60 ideas
13395 | If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien] |
Full Idea: An analysis of a concept tells us what the concept is by telling us what its constituents are and how they are combined. ..The features of the concept are present in the analysis, making it surprising the 'reductive' analyses are sought. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 4.5) | |
A reaction: He says that there are nevertheless reductive analyses, such as David Lewis's analysis of modality. We must disentangle conceptual analysis from causal analysis (e.g. in his example of the physicalist reduction of mind). |
23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The aim of analysis is to give us knowledge of all and only the platitudes surrounding our use of the concept that is up for analysis. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.10) | |
A reaction: His earlier specimen concept is 'redness'. For other concepts there might be considerable disagreement about which propositions are or are not the relevant platitudes. Smith emphasises that analysis need not be reductive. |
23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The discussion of colour concepts shows that permutation problems arise when a set of concepts, acquired inter alia via the presentation of paradigms, is largely interdefined. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
A reaction: Smith says that our normative moral concepts are largely interdefined in this way. The 'permutation' problem is that they can change places in the definition set, and so their intrinsic individual character is not pinned down. Sounds right. |
13378 | It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien] |
Full Idea: It has often been uncritically assumed that logic that was initially a tool for clarifying mathematics could be seamlessly and uniformly applied in the effort to clarify ordinary language and philosophy, but this has been a real mistake. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm not saying he's right (since you need stupendous expertise to make that call) but my intuitions are that he has a good point, and he is at least addressing a crucial question which most analytical philosophers avert their eyes from. |
13402 | We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien] |
Full Idea: We cannot be said to have a full grasp of a name unless we have a definite disposition to apply it or to withhold it under whatever conceivable changes the bearer of the name might come to undergo. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.3) | |
A reaction: This is right, and an excellent counterproposal to the logicians' notion that names have to rigidly designate. As a bare minimum, you are not supposed to deny the identity of your parents because they have grown a bit older, or a damaged painting. |
13405 | The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The person who introduces a proper name gets to pick its bearer, but its category - and consequently the meaning of the name - is determined by social use. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 7) | |
A reaction: New 'division of labour'. The idea that a name has some sort of meaning seems right and important. If babies were switched after baptism, social use might fix the name to the new baby. The namer could stipulate the category at the baptism. Too neat. |
13399 | Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien] |
Full Idea: There are plenty of examples to show that ordinary proper names simply are not rigid designators. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.1) | |
A reaction: His examples are the planet Venus and the dust of which it is formed, and a statue made of clay. In other words, for some objects, perhaps under certain descriptions (e.g. functional ones), the baptised matter can change. Rigidity is an extra topping. |
13398 | We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien] |
Full Idea: 'The winner of the Derby' satisfies some horse, but only accidentally. But we could 'rigidify' the description by inserting 'actual' into it, giving 'the actual winner of the Derby'. Winning is a contingent property, but actually winning is necessary. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.1) | |
A reaction: I like this unusual proposal because instead of switching into formal logic in order to capture the ideas we are after, he is drawing on the resources of ordinary language, offering philosophers a way of speaking plain English more precisely. |
13392 | Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien] |
Full Idea: There is a readiness of philosophers to 'translate' English, with its seeming multitude of kind-driven quantifiers, into first-order logic, with its single wide-open quantifier. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 4.1) | |
A reaction: As in example he says that reference to a statue involves a 'statue-quantifier'. Thus we say things about the statue that we would not say about the clay, which would involve a 'clay-quantifier'. |
13404 | To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated [Jubien] |
Full Idea: For a thing to exist necessarily is for it to have an entity-essence whose own entity-essence entails being instantiated. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 6.4) | |
A reaction: This is the culmination of a lengthy discussion, and is not immediately persuasive. For Jubien the analysis rests on a platonist view of properties, which doesn't help. |
13386 | If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien] |
Full Idea: Under the Quinean (conventional) view of objects, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This is the bold nihilistic account of physical objects, which seems to push all of our ontology into language (English?). We could devise divisions into things that were just crazy, and likely to lead to the rapid extinction of creatures who did it. |
13403 | The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The category of Venus is not 'physical object' or 'mereological sum', but narrower. Surprisingly, it is not 'planet', since it might cease to be a planet and still merit the name 'Venus'. It is something like 'well-integrated, good-sized physical object'. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Jubien is illustrating Idea 13402. This is a nice demonstration of how one might go about the task of constructing categories - by showing the modal profiles of things to which names have been assigned. Categories are file names. |
