successor of each number is its unit set [Zermelo, by Blackburn] |
Full Idea: For Zermelo's set theory the empty set is zero and the successor of each number is its unit set. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (works [1920]) by Simon Blackburn - Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy p.280 |
13378 | It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien] |
Full Idea: It has often been uncritically assumed that logic that was initially a tool for clarifying mathematics could be seamlessly and uniformly applied in the effort to clarify ordinary language and philosophy, but this has been a real mistake. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm not saying he's right (since you need stupendous expertise to make that call) but my intuitions are that he has a good point, and he is at least addressing a crucial question which most analytical philosophers avert their eyes from. |
13402 | We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien] |
Full Idea: We cannot be said to have a full grasp of a name unless we have a definite disposition to apply it or to withhold it under whatever conceivable changes the bearer of the name might come to undergo. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.3) | |
A reaction: This is right, and an excellent counterproposal to the logicians' notion that names have to rigidly designate. As a bare minimum, you are not supposed to deny the identity of your parents because they have grown a bit older, or a damaged painting. |
13405 | The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The person who introduces a proper name gets to pick its bearer, but its category - and consequently the meaning of the name - is determined by social use. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 7) | |
A reaction: New 'division of labour'. The idea that a name has some sort of meaning seems right and important. If babies were switched after baptism, social use might fix the name to the new baby. The namer could stipulate the category at the baptism. Too neat. |
13399 | Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien] |
Full Idea: There are plenty of examples to show that ordinary proper names simply are not rigid designators. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.1) | |
A reaction: His examples are the planet Venus and the dust of which it is formed, and a statue made of clay. In other words, for some objects, perhaps under certain descriptions (e.g. functional ones), the baptised matter can change. Rigidity is an extra topping. |
13398 | We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien] |
Full Idea: 'The winner of the Derby' satisfies some horse, but only accidentally. But we could 'rigidify' the description by inserting 'actual' into it, giving 'the actual winner of the Derby'. Winning is a contingent property, but actually winning is necessary. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.1) | |
A reaction: I like this unusual proposal because instead of switching into formal logic in order to capture the ideas we are after, he is drawing on the resources of ordinary language, offering philosophers a way of speaking plain English more precisely. |
13392 | Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien] |
Full Idea: There is a readiness of philosophers to 'translate' English, with its seeming multitude of kind-driven quantifiers, into first-order logic, with its single wide-open quantifier. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 4.1) | |
A reaction: As in example he says that reference to a statue involves a 'statue-quantifier'. Thus we say things about the statue that we would not say about the clay, which would involve a 'clay-quantifier'. |
13404 | To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated [Jubien] |
Full Idea: For a thing to exist necessarily is for it to have an entity-essence whose own entity-essence entails being instantiated. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 6.4) | |
A reaction: This is the culmination of a lengthy discussion, and is not immediately persuasive. For Jubien the analysis rests on a platonist view of properties, which doesn't help. |
16598 | Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: For a scholastic author, hardly anything was so likely to precipitate a lengthy disputatio as talk of priority, in its various kinds. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 04.3) |
13386 | If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien] |
Full Idea: Under the Quinean (conventional) view of objects, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This is the bold nihilistic account of physical objects, which seems to push all of our ontology into language (English?). We could devise divisions into things that were just crazy, and likely to lead to the rapid extinction of creatures who did it. |
16727 | In mixtures, the four elements ceased to exist, replaced by a mixed body with a form [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The standard view was that in a mixture there is only the mixed body and its substantial form (gold). There are no further substantial forms of the elements, because the elements do not actually exist within the body. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 22.3) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be the key idea that was overthrown in the seventeenth century, so that corpuscular matter kept aspects of its ingredients, which science could then investigate. With the substantial form, investigation seemed impossible. |
13403 | The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The category of Venus is not 'physical object' or 'mereological sum', but narrower. Surprisingly, it is not 'planet', since it might cease to be a planet and still merit the name 'Venus'. It is something like 'well-integrated, good-sized physical object'. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Jubien is illustrating Idea 13402. This is a nice demonstration of how one might go about the task of constructing categories - by showing the modal profiles of things to which names have been assigned. Categories are file names. |
