Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Analyzing Modality', 'The Mental Life of Some Machines' and 'Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


46 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
All the major problems were formulated before Socrates [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: All the major problems were formulated before Socrates.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[064])
     A reaction: So much for it all being 'footnotes to Plato'! Nietzsche's lectures on the pre-Socratics are in print. Given how little survives, this idea is surprising. Nietzsche knew enough to infer a lot of what is lost.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
What matters is how humans can be developed [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: What can be made out of humans: this is what matters to superior human beings.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[435])
     A reaction: That seems to sum up the main aim of Nietzsche's philosophy. What would we then do if the aim was somehow achieved? Does he seriously think that one magnificent ubermensch could achieve this aim?
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Thinkers might agree some provisional truths, as methodological assumptions [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: It is sufficient if we [thinkers] come to agree about a totality of methodological presuppositions - about 'provisional truths' that we want to use as a guideline for our work.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[449])
     A reaction: Descartes attempted this. Maybe Frege is another attempt. Husserl, perhaps? Parmenides? Hume? Lewis? It is hard to imagine Nietzsche joining in a professional consensus! He has just rejected systems.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Aristotle enjoyed the sham generalities of a system, as the peak of happiness! [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Aristotle probably had his best moments when he coldly and clearly (and joyfully) enjoyed the sensual sham of the highest generalities. To perceive the world as a system, and as the pinnacle of human happiness: how the schematic mind betrays itself then!
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[017])
     A reaction: Painful, this. One of my heroes laughing at the other one. I love systems, and love John Richardson's suggestion that Nietzsche was very systematice, despite his protestations.
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
Thoughts are uncertain, and are just occasions for interpretation [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: A thought is not taken to be immediately certain, but rather a sign, a question mark. That each thought is initially ambiguous and fluctuating, and is in itself only an occasion for multiple interpretations …is experienced by every deep observer.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[092])
     A reaction: This idea makes me a little more sympathetic to the hermeneutic view of philosophy, as endless interpretations. I assumed it only referred to texts. A thought is not a done deal, but an occasion for further thought. He says the same of feelings.
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Mathematics is just accurate inferences from definitions, and doesn't involve objects [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Mathematics contains axioms (definitions) and conclusions from definitions. Its objects do not exist. The truth of its conclusions rests on the accuracy of logical thought.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[307])
     A reaction: Not suprising to find Nietzsche defying platonism. This is evidence that he was a systematic philosopher, who knew mathematics could be a challenge to his naturalism.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
     Full Idea: Two ways to see 'all horses are animals' are as picking out all the horses (so that it is a 'horse-quantifier'), ..or as ranging over lots of things in addition to horses, with 'horses' then restricting the things to those that satisfy 'is a horse'.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 2)
     A reaction: Jubien says this gives you two different metaphysical views, of a world of horses etc., or a world of things which 'are horses'. I vote for the first one, as the second seems to invoke an implausible categorical property ('being a horse'). Cf Idea 11116.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
There is no 'being'; it is just the opposition to nothingness [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: 'Being' is unprovable, because there is no 'being'. The concept of being is formed out of the opposition to 'nothingness'.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[185])
     A reaction: Presumably a comment on Hegel's most basic idea. I find both thoughts bewildering. 'Being' is just a generalised (and unhelpful) way of referring to the self-evident existence of stuff.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
I only want thinking that is anchored in body, senses and earth [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: I am not interested …in ways of thinking that are not anchored in the body and the senses and in the earth.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[352])
     A reaction: Exhibit A for Nietzsche as Naturalist. Indeed, this could be a manifesto for the whole school. I totally and completely and utterly agree with Nietzsche's assertion!. I see the 'anchor' as two-way: thought connects to earth, and thought arises from it.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
     Full Idea: Being a physical object (as opposed to being a horse or a statue) really is our most fundamental category for dealing with the external world.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 2)
     A reaction: This raises the interesting question of why any categories should be considered to be more 'fundamental' than others. I can only think that we perceive something to be an object fractionally before we (usually) manage to identify it.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
     Full Idea: Properties of 'being such and such specific entity' are often called 'haecceities', but this term carries the connotation of non-qualitativeness which I don't favour.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 2)
     A reaction: The way he defines it makes it sound as if it was a category, but I take it to be more like a bare individual essence. If it has not qualities then it has no causal powers, so there could be no evidence for its existence.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
     Full Idea: I suggest that the de re is to be analyzed in terms of the de dicto. ...We have a case of modality de re when (and only when) the appropriate property in the de dicto formulation is an object-essence.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 5)
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
     Full Idea: Where modal propositions may once have seemed to transcend the actual, they now seem only to transcend the concrete.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 4)
     A reaction: This is because Jubien has defended a form of platonism. Personally I take modal propositions to be perceptible in the concrete world, by recognising the processes involved, not the mere static stuff.
Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
     Full Idea: The possibility of your having been a playwright has nothing to do with how people are on other planets, whether in our own or in some other realm. It is only to do with you and the relevant property.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
     A reaction: I'm inclined to think that this simple point is conclusive disproof of possible worlds as an explanation of modality (apart from Jubien's other nice points). What we need to understand are modal properties, not other worlds.
Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
     Full Idea: Typical modal truths are just facts about our world, and generally facts about very small parts of it, not facts about some infinitude of complex, maximal entities.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
     A reaction: I think we should embrace this simple fact immediately, and drop all this nonsense about possible worlds, even if they are useful for the semantics of modal logic.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
     Full Idea: Any other realms that happened to exist would just be scattered parts of the actual world, not entire worlds at all. It would just happen that physical reality was fragmented in this remarkable but modally inconsequential way.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
     A reaction: This is aimed explicitly at Lewis's modal realism, and strikes me as correct. Jubien's key point here is that they are irrelevant to modality, just as foreign countries are irrelevant to the modality of this one.
If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
     Full Idea: If all of the possible worlds happened to include stars, how plausible is it to think that if this is how things really are, then we've just been wrong to regard the existence of stars as contingent?
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
     Full Idea: In the world theory, what passes for 'necessity' is just a bunch of parallel 'contingencies'. The theory provides no basis for understanding why these contingencies repeat unremittingly across the board (while others do not).
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
     Full Idea: The suspicion is that the necessity doesn't arise from how worlds are, but rather that the worlds are taken to be as they are in order to capture the intuitive necessity.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
     A reaction: It has always seemed to me rather glaring that you need a prior notion of 'possible' before you can start to talk about 'possible worlds', but I have always been too timid to disagree with the combination of Saul Kripke and David Lewis. Thank you, Jubien!
We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
     Full Idea: As soon as we start talking about 'possible world', we beg the question of their relevance to our prior notion of possibility. For all we know, there are just two such realms, or twenty-seven, or uncountably many, or even set-many.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
     Full Idea: Suppose there happen to be no other concrete realms. Would we happily accept the consequence that we exist necessarily?
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
     Full Idea: If someone similar to Humphrey won the election, that nicely establishes the possibility of someone's winning who is similar to Humphrey. But we mustn't confuse this possibility with the intuitively different possibility of Humphrey himself winning.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: We have only one form of understanding - concept, the more general case that subsumes the particular case.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[156])
     A reaction: This is precisely Aristotle's problem with scientific explanation - that we aim to understand each particular, but accounts and definitions have to be expressed with universals.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: What we believe the most, everything a priori, is not for that reason more certain, just because it is so strongly believed. Rather, it is perhaps a consequence of the condition for the existence of our species.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[307])
     A reaction: This is in defiance of Leibniz and Kant. His proposed explanation is not very convincing. Russell agreed with Nietzsche.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Belief is already present in every sense impression going back to the very moment it begins: a kind of Yes-saying first intellectual activity!
