85 ideas
21955 | My dogmatic slumber was first interrupted by David Hume [Kant] |
Full Idea: I freely admit that remembrance of David Hume was the very thing that many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 4:260), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 5.2 | |
A reaction: A famous declaration. He realised that he had the answer the many scepticisms of Hume, and accept his emphasis on the need for experience. |
16931 | Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic [Kant] |
Full Idea: The generation of knowledge a priori, both according to intuition and according to concepts, and finally the generation of synthetic propositions a priori in philosophical knowledge, constitutes the essential content of metaphysics. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 274) | |
A reaction: By 'concepts' he implies mere analytic thought, so 'intuition' is where the exciting bit is, and that is rather vague. |
9738 | Each line of a truth table is a model [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Each line of a truth table is, in effect, a model. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6) | |
A reaction: I find this comment illuminating. It is being connected with the more complex models of modal logic. Each line of a truth table is a picture of how the world might be. |
9727 | Modal logic adds □ (necessarily) and ◊ (possibly) to classical logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: For modal logic we add to the syntax of classical logic two new unary operators □ (necessarily) and ◊ (possibly). | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.3) |
9726 | We let 'R' be the accessibility relation: xRy is read 'y is accessible from x' [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: We let 'R' be the accessibility relation: xRy is read 'y is accessible from x'. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.5) |
9737 | The symbol ||- is the 'forcing' relation; 'Γ ||- P' means that P is true in world Γ [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The symbol ||- is used for the 'forcing' relation, as in 'Γ ||- P', which means that P is true in world Γ. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6) |
13136 | The prefix σ names a possible world, and σ.n names a world accessible from that one [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: A 'prefix' is a finite sequence of positive integers. A 'prefixed formula' is an expression of the form σ X, where σ is a prefix and X is a formula. A prefix names a possible world, and σ.n names a world accessible from that one. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) |
9734 | Modern modal logic introduces 'accessibility', saying xRy means 'y is accessible from x' [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Modern modal logic takes into consideration the way the modal relates the possible worlds, called the 'accessibility' relation. .. We let R be the accessibility relation, and xRy reads as 'y is accessible from x. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.5) | |
A reaction: There are various types of accessibility, and these define the various modal logics. |
9736 | A 'model' is a frame plus specification of propositions true at worlds, written < G,R,||- > [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea:
A 'model' is a frame plus a specification of which propositional letters are true at which worlds. It is written as |
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From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6) |
13727 | A 'constant' domain is the same for all worlds; 'varying' domains can be entirely separate [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: In 'constant domain' semantics, the domain of each possible world is the same as every other; in 'varying domain' semantics, the domains need not coincide, or even overlap. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 4.5) |
9735 | A 'frame' is a set G of possible worlds, with an accessibility relation R, written < G,R > [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea:
A 'frame' consists of a non-empty set G, whose members are generally called possible worlds, and a binary relation R, on G, generally called the accessibility relation. We say the frame is the pair |
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From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6) |
9741 | Accessibility relations can be 'reflexive' (self-referring), 'transitive' (carries over), or 'symmetric' (mutual) [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: A relation R is 'reflexive' if every world is accessible from itself; 'transitive' if the first world is related to the third world (ΓRΔ and ΔRΩ → ΓRΩ); and 'symmetric' if the accessibility relation is mutual. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.7) | |
A reaction: The different systems of modal logic largely depend on how these accessibility relations are specified. There is also the 'serial' relation, which just says that any world has another world accessible to it. |
9740 | If a proposition is possibly true in a world, it is true in some world accessible from that world [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: If a proposition is possibly true in a world, then it is also true in some world which is accessible from that world. That is: Γ ||- ◊X ↔ for some Δ ∈ G, ΓRΔ then Δ ||- X. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6) |