13375 | The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The pervasiveness, throughout philosophy, of the assumption that entities of various kinds need identity conditions is one unfortunate aspect of Quine's important philosophical legacy. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: Lowe seems to be an example of a philosopher who habitually demands individuation conditions for everything that is referred to. Presumably the alternative is to take lots of things as primitive, but this seems to be second best. |
13393 | Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity [Jubien] |
Full Idea: For any entity of any sort, abstract or concrete, I assume there is a property of being that specific entity. For want of a better term, I will call such properties entity-essences. They are 'singulary' - not instantiable by more than one thing at a time. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 4.2) | |
A reaction: Baffling. Why would someone who has mocked all sorts of bogus philosophical claims based on logic then go on to assert the existence of such weird things as these? I can't make sense of this property being added to a thing's other properties. |
13388 | It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien] |
Full Idea: It is simply far-fetched - even incoherent - to think that, given an entity, of whatever kind, its being a single entity somehow consists in its satisfying some condition involving the kind to which it belongs (or concepts related to that kind). | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 2.3) | |
A reaction: Well said. I can't see how philosophers have allowed themselves to drift into such a daft view. Kinds blatantly depend on the individuals that constitute them, so how could the identity of the individuals depend on their kind? |
13384 | Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility [Jubien] |
Full Idea: We need a first convention to determine what matter constitutes objects, then a second to determine whether there are different temporal possibilities for a given object, then a third for different spatial possibilities. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.5) | |
A reaction: This is building up a Quinean account of objects, as mere matter in regions of spacetime, which are then precisely determined by a set of social conventions. |
13385 | Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like [Jubien] |
Full Idea: There is a certain - very mild - sense in which I don't think the physical world comes with ready-made objects. I think instead that we (conventionally) carve it up into objects, and this can be done any way we like. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.5) | |
A reaction: I have no idea how one could begin to refute such a view. Obviously there are divisions (even if only of physical density) in the world, but nothing obliges us to make divisions at those points. We happily accept objects with gaps in them. |
13383 | If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay [Jubien] |
Full Idea: If a sculptor says 'I love the statue but I really hate that piece of clay - it is way too hard to work with' ...the statement is partly is partly about that object qua statue and partly about that object qua piece of clay. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: His point is that identity is partly determined by the concept or category under which the thing falls. Plausible. Lots of identity muddles seem to come from our conceptual scheme not being quite up to the job when things change. |
13400 | If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways [Jubien] |
Full Idea: A single entity is a physical object, a piece of clay and a statue. We seem to have that the object could be scattered, but not the other two; the object and the clay could be spherical, but not the statue; and only the object could have different matter. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.2) | |
A reaction: His proposal, roughly, is to reduce object-talk to property-talk, and then see the three views of this object as referring to different sets of properties, rather than to a single thing. Promising, except that he goes platonist about properties. |
13401 | The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien] |
Full Idea: I find it surprising that some philosophers accept 'coincident objects'. This notion clearly offends against commonsense 'naturalism' about the world, so it should be viewed as a last resort. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 5.2 n9) | |
A reaction: I'm not quite clear why he invokes 'naturalism', but I pass on his intuition because it seems right to me. |
13380 | Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien] |
Full Idea: When thought of just as an object, the parts of a thing seem definitive and their arrangement seems inconsequential. But when thought of as an object of a familiar kind it is reversed: the arrangement is important and the parts are inessential. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: This is analogous to the Ship of Theseus, where we say that the tour operator and the museum keeper give different accounts of whether it is the same ship. The 'kind' Jubien refers to is most likely to be a functional kind. |
13376 | We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien] |
Full Idea: I argue against the widely accepted characterization of the doctrine of 'essentialism' as the acceptance of nontrivial de re necessity | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: I agree entirely. The notion of an essence is powerful if clearly distinguished. The test is: can everything being said about essences be just as easily said by referring to necessities? If so, you are talking about the wrong thing. |
13381 | Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original [Jubien] |
Full Idea: Thinking about the original ship as a ship, we think we continue to have the 'same ship' as each part is replaced; ...but when we think of them as physical objects, we think the original ship and the outcome of the reassembly are one and the same. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: It seems to me that you cannot eliminate how we are thinking of the ship as influencing how we should read it. My suggestion is to think of Theseus himself valuing either the repaired or the reassembled version. That's bad for Jubien's account. |
13382 | Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement [Jubien] |
Full Idea: That the planks are rearranged as a ship elevates the sense of mystery, because arrangements matter for ships, but if they had been arranged differently we would have the same intuition - that it still counts as the same object. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.4) | |