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[168])
     A reaction: He seems right that there is an intrinsic commitment to believing sense impressions, even in animals. Presumably more of a default setting than an intellectual choice.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
We now have innumerable perspectives to draw on [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: We have been granted perspectives in all directions, broader than any humans have ever been granted, everywhere we look there is no end in sight.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[013])
     A reaction: Clearly perspectivism is not the simple relativism of being trapped in our own private perspective. What strikes me as missing from Nietzsche's brief thoughts is the question of consensus, and even rational and objective consensus.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Mind is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification, aimed at control [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The entire cognitive mechanism is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification - not aimed at knowing, but taking control of things.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[061])
     A reaction: It is my view that we can explain our metaphysics in this way, though I am more realist than Nietzsche, because I think the world has created these capacities within us, so they fit the world. To control, you must know.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
A cognitive mechanism wanting to know itself is absurd! [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: A cognitive mechanism that wants to know itself!! We definitely should have moved beyond this absurd goal! (The stomach that consumes itself! -)
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[018])
     A reaction: We see his point, but Nietzsche learns a huge amount about himself by introspection. To know the Self is a cat chasing its tail. I don't have to leave England to study England.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
A 'person' is just one possible abstraction from a bundle of qualities [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Individuals contain many more persons than they think. 'Person' is merely a point of emphasis, synopsis of characteristics and qualities
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[363])
     A reaction: He makes similar remarks abour character. For Locke 'person'' is a forensic and legal concept, and so must be enduring and unique.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
I have perfected fatalism, as recurrence and denial of the will [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: I have perfected fatalism, through eternal recurrence and preexistence, and through the elimination of the concept 'will'.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[214])
     A reaction: 'Amor fati' - love of fate - was his oft repeated slogan. We can all understand 'go with the flow', but I'm not sure about anything more universal than that.
Fate is inspiring, if you understand you are part of it [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Fate is an inspiring thought for those who understand that they are part of it.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[442])
     A reaction: Sounds a bit like the Niagara Falls being inspiring if you are being swept over it. I find the possibility of fatalism neutral, rather than inspiring.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan]
     Full Idea: In machine functionalism, pain tokens (individual instances of pain) are identical with particular neurophysiological states, but pain itself, the kind, universal, or 'type', can be identified only with something more abstract.
     From: report of Hilary Putnam (The Mental Life of Some Machines [1967]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.6
     A reaction: This is where the "what is it like?" question seems important. Pain doesn't seem like a physical object, or an abstract idea. Personally I think the former is more likely to be correct than the latter. Causation by pain is not like causation by gravity.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
We start with images, then words, and then concepts, to which emotions attach [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Images first, the words applied to images. Finally concepts, not possible until there are words a summary of many images. When see similar images for which there is one word - this weak emotion is the common element, the foundation of the concept.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[168])
     A reaction: Unusual to have an account of the origin of concepts in 1884. His theory entails that animals can't have concepts, but presumably they can combine images, and hence recognise things. I think he is wrong, but interestng. Mental files.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Judging actions by intentions - like judging painters by their thoughts! [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: To judge people by intentions! That would be like classifying artists, not according to their paintings, but according to their visions!