9739 | If a proposition is necessarily true in a world, it is true in all worlds accessible from that world [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: If a proposition is necessarily true in a world, then it is also true in all worlds which are accessible from that world. That is: Γ ||- □X ↔ for every Δ ∈ G, if ΓRΔ then Δ ||- X. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6) |
13142 | Existential: a) if σ ◊X then σ.n X b) if σ ¬□X then σ.n ¬X [n is new] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: General tableau rules for existential modality: a) if σ ◊ X then σ.n X b) if σ ¬□ X then σ.n ¬X , where n introduces some new world (rather than referring to a world that can be seen). | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Note that the existential rule of ◊, usually read as 'possibly', asserts something about a new as yet unseen world, whereas □ only refers to worlds which can already be seen, |
13141 | Negation: if σ ¬¬X then σ X [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: General tableau rule for negation: if σ ¬¬X then σ X | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) |
13139 | Implic: a) if σ ¬(X→Y) then σ X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X→Y then σ ¬X or σ Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: General tableau rules for implications: a) if σ ¬(X → Y) then σ X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X → Y then σ ¬X or σ Y | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) |
13143 | Universal: a) if σ ¬◊X then σ.m ¬X b) if σ □X then σ.m X [m exists] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: General tableau rules for universal modality: a) if σ ¬◊ X then σ.m ¬X b) if σ □ X then σ.m X , where m refers to a world that can be seen (rather than introducing a new world). | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) | |
A reaction: Note that the universal rule of □, usually read as 'necessary', only refers to worlds which can already be seen, whereas possibility (◊) asserts some thing about a new as yet unseen world. |
13138 | Disj: a) if σ ¬(X∨Y) then σ ¬X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X∨Y then σ X or σ Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: General tableau rules for disjunctions: a) if σ ¬(X ∨ Y) then σ ¬X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X ∨ Y then σ X or σ Y | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) |
13148 | 4r rev-trans: a) if σ.n □X then σ □X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬◊X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: System 4r reversed-transitive rules (also for S5): a) if σ.n □X then σ □X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬◊X [where n is a world which already occurs] | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3) |
13147 | 4 transitive: a) if σ □X then σ.n □X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ.n ¬◊X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: System 4 transitive rules (also for K4, S4, S5): a) if σ □X then σ.n □X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ.n ¬◊X [where n is a world which already occurs] | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3) |
13146 | B symmetric: a) if σ.n □X then σ X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: System B symmetric rules (also for S5): a) if σ.n □X then σ X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬X [where n is a world which already occurs] | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3) |
13145 | D serial: a) if σ □X then σ ◊X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬□X [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: System D serial rules (also for T, B, S4, S5): a) if σ □X then σ ◊X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬□X | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3) |
13144 | T reflexive: a) if σ □X then σ X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬X [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: System T reflexive rules (also for B, S4, S5): a) if σ □X then σ X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬X | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3) |
13149 | S5: a) if n ◊X then kX b) if n ¬□X then k ¬X c) if n □X then k X d) if n ¬◊X then k ¬X [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Simplified S5 rules: a) if n ◊X then kX b) if n ¬□X then k ¬X c) if n □X then k X d) if n ¬◊X then k ¬X. 'n' picks any world; in a) and b) 'k' asserts a new world; in c) and d) 'k' refers to a known world | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3) |
13140 | Bicon: a)if σ(X↔Y) then σ(X→Y) and σ(Y→X) b) [not biconditional, one or other fails] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: General tableau rules for biconditionals: a) if σ (X ↔ Y) then σ (X → Y) and σ (Y → X) b) if σ ¬(X ↔ Y) then σ ¬(X → Y) or σ ¬(Y → X) | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) |
13137 | Conj: a) if σ X∧Y then σ X and σ Y b) if σ ¬(X∧Y) then σ ¬X or σ ¬Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: General tableau rules for conjunctions: a) if σ X ∧ Y then σ X and σ Y b) if σ ¬(X ∧ Y) then σ ¬X or σ ¬Y | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2) |
9742 | The system K has no accessibility conditions [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The system K has no frame conditions imposed on its accessibility relation. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) | |
A reaction: The system is named K in honour of Saul Kripke. |