16732 | 17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The seventeenth century is often said to have bequeathed us three ways of thinking about sensible qualities: either in reductive microphysical terms, or as internal phenomenal states, or else as powers or dispositions. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 23.1) | |
A reaction: Pasnau goes on to claim that no one in the 17th century believed the third one. I take it to be a very new, and totally wonderful and correct, view. |
16733 | 17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: In the seventeenth century, my claim is that authors during the period recognise only categorical properties, and never dispositional properties. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 23.1) |
16662 | The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Among scholastics the primary agreement is that what primarily exist are substances. The primary disagreement concerns the nature of their changeable properties. Are they real accidents, or mere modes of substance? | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 13.1) |
16767 | There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: One could empirically reject a centralised power within a substance - and still think a genuine substance requires a form of some more abstract kind, not for a physical explanation, but for a full metaphysical understanding of how things are. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 25.2) | |
A reaction: This divorce of the 'metaphysical' from the physical is a running theme in Pasnau, and he cites support from Leibniz. I'm not sure I understand 'metaphysical' understanding, if it is actually contrary to physics. I take it to be 'psychological'. |
16788 | Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Someone who wants to enrich a strict corpuscularian account with other metaphysical entities has alternatives other than Aristotelian hylomorphism. One can, for instance, introduce dispositions. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 28.2) | |
A reaction: This slightly throws me, because I have been flirting with a dispositional account of hylomorphism. The implication is that the form is abstract and structural, where the disposition is real and physical. But dispositions can do the job of forms. |
16738 | Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Scholastics reject anything like bare dispositions, on Aristotelian principles. Powers are forms, and forms actualise their subject, and are causally efficacious. Therefore no powers can be bare dispositions. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 23.5) | |
A reaction: The point seems to be that a mere disposition is not actual, as a form is required to be. I would have thought that a power does not have to be operational to be actual. A live electric wire is a real phenomenon. It isn't waiting to be live. |
13375 | The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The pervasiveness, throughout philosophy, of the assumption that entities of various kinds need identity conditions is one unfortunate aspect of Quine's important philosophical legacy. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: Lowe seems to be an example of a philosopher who habitually demands individuation conditions for everything that is referred to. Presumably the alternative is to take lots of things as primitive, but this seems to be second best. |
16649 | Scholastics say there is a genuine thing if it is 'separable' [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Among the scholastics (after Duns Scotus) it would be come to be taken for granted that the crucial test for being a genuine thing - a 'res' - is separability. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 11.2) | |
A reaction: The idea of separability is implicit in Aristotle. In borderline cases, it seems that they are tempted to claim that things like accidental properties are separable, simply because they want them to be genuine things. A criterion for separability? |
16785 | If you reject essences, questions of individuation become extremely difficult [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Given the accepted linkage between a thing's essence and its identity, the rejection of essences makes a complete mess out of questions of individuation. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 27.6) | |
A reaction: I note that he talks of a thing having 'identity', contra the view of identity as a two-place relation. I agree with this, but there is a chicken-egg problem. Do I perceive an identity and surmise an essence, or surmise an essence and deduce identity? |
16680 | Scholastics thought Quantity could be the principle of individuation [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Quantity was a leading scholastic contender for the principle of individuation. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 14.4) |
13393 | Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity [Jubien] |
Full Idea: For any entity of any sort, abstract or concrete, I assume there is a property of being that specific entity. For want of a better term, I will call such properties entity-essences. They are 'singulary' - not instantiable by more than one thing at a time. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 4.2) | |
A reaction: Baffling. Why would someone who has mocked all sorts of bogus philosophical claims based on logic then go on to assert the existence of such weird things as these? I can't make sense of this property being added to a thing's other properties. |
13388 | It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien] |
Full Idea: It is simply far-fetched - even incoherent - to think that, given an entity, of whatever kind, its being a single entity somehow consists in its satisfying some condition involving the kind to which it belongs (or concepts related to that kind). | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 2.3) | |
