48 ideas
13395 | If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien] |
Full Idea: An analysis of a concept tells us what the concept is by telling us what its constituents are and how they are combined. ..The features of the concept are present in the analysis, making it surprising the 'reductive' analyses are sought. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 4.5) | |
A reaction: He says that there are nevertheless reductive analyses, such as David Lewis's analysis of modality. We must disentangle conceptual analysis from causal analysis (e.g. in his example of the physicalist reduction of mind). |
19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: If truth can be explicitly defined, it can be eliminated. | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.3) | |
A reaction: That we could just say p corresponds to the facts, or p coheres with our accepted beliefs, or p is the aim of our enquiries, and never mention the word 'true'. Definition is a strategy for reduction or elimination. |
19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: If axioms are formulated for a language (such as set theory) that lacks names for all objects, then they require the use of a satisfaction relation rather than a unary truth predicate. | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 3.3) | |
A reaction: I take it this is an important idea for understanding why Tarski developed his account of truth based on satisfaction. |
19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: Semantic approaches to truth usually necessitate the use of a metalanguage that is more powerful than the object-language for which it provides a semantics. It is usually taken to include set theory. | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1) | |
A reaction: This is a motivation for developing an axiomatic account of truth, that moves it into the object language. |
19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: Although the theory is materially adequate, Tarski thought that the T-sentences are deductively too weak. …Also it seems that the T-sentences are not conservative, because they prove in PA that 0=0 and ¬0=0 are different, so at least two objects exist. | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 3.2) | |
A reaction: They are weak because they can't prove completeness. This idea give two reasons for looking for a better theory of truth. |
19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: If a natural theory of truth is added to Peano Arithmetic, it is not necessary to add explicity global reflection principles to assert soundness, as the truth theory proves them. Truth theories thus prove soundess, and allows its expression. | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This seems like a big attraction of axiomatic theories of truth for students of metamathematics. |
19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: If truth does not have any explanatory force, as some deflationists claim, the axioms of truth should not allow us to prove any new theorems that do not involve the truth predicate. That is, a deflationary axiomatisation of truth should be 'conservative'. | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.3) | |
A reaction: So does truth have 'explanatory force'? These guys are interested in explaining theorems of arithmetic, but I'm more interested in real life. People do daft things because they have daft beliefs. Logic should be neutral, but truth has values? |
19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: It is a virtue of the Friedman-Sheard axiomatisation that it is thoroughly classical in its logic. Its drawback is that it is ω-inconsistent. That is, it proves &exists;x¬φ(x), but proves also φ(0), φ(1), φ(2), … | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 4.3) | |
A reaction: It seems the theory is complete (and presumably sound), yet not fully consistent. FS also proves the finite levels of Tarski's hierarchy, but not the transfinite levels. |
19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes a non-classical notion of truth. It allow truth-value gluts, making some sentences (such as the Liar) both true and not-true. Some authors add an axiom ruling out such gluts. | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 4.4) | |
A reaction: [summary, which I hope is correct! Stanford is not wholly clear] |
13378 | It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien] |
Full Idea: It has often been uncritically assumed that logic that was initially a tool for clarifying mathematics could be seamlessly and uniformly applied in the effort to clarify ordinary language and philosophy, but this has been a real mistake. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm not saying he's right (since you need stupendous expertise to make that call) but my intuitions are that he has a good point, and he is at least addressing a crucial question which most analytical philosophers avert their eyes from. |
13402 | We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien] |
Full Idea: We cannot be said to have a full grasp of a name unless we have a definite disposition to apply it or to withhold it under whatever conceivable changes the bearer of the name might come to undergo. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.3) | |
A reaction: This is right, and an excellent counterproposal to the logicians' notion that names have to rigidly designate. As a bare minimum, you are not supposed to deny the identity of your parents because they have grown a bit older, or a damaged painting. |
13405 | The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The person who introduces a proper name gets to pick its bearer, but its category - and consequently the meaning of the name - is determined by social use. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 7) | |
A reaction: New 'division of labour'. The idea that a name has some sort of meaning seems right and important. If babies were switched after baptism, social use might fix the name to the new baby. The namer could stipulate the category at the baptism. Too neat. |
13399 | Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien] |
Full Idea: There are plenty of examples to show that ordinary proper names simply are not rigid designators. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.1) | |
A reaction: His examples are the planet Venus and the dust of which it is formed, and a statue made of clay. In other words, for some objects, perhaps under certain descriptions (e.g. functional ones), the baptised matter can change. Rigidity is an extra topping. |
13398 | We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien] |