13114 | □P → P is not valid in D (Deontic Logic), since an obligatory action may be not performed [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: System D is usually thought of as Deontic Logic, concerning obligations and permissions. □P → P is not valid in D, since just because an action is obligatory, it does not follow that it is performed. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.12.2 Ex) |
9743 | The system D has the 'serial' conditon imposed on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The system D has the 'serial' condition imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world must have some world which is accessible to it. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) |
9744 | The system T has the 'reflexive' conditon imposed on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The system T has the 'reflexive' condition imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world must be accessible to itself. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) |
9746 | The system K4 has the 'transitive' condition on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The system K4 has the 'transitive' condition imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, if a relation holds between worlds 1 and 2 and worlds 2 and 3, it must hold between worlds 1 and 3. The relation carries over. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) |
9745 | The system B has the 'reflexive' and 'symmetric' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The system B has the 'reflexive' and 'symmetric' conditions imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world must be accessible to itself, and any relation between worlds must be mutual. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) |
9747 | The system S4 has the 'reflexive' and 'transitive' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The system S4 has the 'reflexive' and 'transitive' conditions imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world is accessible to itself, and accessibility carries over a series of worlds. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) |
9748 | System S5 has the 'reflexive', 'symmetric' and 'transitive' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The system S5 has the 'reflexive', 'symmetric' and 'transitive' conditions imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world is self-accessible, and accessibility is mutual, and it carries over a series of worlds. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8) | |
A reaction: S5 has total accessibility, and hence is the most powerful system (though it might be too powerful). |
9404 | Modality affects content, because P→◊P is valid, but ◊P→P isn't [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: P→◊P is usually considered to be valid, but its converse, ◊P→P is not, so (by Frege's own criterion) P and possibly-P differ in conceptual content, and there is no reason why logic should not be widened to accommodate this. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Frege had denied that modality affected the content of a proposition (1879:p.4). The observation here is the foundation for the need for a modal logic. |
13112 | In epistemic logic knowers are logically omniscient, so they know that they know [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: In epistemic logic the knower is treated as logically omniscient. This is puzzling because one then cannot know something and yet fail to know that one knows it (the Principle of Positive Introspection). | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.11) | |
A reaction: This is nowadays known as the K-K Problem - to know, must you know that you know. Broadly, we find that externalists say you don't need to know that you know (so animals know things), but internalists say you do need to know that you know. |
13111 | Read epistemic box as 'a knows/believes P' and diamond as 'for all a knows/believes, P' [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: In epistemic logic we read Υ as 'KaP: a knows that P', and ◊ as 'PaP: it is possible, for all a knows, that P' (a is an individual). For belief we read them as 'BaP: a believes that P' and 'CaP: compatible with everything a believes that P'. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.11) | |
A reaction: [scripted capitals and subscripts are involved] Hintikka 1962 is the source of this. Fitting and Mendelsohn prefer □ to read 'a is entitled to know P', rather than 'a knows that P'. |
13113 | F: will sometime, P: was sometime, G: will always, H: was always [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: We introduce four future and past tense operators: FP: it will sometime be the case that P. PP: it was sometime the case that P. GP: it will always be the case that P. HP: it has always been the case that P. (P itself is untensed). | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.10) | |
A reaction: Temporal logic begins with A.N. Prior, and starts with □ as 'always', and ◊ as 'sometimes', but then adds these past and future divisions. Two different logics emerge, taking □ and ◊ as either past or as future. |
13728 | The Barcan says nothing comes into existence; the Converse says nothing ceases; the pair imply stability [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The Converse Barcan says nothing passes out of existence in alternative situations. The Barcan says that nothing comes into existence. The two together say the same things exist no matter what the situation. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 4.9) | |
A reaction: I take the big problem to be that these reflect what it is you want to say, and that does not keep stable across a conversation, so ordinary rational discussion sometimes asserts these formulas, and 30 seconds later denies them. |