A reaction: Well said. I can't see how philosophers have allowed themselves to drift into such a daft view. Kinds blatantly depend on the individuals that constitute them, so how could the identity of the individuals depend on their kind? |
13384 | Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility [Jubien] |
Full Idea: We need a first convention to determine what matter constitutes objects, then a second to determine whether there are different temporal possibilities for a given object, then a third for different spatial possibilities. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This is building up a Quinean account of objects, as mere matter in regions of spacetime, which are then precisely determined by a set of social conventions. |
13385 | Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like [Jubien] |
Full Idea: There is a certain - very mild - sense in which I don't think the physical world comes with ready-made objects. I think instead that we (conventionally) carve it up into objects, and this can be done any way we like. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.5) | |
A reaction: I have no idea how one could begin to refute such a view. Obviously there are divisions (even if only of physical density) in the world, but nothing obliges us to make divisions at those points. We happily accept objects with gaps in them. |
16617 | Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism say only substances exist [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism tend to think that only substances exist. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 06.2) | |
A reaction: Pasnau treats this as an extreme 17th C reaction which was hopelessly inadequate as metaphysics. We have been struggling with the nature of 'properties' ever since, while losing our grip on the concept of a unified 'substance'. |
16741 | Scholastics wanted to treat Aristotelianism as physics, rather than as metaphysics [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: There is a broad scholastic tendency to understand Aristotelianism not in abstract, metaphysical terms, but as a concrete, physical theory of the world. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 23.5) | |
A reaction: This seems to give a good explanation of why Aristotelianism plummeted to oblivion in the 17th C. Pasnau obviously wants to revive it, by drawing a sharp line between metaphysics and science. I doubt the line. |
16777 | If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Crowds seem to be the bearers of properties, and if they are things at all, then there is no place for them other than in the category of Substance. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 26.1) | |
A reaction: It is tempting to say, based on Aristotle, that a substance is whatever 1) bears properties, and 2) endures in spite of change, but a crowd is a nice problem case, because it looks too disunited to be a 'substance'. |
16628 | Corpuscularianism promised a decent account of substance [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: One of the great attractions of corpuscularianism is that it promises to put our acquaintance with substances on a solid foundation. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 07.3) | |
A reaction: This is why the seventeenth century did not abandon 'substance', even though they banished 'substantial form'. |
16615 | Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Scholastic texts are rife with different senses of 'substantia', using the term to refer, among other things, both to thick concrete entities and to thin metaphysical ones. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 06.1) | |
A reaction: Pasnau introduces 'thin' and 'thick' substance for this reason. I may adopt this. Without distinctions between thin and thick concepts of things we can get very muddled. I like the word to label something which is an 'entity'. |
16775 | For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: According to strict corpuscularianism the only real constituents of a substance are its integral parts. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 26.1) | |
A reaction: An understandable reaction to the emptiness of Aristotelian substantial forms in science. It seems to leave out the structural principles that distinguish one arrangement of parts from another. See Koslicki on this. |
13383 | If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay [Jubien] |
Full Idea: If a sculptor says 'I love the statue but I really hate that piece of clay - it is way too hard to work with' ...the statement is partly is partly about that object qua statue and partly about that object qua piece of clay. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: His point is that identity is partly determined by the concept or category under which the thing falls. Plausible. Lots of identity muddles seem to come from our conceptual scheme not being quite up to the job when things change. |
13400 | If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways [Jubien] |
Full Idea: A single entity is a physical object, a piece of clay and a statue. We seem to have that the object could be scattered, but not the other two; the object and the clay could be spherical, but not the statue; and only the object could have different matter. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.2) | |
A reaction: His proposal, roughly, is to reduce object-talk to property-talk, and then see the three views of this object as referring to different sets of properties, rather than to a single thing. Promising, except that he goes platonist about properties. |