A reaction: Implausible. Classic case: can I have my pen back? - smashes it to pieces and hands it over with 'there you are' - that's not my pen! - Jubien says it's the same object! - it isn't my pen, and it isn't the same object either! Where is Shelley's skylark? |
13379 | If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same? [Jubien] |
Full Idea: If a bit of matter has a qualitatively indistinguishable object located at a later time, with a path of spacetime connecting them, how could we determine they are identical? Neither identity nor diversity follows from qualitative indiscernibility. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 1.3) | |
A reaction: All these principles expounded by Leibniz were assumed to be timeless, but for identity over time the whole notion of things retaining identity despite changing has to be rethought. Essentialism to the rescue. |
13394 | Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien] |
Full Idea: Typically philosophers say that for P to entail Q is for the proposition that all P's are Q's to be necessary. I think this analysis is backwards, and that necessity rests on entailment, not vice versa. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 4.4) | |
A reaction: His example is that being a horse and being an animal are such that one entails the other. In other words, necessities arise out of property relations (which for Jubien are necessary because the properties are platonically timeless). Wrong. |
13391 | Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien] |
Full Idea: I think modality has to do with relations involving the abstract part of the world, specifically with relations among (Platonic) properties. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 3.2) | |
A reaction: [Sider calls Jubien's the 'governance' view, since abstract relations govern the concrete] I take Jubien here (having done a beautiful demolition job on the possible worlds account of modality) to go spectacularly wrong. Modality starts in the concrete. |
13374 | To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The ultimate analysis of possibility and necessity depends on two important ontological decisions: the choice of an analysis of the intuitive concept of a physical object, and the other is the positing of properties and relations. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: In the same passage he adopts Quine's view of objects, leading to mereological essentialism, and a Platonic view of properties, based on Lewis's argument for taking some things at face value. One might start with processes and events instead. |
13389 | The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien] |
Full Idea: I believe the contemporary infatuation with possible worlds in philosophy stems in part from a tendency to think that technical logic offers silver-bullet solutions to philosophical problems. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 3.2) | |
A reaction: I would say that the main reason for the infatuation is just novelty. As a technical device it was only invented in the 1960s, so we are in a honeymoon period, as we would be with any new gadget. I can't imagine possible worlds figuring much in 100 years. |
13390 | Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien] |
Full Idea: The fundamental problem is that in world theory, what passes for necessity is in effect just a bunch of parallel 'contingencies'. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Jubien's general complaint is that there is no connection between the possible worlds and the actual world, so they are irrelevant, but this is a nicely different point - that lots of contingent worlds can't add up to necessity. Nice. |
13396 | Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical [Jubien] |
Full Idea: We have (physicalist) 'inclusionism' when the mental is included in the physical, and mental phenomena are to be found among physical phenomena. Only inclusionism is compatible with a genuine physicalist analysis of mental concepts. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], 4.5) | |
A reaction: This isn't the thesis of conceptual dualism (which I like), but an interesting accompaniment for it. Jubien is offering this as an alternative to 'reductive' analysis, translating all the mental concepts into physical language. He extends 'physical'. |
23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: It would be a superhuman task just to write down an explicit, non-summary style, statement of the platitudes that capture our idea of what it is to be fully rational. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
A reaction: Well said. Philosophers are inclined to make simplistic binary judgements about whether persons or animals are rational. A visit to YouTube will show fish acting extremely rationally. |
13377 | First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien] |
Full Idea: First-order logic tilts in favor of the direct reference account of proper names by using individual constants to play the intuitive role of names, and by 'interpreting' the constants simply as the individuals that are assigned to them for truth-values. | |
From: Michael Jubien (Possibility [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is the kind of challenge to orthodoxy that is much needed at the moment. We have an orthodoxy which is almost a new 'scholasticism', that logic will clarify our metaphysics. Trying to enhance the logic for the job may be a dead end. |
23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: There is a minor proviso to Hume's view, which is that desires are subject to rational criticism, but only insofar as they are based on beliefs that are subject to rational criticism. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.3) | |
A reaction: He says this is not a refutation of the basic Humean claim. He has in mind a desire such as to consume cyanide because you believe it will be good for you. |
23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: We should concede that a desire may be had in the absence of its being felt. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.5) | |
A reaction: A nice observation. An example he gives is a father's desire that his child does well. Smith is discussing Hume's account of motivation in terms of desires and beliefs. |
23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: According to the standard picture of human psychology that we get from Hume, not only are desires not assessable in terms of truth and falsehood, they are not subject to any sort of rational criticism at all. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 1.3) | |
A reaction: This is where action theory meets metaethics. The separation of facts from values underlies this, because a desire is a fact, but the wickedness of a desire is not. Surely a desire could be a failure of practical reason? |