Full Idea: 'The winner of the Derby' satisfies some horse, but only accidentally. But we could 'rigidify' the description by inserting 'actual' into it, giving 'the actual winner of the Derby'. Winning is a contingent property, but actually winning is necessary. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.1) | |
A reaction: I like this unusual proposal because instead of switching into formal logic in order to capture the ideas we are after, he is drawing on the resources of ordinary language, offering philosophers a way of speaking plain English more precisely. |
13392 | Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien] |
Full Idea: There is a readiness of philosophers to 'translate' English, with its seeming multitude of kind-driven quantifiers, into first-order logic, with its single wide-open quantifier. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 4.1) | |
A reaction: As in example he says that reference to a statue involves a 'statue-quantifier'. Thus we say things about the statue that we would not say about the clay, which would involve a 'clay-quantifier'. |
13404 | To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated [Jubien] |
Full Idea: For a thing to exist necessarily is for it to have an entity-essence whose own entity-essence entails being instantiated. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 6.4) | |
A reaction: This is the culmination of a lengthy discussion, and is not immediately persuasive. For Jubien the analysis rests on a platonist view of properties, which doesn't help. |
13386 | If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien] |
Full Idea: Under the Quinean (conventional) view of objects, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This is the bold nihilistic account of physical objects, which seems to push all of our ontology into language (English?). We could devise divisions into things that were just crazy, and likely to lead to the rapid extinction of creatures who did it. |
13403 | The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The category of Venus is not 'physical object' or 'mereological sum', but narrower. Surprisingly, it is not 'planet', since it might cease to be a planet and still merit the name 'Venus'. It is something like 'well-integrated, good-sized physical object'. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Jubien is illustrating Idea 13402. This is a nice demonstration of how one might go about the task of constructing categories - by showing the modal profiles of things to which names have been assigned. Categories are file names. |
19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: One might say that 'x is a poor philosopher' is true of Tom instead of saying that Tom has the property of being a poor philosopher. We quantify over formulas instead of over definable properties, and thus reduce properties to truth. | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This stuff is difficult (because the axioms are complex and hard to compare), but I am excited (yes!) about this idea. Their point is that you need a truth predicate within the object language for this, which disquotational truth forbids. |
19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh] |
Full Idea: The reduction of second-order theories (of properties or sets) to axiomatic theories of truth is a form of reductive nominalism, replacing existence assumptions (e.g. comprehension axioms) by innocuous assumptions about the truth predicate. | |
From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I'm currently thinking that axiomatic theories of truth are the most exciting development in contemporary philosophy. See Halbach and Horsten. |
13375 | The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The pervasiveness, throughout philosophy, of the assumption that entities of various kinds need identity conditions is one unfortunate aspect of Quine's important philosophical legacy. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: Lowe seems to be an example of a philosopher who habitually demands individuation conditions for everything that is referred to. Presumably the alternative is to take lots of things as primitive, but this seems to be second best. |
13393 | Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity [Jubien] |
Full Idea: For any entity of any sort, abstract or concrete, I assume there is a property of being that specific entity. For want of a better term, I will call such properties entity-essences. They are 'singulary' - not instantiable by more than one thing at a time. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 4.2) | |
A reaction: Baffling. Why would someone who has mocked all sorts of bogus philosophical claims based on logic then go on to assert the existence of such weird things as these? I can't make sense of this property being added to a thing's other properties. |
13388 | It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien] |
Full Idea: It is simply far-fetched - even incoherent - to think that, given an entity, of whatever kind, its being a single entity somehow consists in its satisfying some condition involving the kind to which it belongs (or concepts related to that kind). | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 2.3) | |
A reaction: Well said. I can't see how philosophers have allowed themselves to drift into such a daft view. Kinds blatantly depend on the individuals that constitute them, so how could the identity of the individuals depend on their kind? |
13384 | Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility [Jubien] |
Full Idea: We need a first convention to determine what matter constitutes objects, then a second to determine whether there are different temporal possibilities for a given object, then a third for different spatial possibilities. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This is building up a Quinean account of objects, as mere matter in regions of spacetime, which are then precisely determined by a set of social conventions. |
13385 | Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like [Jubien] |
Full Idea: There is a certain - very mild - sense in which I don't think the physical world comes with ready-made objects. I think instead that we (conventionally) carve it up into objects, and this can be done any way we like. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.5) | |
A reaction: I have no idea how one could begin to refute such a view. Obviously there are divisions (even if only of physical density) in the world, but nothing obliges us to make divisions at those points. We happily accept objects with gaps in them. |
13383 | If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay [Jubien] |