16769 | If clay survives destruction of the statue, the statue wasn't a substance, but a mere accident [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The unitarian view of substance says it cannot be divided. If the clay can survive the destruction of the statue, then that shows that the statue was not a substance at all, and that its shape (or whatever made it a statue) was merely a passing accident. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 25.3) | |
A reaction: This seems to give the orthodox Aristotelian/Thomist reading, assuming that a substance only has one form, which unifies it. Since clay must have shape, and statues must have matter, I have never understood how there were two objects here. |
13401 | The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien] |
Full Idea: I find it surprising that some philosophers accept 'coincident objects'. This notion clearly offends against commonsense 'naturalism' about the world, so it should be viewed as a last resort. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.2 n9) | |
A reaction: I'm not quite clear why he invokes 'naturalism', but I pass on his intuition because it seems right to me. |
16602 | Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: What marks the rise of the corpuscularian movement is not just the rejection of form, but the rejection of matter as dependent on form. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 04.5) | |
A reaction: The point was that matter required form to have any kind of actual existence, but now matter can stand on its own. |
16612 | Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Hylomorphism admits of an alternative formulation, as an explanatory schema at a different level of analysis, not competing with corpuscular-mechanistic theory, but accounting for abstract features of the world - notably unity and endurance of substances. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 06.1) | |
A reaction: Pasnau is clearly sympathetic. As a view of why normal objects have unity and persist over time it is almost the only decent theory around. Hawley, for example, struggles to explain how 'stages' of a thing are linked. Classical mereology is silly. |
16613 | Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Scholastics lost their grip on hylomorphism as a metaphysical theory, conceiving of it as a concrete, physical hypothesis about causal forces. Once form and matter were made subject to empirical research, their days were inevitably numbered. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 06.1) | |
A reaction: Pasnau seems to make a sharp distinction between science, and a separate realm he labels 'metaphysical'. You can't keep causation out of Aristotelian hylomorphism. The defence is that it is at a higher level of generality than science. |
16747 | Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The conception of form as somehow substantial took on new life among scholastic Aristotelians, and was developed in ways that Aristotle himself never suggested. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.1) | |
A reaction: This is music to we modern neo-Aristotelians, because scholasticism was rightly dumped in the 17th C, but we can go back and start again from what The Philosopher actually said. |
16759 | Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The whole scholastic conception of substantial form came to have more and more in common with an Aristotelian efficient cause. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.2) | |
A reaction: Aristotle, of course, identified the form with the 'formal cause [aitia]', which is the shape of the statue, rather than the efficient cause, which is the sculptor. |
16748 | Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Aquinas subscribes to the unitarian doctrine that a single substance has just a single substantial form, but authors like Scotus subscribe to a plurality of substantial forms. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.1) | |
A reaction: The Scotists seem to think that qualities themselve can have forms. I take it that Aristotle would have agreed with Aquinas. |
16671 | Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: On one version of Quantity realism it is what makes a body have parts; on another version, it is what makes the body's parts be spread out in a continuous and unified way. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 14.1) |
16579 | There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The substratum thesis says …perhaps there is a different subject for different kinds of changes, and perhaps what endures through one kind of change will be corrupted by another. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 02.5) |
16596 | A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: A completely bare substratum seems not just incoherent but also unable to carry out the function for which it is intended - to be a substratum. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 03.3) |
16584 | If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: When the substratum thesis is grounded on the idea that the ingredients must endure through the change, if they are to play a causal role, then it is natural to suppose that quite a lot of the ingredients must endure. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 02.5) | |
A reaction: Aristotle sharply distinguishes alteration from substantial change, but as the substrate gets thinner, the boundary between those two would blur. |
16580 | A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The 'conservation thesis' about substrates says that there is a single, most basic substrate that endures through every material change, something we call 'prime matter'. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 02.5) |
13380 | Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien] |
Full Idea: When thought of just as an object, the parts of a thing seem definitive and their arrangement seems inconsequential. But when thought of as an object of a familiar kind it is reversed: the arrangement is important and the parts are inessential. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: This is analogous to the Ship of Theseus, where we say that the tour operator and the museum keeper give different accounts of whether it is the same ship. The 'kind' Jubien refers to is most likely to be a functional kind. |