23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: It is an adequacy constraint on any conception of desire that the epistemology of desire it recommends allows that subjects may be fallible about the desires they have. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.5) | |
A reaction: [I do wish authors would write my short versions instead of their rambling sentences!] Even after the event we may be unsure why we did something. If someone observes self-interest when I thought my action was altruistic, I don't know how to respond. |
23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Humeans claim that agents who believe they should act may nevertheless lack the desire to do so, where anti-Humeans must say the two go together, and someone with the belief thereby has the desire. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.7) | |
A reaction: [very compressed] A very helpful distinction about the classic debates over the motivations of action. Smith defends the Humean view, and makes it very plausible. No mere sense of rightness or duty can compel us to act. |
23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Even if we assume that reason prefers harmony between first- and second-order desires, there is no reason to assume that reason is on the side of achieving that harmony by changing first-order desires to suit second-order, rather than vice versa. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.7) | |
A reaction: [Smith is discussing David Lewis 1989 on second-order desires] Smith says that on the Humean view the rational winner should simply be the stronger of the two. Since this sounds like an endorsement for weakness of will, Smith relies on beliefs. |
23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: One way to decide what we have normative reasons to do …is by trying to find a set of desires that is systematically justifiable, which is our best assessment of the desires we would have under conditions of full rationality. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
A reaction: This is Smith accepting the Humean view that desires are essential for motivation, but trying to find a marriage of desires with reason to produce the more objective aspects of morality. An interesting aspiration… |
23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Only an agent's desires may constitute her having certain goals, and it follows from this that only her desires may constitute her motivating reasons. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.8) | |
A reaction: We might distinguish between reasons which direct us towards certain ends, and reasons which motivate us to pursue those ends. Most mornings I have a reason to get out of bed, which precedes my motivation to actually do it. |
23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: There are motivating reasons for action, which are psychological states, and normative reasons, which are propositions of the general form 'a person's doing this is desirable or required'. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 4.2) | |
A reaction: Motivating reasons are locatable entities in minds, whereas normative reasons are either abstract, or perhaps motivating reasons expressed by other people. Smith says the two types are unconnected. |
23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The distinctive Humean view of normative reasons for action is that the rational thing for an agent to do is simply to act so as to maximally satisfy her desires, whatever the content of those desires. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.1) | |
A reaction: Smith disagrees with this view (though he agrees with Hume about motivating reasons). An obvious problem for the Humean view would be a strong desire to do something excessively dangerous. |
23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: We cannot expect that, even under conditions of full rationality, agents would all converge on the same desires about what is to be done in the various circumstances they might face. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.9) | |
A reaction: A very good argument in favour of the Humean view that desires are an essential part of moral motivation. Possible convergence of view is a standard hallmark of communal rationality. |
23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The 'externalist' view of morality says either that judgements of rightness are motives but not reasons, or (more strongly) that they are neither, meaning that moral judgements do not have practical implications. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
A reaction: [Philippa Foot's untypical 1972 article is cited for the strong view. Hare and Blackburn are typical of the first view]. I would say that such judgements are both reasons and motives - but not necessarily for me! 'Someone should do something about this!'. |
23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Amoralists make moral judgements without being motivated accordingly, and without suffering any sort of practical irrationality either; the practicality requirement of moral judgement is thus false. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.3) | |
A reaction: It is hard to imagine an immoralist with this nihilistic attitude bothering to make any moral judgements at all. Why would someone indifferent to art make aesthetic judgements? What could a 'judgement of rightness' mean to an amoralist? |
23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Moral 'internalism' says if an agent judges an action as right in some circumstance, then they are either thereby motivated to do it, or they are irrational (e.g. their will is weak). | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
A reaction: [Somewhat reworded] So the motivation comes from an internal judgement, not from external factors. Is it not tautological that 'this is the right thing to do' means it should be done (ceteris paribus)? |
23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: Moral 'rationalism' says if an action is right for agents in some circumstances, then there is a reason for the agents to do it. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1) | |
A reaction: That is, there is not merely a motivation to act (the 'internalist' view), but there is a reason to act. Smith calls both views the 'practicality requirement' of normal moral judgements. Smith defends the rationalist view. |