13729 | The Barcan corresponds to anti-monotonicity, and the Converse to monotonicity [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The Barcan formula corresponds to anti-monotonicity, and the Converse Barcan formula corresponds to monotonicity. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 6.3) |
9725 | 'Predicate abstraction' abstracts predicates from formulae, giving scope for constants and functions [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: 'Predicate abstraction' is a key idea. It is a syntactic mechanism for abstracting a predicate from a formula, providing a scoping mechanism for constants and function symbols similar to that provided for variables by quantifiers. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], Pref) |
11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
Full Idea: Two ways to see 'all horses are animals' are as picking out all the horses (so that it is a 'horse-quantifier'), ..or as ranging over lots of things in addition to horses, with 'horses' then restricting the things to those that satisfy 'is a horse'. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 2) | |
A reaction: Jubien says this gives you two different metaphysical views, of a world of horses etc., or a world of things which 'are horses'. I vote for the first one, as the second seems to invoke an implausible categorical property ('being a horse'). Cf Idea 11116. |
16918 | Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts [Kant] |
Full Idea: Mathematics cannot proceed analytically, namely by analysis of concepts, but only synthetically. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 284) | |
A reaction: I'm with Kant insofar as I take mathematics to be about the world, no matter how rarefied and 'abstract' it may become. |
16930 | Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality [Kant] |
Full Idea: No principle of pure geometry is analytic. That the straight line beween two points is the shortest is a synthetic proposition. For my concept of straight contains nothing of quantity but only of quality. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 269) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure what his authority is for calling straightness a quality rather than a quantity, given that it can be expressed quantitatively. It is a very nice example for focusing our questions about the nature of geometry. I can't decide. |
16919 | Geometry rests on our intuition of space [Kant] |
Full Idea: Geometry is grounded on the pure intuition of space. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 284) | |
A reaction: I have the impression that recent thinkers are coming round to this idea, having attempted purely algebraic or logical accounts of geometry. |
16920 | Numbers are formed by addition of units in time [Kant] |
Full Idea: Arithmetic forms its own concepts of numbers by successive addition of units in time. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 284) | |
A reaction: It is hard to imagine any modern philosopher of mathematics embracing this idea. It sounds as if Kant thinks counting is the foundation of arithmetic, which I quite like. |
16929 | 7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12 [Kant] |
Full Idea: The concept of twelve is in no way already thought by merely thinking the unification of seven and five, and though I analyse my concept of such a possible sum as long as I please, I shall never find twelve in it. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 269) | |
A reaction: It might be more plausible to claim that an analysis of 12 would reveal the concept of 7+5. Doesn't the concept of two collections of objects contain the concept of their combined cardinality? |
16910 | Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure [Kant] |
Full Idea: We find that all mathematical knowledge has this peculiarity, that it must first exhibit its concept in intuition, and do so a priori, in an intuition that is not empirical but pure. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 281) | |
A reaction: Later thinkers had grave doubts about this Kantian 'intuition', even if they though maths was known a priori. Personally I am increasing fan of rational intuition, even if I am not sure how to discern whether it is rational on any occasion. |
16917 | All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time [Kant] |
Full Idea: Space and time are the two intuitions on which pure mathematics grounds all its cognitions and judgements that present themselves as at once apodictic and necessary. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 284) | |
A reaction: This unlikely proposal seems to be based on the idea that mathematics must arise from the basic categories of our intuition, and these two are the best candidates he can find. I would say that high-level generality is the basis of mathematics. |
16928 | Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant] |
Full Idea: Mathematical propositions are always judgements a priori, and not empirical, because they carry with them necessity, which cannot be taken from experience. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 268) | |
A reaction: Presumably there are necessities in the physical world, and we might discern them by generalising about that world, so that mathematics is (by a tortuous abstract route) a posteriori necessary? Just a thought… |
11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