13376 | We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien] |
Full Idea: I argue against the widely accepted characterization of the doctrine of 'essentialism' as the acceptance of nontrivial de re necessity | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: I agree entirely. The notion of an essence is powerful if clearly distinguished. The test is: can everything being said about essences be just as easily said by referring to necessities? If so, you are talking about the wrong thing. |
16749 | Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: For an Aristotelian not all necessary properties are essential; the essential properties are those that define a thing as what it is. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.1) | |
A reaction: I take it as basic that whatever is essential is in some way important, whereas necessities can be trivial. |
16694 | Typical successive things are time and motion [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The standard scholastic examples of 'entia successiva' are time and motion. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 18.1) | |
A reaction: Aristotle's examples of a day and the Games seem clearer, as time and motion do not count so clearly as 'things'. |
13381 | Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original [Jubien] |
Full Idea: Thinking about the original ship as a ship, we think we continue to have the 'same ship' as each part is replaced; ...but when we think of them as physical objects, we think the original ship and the outcome of the reassembly are one and the same. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: It seems to me that you cannot eliminate how we are thinking of the ship as influencing how we should read it. My suggestion is to think of Theseus himself valuing either the repaired or the reassembled version. That's bad for Jubien's account. |
13382 | Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement [Jubien] |
Full Idea: That the planks are rearranged as a ship elevates the sense of mystery, because arrangements matter for ships, but if they had been arranged differently we would have the same intuition - that it still counts as the same object. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: Implausible. Classic case: can I have my pen back? - smashes it to pieces and hands it over with 'there you are' - that's not my pen! - Jubien says it's the same object! - it isn't my pen, and it isn't the same object either! Where is Shelley's skylark? |
16583 | Weak ex nihilo says it all comes from something; strong version says the old must partly endure [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The weak ex nihilo principle says that everything comes from something, and the strong ex nihilo principle says that in everything new, something of the old must endure | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 02.5) |
13379 | If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same? [Jubien] |
Full Idea: If a bit of matter has a qualitatively indistinguishable object located at a later time, with a path of spacetime connecting them, how could we determine they are identical? Neither identity nor diversity follows from qualitative indiscernibility. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.3) | |
A reaction: All these principles expounded by Leibniz were assumed to be timeless, but for identity over time the whole notion of things retaining identity despite changing has to be rethought. Essentialism to the rescue. |
13394 | Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien] |
Full Idea: Typically philosophers say that for P to entail Q is for the proposition that all P's are Q's to be necessary. I think this analysis is backwards, and that necessity rests on entailment, not vice versa. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 4.4) | |
A reaction: His example is that being a horse and being an animal are such that one entails the other. In other words, necessities arise out of property relations (which for Jubien are necessary because the properties are platonically timeless). Wrong. |
13391 | Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien] |
Full Idea: I think modality has to do with relations involving the abstract part of the world, specifically with relations among (Platonic) properties. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 3.2) | |
A reaction: [Sider calls Jubien's the 'governance' view, since abstract relations govern the concrete] I take Jubien here (having done a beautiful demolition job on the possible worlds account of modality) to go spectacularly wrong. Modality starts in the concrete. |
13374 | To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The ultimate analysis of possibility and necessity depends on two important ontological decisions: the choice of an analysis of the intuitive concept of a physical object, and the other is the positing of properties and relations. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: In the same passage he adopts Quine's view of objects, leading to mereological essentialism, and a Platonic view of properties, based on Lewis's argument for taking some things at face value. One might start with processes and events instead. |
13389 | The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien] |
Full Idea: I believe the contemporary infatuation with possible worlds in philosophy stems in part from a tendency to think that technical logic offers silver-bullet solutions to philosophical problems. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 3.2) | |
A reaction: I would say that the main reason for the infatuation is just novelty. As a technical device it was only invented in the 1960s, so we are in a honeymoon period, as we would be with any new gadget. I can't imagine possible worlds figuring much in 100 years. |