Full Idea: If a sculptor says 'I love the statue but I really hate that piece of clay - it is way too hard to work with' ...the statement is partly is partly about that object qua statue and partly about that object qua piece of clay. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: His point is that identity is partly determined by the concept or category under which the thing falls. Plausible. Lots of identity muddles seem to come from our conceptual scheme not being quite up to the job when things change. |
13400 | If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways [Jubien] |
Full Idea: A single entity is a physical object, a piece of clay and a statue. We seem to have that the object could be scattered, but not the other two; the object and the clay could be spherical, but not the statue; and only the object could have different matter. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.2) | |
A reaction: His proposal, roughly, is to reduce object-talk to property-talk, and then see the three views of this object as referring to different sets of properties, rather than to a single thing. Promising, except that he goes platonist about properties. |
13401 | The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien] |
Full Idea: I find it surprising that some philosophers accept 'coincident objects'. This notion clearly offends against commonsense 'naturalism' about the world, so it should be viewed as a last resort. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.2 n9) | |
A reaction: I'm not quite clear why he invokes 'naturalism', but I pass on his intuition because it seems right to me. |
13380 | Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien] |
Full Idea: When thought of just as an object, the parts of a thing seem definitive and their arrangement seems inconsequential. But when thought of as an object of a familiar kind it is reversed: the arrangement is important and the parts are inessential. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: This is analogous to the Ship of Theseus, where we say that the tour operator and the museum keeper give different accounts of whether it is the same ship. The 'kind' Jubien refers to is most likely to be a functional kind. |
13376 | We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien] |
Full Idea: I argue against the widely accepted characterization of the doctrine of 'essentialism' as the acceptance of nontrivial de re necessity | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: I agree entirely. The notion of an essence is powerful if clearly distinguished. The test is: can everything being said about essences be just as easily said by referring to necessities? If so, you are talking about the wrong thing. |
13381 | Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original [Jubien] |
Full Idea: Thinking about the original ship as a ship, we think we continue to have the 'same ship' as each part is replaced; ...but when we think of them as physical objects, we think the original ship and the outcome of the reassembly are one and the same. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: It seems to me that you cannot eliminate how we are thinking of the ship as influencing how we should read it. My suggestion is to think of Theseus himself valuing either the repaired or the reassembled version. That's bad for Jubien's account. |
13382 | Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement [Jubien] |
Full Idea: That the planks are rearranged as a ship elevates the sense of mystery, because arrangements matter for ships, but if they had been arranged differently we would have the same intuition - that it still counts as the same object. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: Implausible. Classic case: can I have my pen back? - smashes it to pieces and hands it over with 'there you are' - that's not my pen! - Jubien says it's the same object! - it isn't my pen, and it isn't the same object either! Where is Shelley's skylark? |
13379 | If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same? [Jubien] |
Full Idea: If a bit of matter has a qualitatively indistinguishable object located at a later time, with a path of spacetime connecting them, how could we determine they are identical? Neither identity nor diversity follows from qualitative indiscernibility. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.3) | |
A reaction: All these principles expounded by Leibniz were assumed to be timeless, but for identity over time the whole notion of things retaining identity despite changing has to be rethought. Essentialism to the rescue. |
13394 | Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien] |
Full Idea: Typically philosophers say that for P to entail Q is for the proposition that all P's are Q's to be necessary. I think this analysis is backwards, and that necessity rests on entailment, not vice versa. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 4.4) | |
A reaction: His example is that being a horse and being an animal are such that one entails the other. In other words, necessities arise out of property relations (which for Jubien are necessary because the properties are platonically timeless). Wrong. |
13391 | Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien] |
Full Idea: I think modality has to do with relations involving the abstract part of the world, specifically with relations among (Platonic) properties. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 3.2) | |
A reaction: [Sider calls Jubien's the 'governance' view, since abstract relations govern the concrete] I take Jubien here (having done a beautiful demolition job on the possible worlds account of modality) to go spectacularly wrong. Modality starts in the concrete. |
13374 | To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The ultimate analysis of possibility and necessity depends on two important ontological decisions: the choice of an analysis of the intuitive concept of a physical object, and the other is the positing of properties and relations. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: In the same passage he adopts Quine's view of objects, leading to mereological essentialism, and a Platonic view of properties, based on Lewis's argument for taking some things at face value. One might start with processes and events instead. |
13389 | The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien] |
Full Idea: I believe the contemporary infatuation with possible worlds in philosophy stems in part from a tendency to think that technical logic offers silver-bullet solutions to philosophical problems. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 3.2) | |