Full Idea: Being a physical object (as opposed to being a horse or a statue) really is our most fundamental category for dealing with the external world. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 2) | |
A reaction: This raises the interesting question of why any categories should be considered to be more 'fundamental' than others. I can only think that we perceive something to be an object fractionally before we (usually) manage to identify it. |
11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
Full Idea: Properties of 'being such and such specific entity' are often called 'haecceities', but this term carries the connotation of non-qualitativeness which I don't favour. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 2) | |
A reaction: The way he defines it makes it sound as if it was a category, but I take it to be more like a bare individual essence. If it has not qualities then it has no causal powers, so there could be no evidence for its existence. |
11833 | The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant] |
Full Idea: It has long since been noticed that in all substances the subject proper, namely what is left over after all the accidents (as predicates) have been taken away and hence the 'substantial' itself, is unknown to us. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 333) | |
A reaction: This is the terminus of the process of abstraction (though Wiggins says such removal of predicates is a myth). Kant is facing the problem of the bare substratum, or haecceity. |
13730 | The Indiscernibility of Identicals has been a big problem for modal logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: Equality has caused much grief for modal logic. Many of the problems, which have struck at the heart of the coherence of modal logic, stem from the apparent violations of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 7.1) | |
A reaction: Thus when I say 'I might have been three inches taller', presumably I am referring to someone who is 'identical' to me, but who lacks one of my properties. A simple solution is to say that the person is 'essentially' identical. |
11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
Full Idea: I suggest that the de re is to be analyzed in terms of the de dicto. ...We have a case of modality de re when (and only when) the appropriate property in the de dicto formulation is an object-essence. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 5) |
11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
Full Idea: Where modal propositions may once have seemed to transcend the actual, they now seem only to transcend the concrete. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 4) | |
A reaction: This is because Jubien has defended a form of platonism. Personally I take modal propositions to be perceptible in the concrete world, by recognising the processes involved, not the mere static stuff. |
11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The possibility of your having been a playwright has nothing to do with how people are on other planets, whether in our own or in some other realm. It is only to do with you and the relevant property. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1) | |
A reaction: I'm inclined to think that this simple point is conclusive disproof of possible worlds as an explanation of modality (apart from Jubien's other nice points). What we need to understand are modal properties, not other worlds. |
11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
Full Idea: Typical modal truths are just facts about our world, and generally facts about very small parts of it, not facts about some infinitude of complex, maximal entities. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1) | |
A reaction: I think we should embrace this simple fact immediately, and drop all this nonsense about possible worlds, even if they are useful for the semantics of modal logic. |
11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
Full Idea: If all of the possible worlds happened to include stars, how plausible is it to think that if this is how things really are, then we've just been wrong to regard the existence of stars as contingent? | |
From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1) |
11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
Full Idea: In the world theory, what passes for 'necessity' is just a bunch of parallel 'contingencies'. The theory provides no basis for understanding why these contingencies repeat unremittingly across the board (while others do not). | |
From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1) |
11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
Full Idea: Any other realms that happened to exist would just be scattered parts of the actual world, not entire worlds at all. It would just happen that physical reality was fragmented in this remarkable but modally inconsequential way. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1) | |
A reaction: This is aimed explicitly at Lewis's modal realism, and strikes me as correct. Jubien's key point here is that they are irrelevant to modality, just as foreign countries are irrelevant to the modality of this one. |
11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The suspicion is that the necessity doesn't arise from how worlds are, but rather that the worlds are taken to be as they are in order to capture the intuitive necessity. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1) | |
A reaction: It has always seemed to me rather glaring that you need a prior notion of 'possible' before you can start to talk about 'possible worlds', but I have always been too timid to disagree with the combination of Saul Kripke and David Lewis. Thank you, Jubien! |