23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: The pro- and con- attitudes of the expressivists count as 'moral' only if they are had towards particular people, actions or states of affairs in virtue of their natural features, ….rather than in virtue of being the particulars that they are. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 2.4) | |
A reaction: So whereas emotivists don't have to have any reasons for their moral feelings, other expressivists seem to require reasons (i.e. indicating features of things) to endorse their attitudes. What of reasonless emotionless attitudes? |
23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
Full Idea: What is it to value something? That is, equivalently, what is it to accept that we have a normative reason to do something? In Hume's terms, is it a matter of believing? Or is it a matter of desiring? We seem to face a dilemma. | |
From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 5.4) | |
A reaction: Smith is discussing moral motivation, and there is obviously more to valuing something than acting on it. Nice question, though. Personally I value St Paul's Cathedral, but I don't desire it. I value heart surgeons, but don't want to emulate them. |
23865 | Morality would improve if people could pursue private interests [Weil] |
Full Idea: The common run of moralists complain that man is moved by his private interest: would to heaven it were so! | |
From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.65) | |
A reaction: Her point is that currently people have to sacrifice their own interests to communal activities which offer dubious benefits. |
23866 | In oppressive societies the scope of actual control is extended by a religion of power [Weil] |
Full Idea: Every oppressive society is cemented by a religion of power, which falsifies all social relations by enabling the powerful to command over and above what they are able to impose. | |
From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.69) | |
A reaction: A rather acute and accurate observation, I think. Flashy cars, grand uniforms, lots of medals, rituals of deference….. Sometimes I like the order and security this brings, but Simone Weil could quickly change my view. |
23871 | No central authority can initiate decentralisation [Weil] |
Full Idea: It is quite patently impossible for decentralisation to be initiated by the central authority. | |
From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.113) | |
A reaction: This is contradicted by the creation of regional parliaments and mayors, but we see nothing beyond that. A state could crumble into small parts if there were'lots of autonomous regional groups. Easier for weird minorities to take control. |
23867 | After a bloody revolution the group which already had the power comes to the fore [Weil] |
Full Idea: There is no real break in continuity after a bloody struggle for regime change; for the victory just sanctions forces that before the struggle were the decisive factor in community life, patterns which were replacing those of the declining regime. | |
From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.73) | |
A reaction: [from Marx] I assume she has in mind the French Revolution, and perhaps the Russian Revolution, though in the latter the new bourgeois leaders also got swept away. So revolutions are not nearly as dramatic as they appear to be. |
23870 | Decentralisation is only possible by co-operation between strong and weak - which is absurd [Weil] |
Full Idea: The only possibility of salvation would lie in a co-operation between weak and strong, with a view to accomplishing a progressive decentralisation of social life; but the absurdity of such an idea strikes one immediately. | |
From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.113) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a judgement on the anarchist ideal, rather than a bit of modest devolution. The UK government set up regional parliaments. She says centralisation is remorseless. |
23863 | Only individual people of good will can achieve social progress [Weil] |
Full Idea: The enlightened goodwill of men acting in an individual capacity is the only possible principle of social progress. | |
From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.57) | |
A reaction: I identify with this. Virtually every admirable institution in a society can be traced back to the initiative of a few individuals. Every helpful technology was someone's brainwave. |
23869 | In the least evil societies people can think, control community life, and be autonomous [Weil] |
Full Idea: The least evil society is that in which the general run of men are most often obliged to think while acting, have the most opportunities for exercising control over collective life as a whole, and enjoy the greatest amount of independence. | |
From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.97) | |
A reaction: So Simone Weil was a liberal. How do you stop the most dynamic thinkers, social controllers, and exercisers of their own independence from coming to dominate the others? Only liberal institutions, such as the law and education, can do this. |
23861 | Marx showed that capitalist oppression, because of competition, is unstoppable [Weil] |
Full Idea: Marx gives a first-rate account of the mechanism of capitalist oppression; but so good is it that one finds it hard to visualise how this mechanism could cease to function. …The exploitation is the competitive need to expand as rapidly as possible. | |
From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.39) | |
A reaction: [Last bit compressed] This pinpoints the main motivation for desiring to overthrow capitalism. Resistance to that view is presumably the fear that an even worse oppression might replace it. |
23868 | The pleasure of completing tasks motivates just as well as the whip of slavery [Weil] |
Full Idea: The sight of the unfinished task attracts the free man as powerfully as the over-seer's whip stimulates the slave. | |
From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.94) | |
A reaction: This is Weil's key social idea - that freely performed productive work can be, and should be, a joy, as long as it is accompanied by respect and friendship, rather than oppression. Did this idea ever occur to a slave owner? |
23864 | Inequality could easily be mitigated, if it were not for the struggle for power [Weil] |
Full Idea: Inequality could easily be mitigated by the resistance of the weak and the feeling for justice of the strong, …were it not for the intervention of a further factor, namely, the struggle for power. | |
From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.62) | |
A reaction: The implication is that many of 'the strong' are inclined to diminish inequality, but find themselves trapped and unable to do so, because of irresistable capitalist forces. Sounds plausible. |