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[119])
     A reaction: What is wrong is to judge an action by any simple single principle. Our nuanced attitude to excuses shows the true complexity of it. 'I didn't mean to do that'.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Values need a perspective, of preserving some aspect of life [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: All value judgements involve a particular perspective: preservation of the individual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a belief, a culture.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[119])
     A reaction: This chimes in with my Aristotelian view of value, as arising out of the thing valued, rather than descending on it from outside. I think more than mere 'preservaation' is at stake. Fostering, cherishing.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
If you love something, it is connected with everything, so all must be affirmed as good [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: To appreciate and love anything, I must understand it as absolutely necessarily connected with everything that is - therefore I must affirm the goodness of all existence for its own sake.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 26[117])
     A reaction: For those of you out there imagining that Nietzsche was a nihilist…… It's a plausible idea. You could hardly love your dog, but hate the whole universe. A true misanthrope would struggle to love one exceptional person.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Egoism should not assume that all egos are equal [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Egoism! But no one has ever asked: what kind of ego! Instead, every person automatically assumes that the ego of every ego is equal.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[287])
     A reaction: The implication, I presume, is that you should be egoistic if you have a really excellent ego, but very altruistic if you are a loser. Or a slave. Or a monk.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
After Socrates virtue is misunderstood, as good for all, not for individuals [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: From Socrates onwards arete [virtue] is misunderstood - first it had to reestablish itself over and over, and yet it did not want to do this on an individual basis! But rather tyrannically 'good for all!'.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[208])
     A reaction: Why not both? The virtues of a good citizen can't be private, but we are all allowed to develop virtues that concern us alone.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We contain multitudes of characters, which can brought into the open [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: There is a multitude of characters hidden within each one of us: and attempts should be made to allow some of them to appear.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[021])
     A reaction: So character is not fate, contrary to Heraclitus (his hero). We are more inclined now to see varied characters as social roles (as in Irving Goffman). This idea challenges it, with our intrinsic nature containing variety.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Who can endure the thought of eternal recurrence? [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: I conduct the great test: who will endure the thought of eternal recurrence?
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[290])
     A reaction: He sometimes talks as if eternal recurrence were a cosmic fact, but we should definitely ignore that. This idea captures his idea best, I think - that we should try to live with the prospect of recurrence always in mind. A type of existentialism.
If you want one experience repeated, you must want all of them [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Whoever wants to have a single experience again must want all of them again.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 29[054])
     A reaction: Nehemas says this is the main factual commitment of eternal recurrence (and certainly not that global recurrence actually occurs). It might be expressed in terms of possible worlds. We yearn for recurrence, then dread it?
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Humans are determined by community, so its preservation is their most valued drive [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: If a community is what absolutely determines the nature of humans, then the drive that allows the community to be preserved will be most forcefully developed in them.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 27[030])
     A reaction: Nietzsche was a loner, who despised 'the herd' and its dull 'good and evil', but humans are obviously social creatures, who need to raise families, so it seems perverse to despise the values this requires. Note the Marxist view of human nature.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
There is always slavery, whether we like it or not [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: In truth there is always slavery - whether you want it or not; e.g. Prussian officials. Scholars. Monks.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[225])
     A reaction: Not very persuasive examples. Monks are free to join and to leave. Maybe a lot of marriages are close to slavery for one side (usually the woman). Strict slavery has almost ceased in western civilisation (I think!). Nietzsche saw 'the herd' as slaves.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
After history following God, or a people, or an idea, we now see it in terms of animals [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Earlier we sought God's intentions in history: then an unconscious purposefulness, in a people or an idea. Only recently are we considering the history of animals, and the first insight is that no plan has so far existed. Coincidences have been dominant.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[127])
     A reaction: Not a Whig historian then! Presumably Hegel is his main target. In 2024 there is a definite feeling that western democracies are regressing.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Cause and effect is a hypothesis, based on our supposed willing of actions [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Cause and effect is not a truth but rather a hypothesis - and indeed the one which we use to anthropomorphise the world for ourselves, bringing it in closer proximity to our feelings ('willing' is projected into it).
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[371])
     A reaction: That is (I think), we read the gap between thought and action onto natural external events, dividing them up. We treat the flow of events as if they were agent causation. Modern theories seem close to Nietzsche's unified view.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Having a sense of time presupposes absolute time [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Our derivation of the sense of time etc. still presupposes time as absolute.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85 [1884], 25[406])
     A reaction: 'Etc.'? I suppose this is meant to pre-empt whatever Bergson might have been planning to say. The idea that time actually is subjective strikes as very wrong. Whether physicists can reduce time to something else is above my pay scale.