11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
Full Idea: As soon as we start talking about 'possible world', we beg the question of their relevance to our prior notion of possibility. For all we know, there are just two such realms, or twenty-seven, or uncountably many, or even set-many. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1) |
11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
Full Idea: Suppose there happen to be no other concrete realms. Would we happily accept the consequence that we exist necessarily? | |
From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1) |
13725 | □ must be sensitive as to whether it picks out an object by essential or by contingent properties [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: If □ is to be sensitive to the quality of the truth of a proposition in its scope, then it must be sensitive as to whether an object is picked out by an essential property or by a contingent one. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 4.3) | |
A reaction: This incredibly simple idea strikes me as being powerful and important. ...However, creating illustrative examples leaves me in a state of confusion. You try it. They cite '9' and 'number of planets'. But is it just nominal essence? '9' must be 9. |
13731 | Objects retain their possible properties across worlds, so a bundle theory of them seems best [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The property of 'possibly being a Republican' is as much a property of Bill Clinton as is 'being a democrat'. So we don't peel off his properties from world to world. Hence the bundle theory fits our treatment of objects better than bare particulars. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 7.3) | |
A reaction: This bundle theory is better described in recent parlance as the 'modal profile'. I am reluctant to talk of a modal truth about something as one of its 'properties'. An objects, then, is a bundle of truths? |
11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
Full Idea: If someone similar to Humphrey won the election, that nicely establishes the possibility of someone's winning who is similar to Humphrey. But we mustn't confuse this possibility with the intuitively different possibility of Humphrey himself winning. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1) |
13726 | Counterpart relations are neither symmetric nor transitive, so there is no logic of equality for them [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
Full Idea: The main technical problem with counterpart theory is that the being-a-counterpart relation is, in general, neither symmetric nor transitive, so no natural logic of equality is forthcoming. | |
From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 4.5) | |
A reaction: That is, nothing is equal to a counterpart, either directly or indirectly. |
21957 | 'Transcendental' concerns how we know, rather than what we know [Kant] |
Full Idea: The word 'transcendental' signifies not a relation of our cognition to things, but only to the faculty of cognition. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 4:293), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 5.4 | |
A reaction: This is the annoying abduction of a word which is very useful in metaphysical contexts. |
16923 | I admit there are bodies outside us [Kant] |
Full Idea: I do indeed admit that there are bodies outside us. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 289 n.II) | |
A reaction: This is the end of a passage in which Kant very explicitly denies being an idealist. Of course, he says we can only know the representations of things, and not how they are in themselves. |
21441 | 'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience [Kant] |
Full Idea: The word 'transcendental' does not mean something that goes beyond all experience, but something which, though it precedes (a priori) all experience, is destined only to make knowledge by experience possible. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 373 n) | |
A reaction: One of two explanations by Kant of 'transcendental', picked out by Sebastian Gardner. I think the word 'prerequisite' covers the idea nicely, using a normal English word. Or am I missing something? |
16916 | A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves [Kant] |
Full Idea: Through intuition we can only know objects as they appear to us (to our senses), not as they may be in themselves; and this presupposition is absolutely necessary if synthetic propositions a priori are to be granted as possible. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 283) | |
A reaction: This idea is basic to understanding Kant, and especially his claim that arithmetic is a priori synthetic. |
16915 | A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant] |
Full Idea: Intuitions which are possible a priori can never concern any other things than objects of our senses. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 283) | |
A reaction: Given the Kantian idea that what is known a priori will also be necessary, we might have had great hopes for big-time metaphysics, but this idea cuts it down to size. Personally, I don't think we are totally imprisoned in the phenomena. |
16914 | A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility [Kant] |
Full Idea: The only way for my intuition to precede the reality of the object and take place as knowledge a priori is if it contains nothing else than the form of sensibility which in me as subject precedes all real impressions through which I'm affected by objects. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 283) | |