13390 | Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The fundamental problem is that in world theory, what passes for necessity is in effect just a bunch of parallel 'contingencies'. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Jubien's general complaint is that there is no connection between the possible worlds and the actual world, so they are irrelevant, but this is a nicely different point - that lots of contingent worlds can't add up to necessity. Nice. |
16783 | Essences must explain, so we can infer them causally from the accidents [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Without the explanatory role of essence, the underlying epistemic picture would be jeopardised, because there would no longer be any causal route by which we might get from accidents to essence. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 27.5) | |
A reaction: There is a slight whiff of circularity here. It could be that we are psychologically desperate for essences, and so we invent bogus causal routes from the accidents to get at them. Can we know there are essences awaiting us, on independent grounds? |
13396 | Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical [Jubien] |
Full Idea: We have (physicalist) 'inclusionism' when the mental is included in the physical, and mental phenomena are to be found among physical phenomena. Only inclusionism is compatible with a genuine physicalist analysis of mental concepts. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 4.5) | |
A reaction: This isn't the thesis of conceptual dualism (which I like), but an interesting accompaniment for it. Jubien is offering this as an alternative to 'reductive' analysis, translating all the mental concepts into physical language. He extends 'physical'. |
13377 | First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien] |
Full Idea: First-order logic tilts in favor of the direct reference account of proper names by using individual constants to play the intuitive role of names, and by 'interpreting' the constants simply as the individuals that are assigned to them for truth-values. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is the kind of challenge to orthodoxy that is much needed at the moment. We have an orthodoxy which is almost a new 'scholasticism', that logic will clarify our metaphysics. Trying to enhance the logic for the job may be a dead end. |
16609 | Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The atomist view is that causation is limited to collisions among corpuscles (which is 'mechanism'), and the only bodily qualities are those found at the microcorpuscular level; sensible qualities are in fact sensations. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 05.4) | |
A reaction: [Part of a full summary of atomism by Pasnau] |
16603 | In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: In the seventeenth century, matter becomes body, and body becomes the object of natural science. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 04.5) |
16592 | Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Atomism is the most common version of corpuscular prime matter, but it is not the only option. Indeed, atomism neither entails nor is entailed by the combination of corpuscularianism and the substratum thesis. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 03.2) | |
A reaction: The point is that the corpuscles may be endlessly divisible (which Lewis called 'gunk'). |
16750 | If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances? [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: If all there are corpuscles of various shapes and sizes, variously arranged, it is not easy to see how we might draw the boundary lines, at any given moment, between one substance and another. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.2) | |
A reaction: We still have precisely that problem, and it leads to the nihilism about ordinary objects found in Unger, Van Inwagen and Merricks. I have so far found modern defences of ordinary objects unpersuasive. |
16722 | Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: There is a scholastic theory of causation. Of Aristotle's Four Causes, the main one is the 'formal' cause, and that consists of changes in the primary, elemental qualities, which are hot, cold, wet and dry. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 21.2) | |
A reaction: [my summary] It is probably right to call this 'scholastic' rather than 'Aristotelian', as I take Aristotelian essence to run deeper than this, and involve principles as well as qualities. |
16760 | Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Substantial forms might well be viewed as an early step in the development of scientific essentialism. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.4) | |
A reaction: This is the scholastic view of substantial forms, which is much more physical and causal, rather than Aristotle's more abstract view. The rejection of substantial forms led to the 'Humean' view of laws of nature. |
16581 | Scholastic authors agree that matter was created by God, out of nothing [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Authors from 1274 to 1671 unanimously endorse the Christian doctrine that matter was created by God, before which time there was no material world at all. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 02.5) |
16642 | Transubstantion says accidents of bread and wine don't inhere in the substance [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Transubstantiation maintains that the accidents of the bread and wine endure after consecration without inhering in the substance. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 10.3) | |
A reaction: It's a big puzzle to outsiders why softness and nice taste should have theological significance. If it is the body and blood of Christ, presumably a miracle has occurred, so normal theories don't apply. It is the key difficulty for scholastic metaphysics. |