A reaction: I would say that the main reason for the infatuation is just novelty. As a technical device it was only invented in the 1960s, so we are in a honeymoon period, as we would be with any new gadget. I can't imagine possible worlds figuring much in 100 years. |
13390 | Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The fundamental problem is that in world theory, what passes for necessity is in effect just a bunch of parallel 'contingencies'. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Jubien's general complaint is that there is no connection between the possible worlds and the actual world, so they are irrelevant, but this is a nicely different point - that lots of contingent worlds can't add up to necessity. Nice. |
7630 | Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund] |
Full Idea: There is a convincing claim that we need to leave behind Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that as being too simplistic. | |
From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: [John Campbell is mentioned as source of this idea] I find this proposal immediately appealing. I was taught that riding a bicycle shows the division, as hardly anyone knows the theory, but I am sure children need some propositional information. |
7632 | Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund] |
Full Idea: Three forms of (cognitive) direct realism are: two stages - non-conceptual sensory experience, then a non-sensory conceptual state; directly acquiring non-sensuous conceptual states; and sensuous states saturated with concepts. | |
From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch. 3) | |
A reaction: [First: Reid, Dretske, Evans, Sellars. Second: Armstrong, Heil, Pitcher, Clark. Third: Kant, McDowell, Strawson, McGinn, Searle]. I find the first one plausible, because of the ambiguity in language, and because unusual experiences separate them. |
7635 | Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund] |
Full Idea: Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (to serve as foundations on which the edifice of knowledge is to be constructed), and a metaphysical purpose (to provide an accurate account of the phenomenology of perceptual experience). | |
From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch. 6) | |
A reaction: This is very important, because there is a real danger (e.g. in Russell) that the epistemological convenience of sense-data for giving reliability in knowledge means that we are too quick in making the assumption that they actually exist. |
7638 | One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund] |
Full Idea: The representationalist/intentionalist thesis about perception is that we are not aware of the intrinsic qualities of experience in normal perception; we are instead aware of those objects and their qualities that are specified in the content. | |
From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: If secondary qualities are in the mind, not in objects, how come people always thought they were in objects? Answer: because this thesis is right? The primary mode of the mind is projected outwards, though we can introspect about colours. [Dretske] |
7642 | The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund] |
Full Idea: The so-called 'myth of the given' is the view that conceptual content can be rationally supported by experiences construed as states with non-conceptual content. | |
From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: The myth is attacked by Sellars and McDowell, the latter claiming that concepts must be embedded in the experiences. Maybe only realism is required to make the Given work. The experiences are definitely of something, and off we go... |
7640 | Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund] |
Full Idea: Metaphysically, mountains are only adverbial modifications of the Earth's belt. They have no existence independent of being part of the earth. Yet for all that, they have some rather strong 'object'-characteristics. | |
From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: The point being that you don't give up all the advantages of a sense-data view if you switch to adverbialism. I'm not convinced by the analogy, but we can only be aware of adverbial qualities if they have causal powers. |
7641 | Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund] |
Full Idea: The two primary motivations of the adverbialist analysis are thought to be to avoid commitment to sensory particulars such as sense-data, and to allow us to hold on to a version of direct realism. | |
From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: Maund says that the adverbialist's fears about indirect/representative theories are unfounded. My feeling is that neither account will do the job properly once we get a better account of consciousness. Maybe adverbialism is only for secondary qualities. |
13396 | Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical [Jubien] |
Full Idea: We have (physicalist) 'inclusionism' when the mental is included in the physical, and mental phenomena are to be found among physical phenomena. Only inclusionism is compatible with a genuine physicalist analysis of mental concepts. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 4.5) | |
A reaction: This isn't the thesis of conceptual dualism (which I like), but an interesting accompaniment for it. Jubien is offering this as an alternative to 'reductive' analysis, translating all the mental concepts into physical language. He extends 'physical'. |
7637 | Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG] |
Full Idea: The content of thought can either be expressed as satisfaction conditions (e.g. truth-conditions for beliefs), or as the exercise of at least two concepts. | |
From: report of Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch. 8) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: I think I favour the first view, because not all conjunctions of concepts would count as thoughts (e.g. rhubarb-plus-contradiction). A bunch of concepts becomes a thought when it connects in some way to reality? |
13377 | First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien] |
Full Idea: First-order logic tilts in favor of the direct reference account of proper names by using individual constants to play the intuitive role of names, and by 'interpreting' the constants simply as the individuals that are assigned to them for truth-values. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is the kind of challenge to orthodoxy that is much needed at the moment. We have an orthodoxy which is almost a new 'scholasticism', that logic will clarify our metaphysics. Trying to enhance the logic for the job may be a dead end. |