A reaction: This may be the single most famous idea in Kant. I'm not really a Kantian, but this is a powerful idea, the culmination of Descartes' proposal to start philosophy by looking at ourselves. No subsequent thinking can ignore the idea. |
21447 | I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant] |
Full Idea: I can make little sense of the assertion that the sensation of red is similar to the property of the vermilion [cinnabar] which excites this sensation in me. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 290) | |
A reaction: A sensible remark. In Kant's case it is probably a part of his scepticism that his intuitions reveal anything directly about reality. Locke seems to have thought (reasonably enough) that the experience contains some sort of valid information. |
16924 | I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant] |
Full Idea: I also count as mere appearances, in addition to [heat, colour, taste], the remaining qualities of bodies which are called primariae, extension, place, and space in general, with all that depends on it (impenetrability or materiality, shape etc.). | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 289 n.II) | |
A reaction: He sides with Berkeley and Hume against Locke and Boyle. He denies being an idealist (Idea 16923), so it seems to me that Kant might be described as a 'phenomenalist'. |
16913 | I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant] |
Full Idea: It seems inconceivable how the intuition of a thing that is present should make me know it as it is in itself, for its properties cannot migrate into my faculty of representation. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 282) | |
A reaction: One might compare this with Locke's distinction of primary and secondary, where the primary properties seem to 'migrate into my faculty of representation', but the secondary ones fail to do so. I think I prefer Locke. This idea threatens idealism. |
16925 | Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience [Kant] |
Full Idea: Appearance brings forth truth so long as it is used in experience, but as soon as it goes beyond the boundary of experience and becomes transcendent, it brings forth nothing but illusion. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 292 n.III) | |
A reaction: This is the nearest I have found to Kant declaring for empiricism. It sounds something like direct realism, if experience itself can bring forth truth. |
16911 | Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant] |
Full Idea: Intuition is a representation, such as would depend on the presence of the object. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 282) | |
A reaction: This is a distinctively Kantian view of intuition, which arises through particulars, rather than the direct apprehension of generalities. |
16912 | Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause [Kant] |
Full Idea: Concepts are of such a nature that we can make some of them ourselves a priori, without standing in any immediate relation to the object; namely concepts that contain the thought of an object in general, such as quantity or cause. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 282) | |
A reaction: 'Quantity' seems to be the scholastic idea, of something having a magnitude (a big pebble, not six pebbles). |
16926 | Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject [Kant] |
Full Idea: Analytic judgements say nothing in the predicate that was not already thought in the concept of the subject, though not so clearly and with the same consciousness. If I say all bodies are extended, I have not amplified my concept of body in the least. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 266) | |
A reaction: If I say all bodies are made of atoms, have I extended my concept of 'body'? It would come as a sensational revelation for Aristotle, but it now seems analytic. |
16927 | Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject [Kant] |
Full Idea: Analytic judgements rest wholly on the principle of contradiction, …because the predicate cannot be denied of the subject without contradiction. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 267) | |
A reaction: So if I say 'gold has atomic number 79', that is a (Kantian) analytic statement? This is the view of sceptics about Kripke's a posteriori necessity. …a few lines later Kant gives 'gold is a yellow metal' as an example. |
16922 | Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles [Kant] |
Full Idea: That complete space …has three dimensions, and that space in general cannot have more, is built on the proposition that not more than three lines can intersect at right angles in a point. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 285) | |
A reaction: Modern geometry seems to move, via the algebra, to more than three dimensions, and then battles for an intuition of how that can be. I don't know how they would respond to Kant's challenge here. |
16921 | If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left [Kant] |
Full Idea: If everything empirical, namely what belongs to sensation, is taken away from the empirical intuition of bodies and their changes (motion), space and time are still left. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 284) | |
A reaction: This is an exercise in psychological abstraction, which doesn't sound like good evidence, though it is an interesting claim. Physicists want to hijack this debate, but I like Kant's idea. |