Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Analyzing Modality', 'New Foundations for Mathematical Logic' and 'Things and Their Parts'

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23 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
9879 NF has no models, but just blocks the comprehension axiom, to avoid contradictions [Quine, by Dummett]
     Full Idea: Quine's New Foundations system of set theory, devised with no model in mind, but on the basis of a hunch that a purely formal restriction on the comprehension axiom would block all contradictions.
     From: report of Willard Quine (New Foundations for Mathematical Logic [1937]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.18
     A reaction: The point is that Quine (who had an ontological preference for 'desert landscapes') attempted to do without an ontological commitment to objects (and their subsequent models), with a purely formal system. Quine's NF is not now highly regarded.
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
13331 Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The whole identity of a part is relevant to whether it is a part, but the identity of the whole makes a part a part. The whole part belongs to the whole as a part. The standard account in terms of time-slices fails to respect this part/whole asymmetry.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §2)
     A reaction: Hard to follow, but I think the asymmetry is that the wholeness of the part contributes to the wholeness of the whole, while the wholeness of the whole contributes to the parthood of the part. Wholeness does different jobs in different directions. OK?
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
11115 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
     Full Idea: Two ways to see 'all horses are animals' are as picking out all the horses (so that it is a 'horse-quantifier'), ..or as ranging over lots of things in addition to horses, with 'horses' then restricting the things to those that satisfy 'is a horse'.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 2)
     A reaction: Jubien says this gives you two different metaphysical views, of a world of horses etc., or a world of things which 'are horses'. I vote for the first one, as the second seems to invoke an implausible categorical property ('being a horse'). Cf Idea 11116.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
11116 Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
     Full Idea: Being a physical object (as opposed to being a horse or a statue) really is our most fundamental category for dealing with the external world.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 2)
     A reaction: This raises the interesting question of why any categories should be considered to be more 'fundamental' than others. I can only think that we perceive something to be an object fractionally before we (usually) manage to identify it.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11117 Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
     Full Idea: Properties of 'being such and such specific entity' are often called 'haecceities', but this term carries the connotation of non-qualitativeness which I don't favour.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 2)
     A reaction: The way he defines it makes it sound as if it was a category, but I take it to be more like a bare individual essence. If it has not qualities then it has no causal powers, so there could be no evidence for its existence.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
13332 Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: It is the hierarchical conception of sets and their members, rather than the linear conception of set and subset or of aggregate and component, that provides us with the better model for the structure of part-whole in its application to material things.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §5)
     A reaction: His idea is to give some sort of internal structure. He says of {a,b,c,d} that we can create subsets {a,b} and {c,d} from that. But {{a,b},{c,d}} has given member sets, and he is looking for 'natural' divisions between the members.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
13333 The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The wood is, as it were, a relatively unstructured version of the tree, just as the set {a,b,c,d} is an unstructured counterpart of the set {{a,b},{c,d}}.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §5)
     A reaction: He is trying to give a modern logicians' account of the Aristotelian concept of 'form' (as applied to matter). It is part of the modern project that objects must be connected to the formalism of mereology or set theory. If it works, are we thereby wiser?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
13326 A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: First, a thing can be a part in a way that is relative to a time, for example, that a newly installed carburettor is now part of my car, whereas earlier it was not. (This will be called a 'temporary' part).
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
     A reaction: [Cf Idea 13327 for the 'second' concept of part] I'm immediately uneasy. Being a part seems to be a univocal concept. He seems to be distinguishing parts which are necessary for identity from those which aren't. Fine likes to define by example.
13327 A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Second, an object can be a part of another in a way that is not relative to time ('timeless'). It is not appropriate to ask when it is a part. Thus pants and jacket are parts of the suit, atoms of a water molecule, and two pints part of a quart of milk.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
     A reaction: [cf Idea 13326 for the other concept of 'part'] Again I am uneasy that 'part' could have two meanings. A Life Member is a member in the same way that a normal paid up member is a member.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
13329 An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: In the 'aggregative' understanding of a sum, it is spread out in time, so that exists whenever any of its components exists (just as it is located at any time wherever any of its components are located).
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §1)
     A reaction: This works particularly well for something like an ancient forest, which steadily changes its trees. On that view, though, the ship which has had all of its planks replaced will be the identical single sum of planks all the way through. Fine agrees.
13330 An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: In the 'compound' notion of sum, the mereological sum is spread out only in space, not also in time. For it to exist at a time, all of its components must exist at the time.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], §1)
     A reaction: It is hard to think of anything to which this applies, apart from for a classical mereologist. Named parts perhaps, like Tom, Dick and Harry. Most things preserve sum identity despite replacement of parts by identical components.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13328 Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: I develop a version of hylomorphism, in which the theory of 'rigid embodiment' provides an account of the timeless relation of part, and the theory of 'variable embodiment' is an account of the temporary relation. We must accept two new kinds of whole.
     From: Kit Fine (Things and Their Parts [1999], Intro)
     A reaction: [see Idea 13326 and Idea 13327 for the two concepts of 'part'] This is easier to take than the two meanings for 'part'. Since Aristotle, everyone has worried about true wholes (atoms, persons?) and looser wholes (houses).
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
11119 De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
     Full Idea: I suggest that the de re is to be analyzed in terms of the de dicto. ...We have a case of modality de re when (and only when) the appropriate property in the de dicto formulation is an object-essence.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 5)
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
11118 Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
     Full Idea: Where modal propositions may once have seemed to transcend the actual, they now seem only to transcend the concrete.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 4)
     A reaction: This is because Jubien has defended a form of platonism. Personally I take modal propositions to be perceptible in the concrete world, by recognising the processes involved, not the mere static stuff.
11108 Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
     Full Idea: The possibility of your having been a playwright has nothing to do with how people are on other planets, whether in our own or in some other realm. It is only to do with you and the relevant property.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
     A reaction: I'm inclined to think that this simple point is conclusive disproof of possible worlds as an explanation of modality (apart from Jubien's other nice points). What we need to understand are modal properties, not other worlds.
11111 Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
     Full Idea: Typical modal truths are just facts about our world, and generally facts about very small parts of it, not facts about some infinitude of complex, maximal entities.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
     A reaction: I think we should embrace this simple fact immediately, and drop all this nonsense about possible worlds, even if they are useful for the semantics of modal logic.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
11105 We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
     Full Idea: As soon as we start talking about 'possible world', we beg the question of their relevance to our prior notion of possibility. For all we know, there are just two such realms, or twenty-seven, or uncountably many, or even set-many.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
11107 If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
     Full Idea: Suppose there happen to be no other concrete realms. Would we happily accept the consequence that we exist necessarily?
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
11106 If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
     Full Idea: If all of the possible worlds happened to include stars, how plausible is it to think that if this is how things really are, then we've just been wrong to regard the existence of stars as contingent?
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
11112 Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
     Full Idea: In the world theory, what passes for 'necessity' is just a bunch of parallel 'contingencies'. The theory provides no basis for understanding why these contingencies repeat unremittingly across the board (while others do not).
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
11109 If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
     Full Idea: Any other realms that happened to exist would just be scattered parts of the actual world, not entire worlds at all. It would just happen that physical reality was fragmented in this remarkable but modally inconsequential way.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
     A reaction: This is aimed explicitly at Lewis's modal realism, and strikes me as correct. Jubien's key point here is that they are irrelevant to modality, just as foreign countries are irrelevant to the modality of this one.
11113 Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
     Full Idea: The suspicion is that the necessity doesn't arise from how worlds are, but rather that the worlds are taken to be as they are in order to capture the intuitive necessity.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
     A reaction: It has always seemed to me rather glaring that you need a prior notion of 'possible' before you can start to talk about 'possible worlds', but I have always been too timid to disagree with the combination of Saul Kripke and David Lewis. Thank you, Jubien!
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11110 We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
     Full Idea: If someone similar to Humphrey won the election, that nicely establishes the possibility of someone's winning who is similar to Humphrey. But we mustn't confuse this possibility with the intuitively different possibility of Humphrey himself winning.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)