60 ideas
| 5278 | Philosophy is no more than abstractions concerning observations of human historical development [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: When reality is depicted, philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge loses its medium of existence. At best it is a summing up of general results, abstractions which arise from observation of the historical development of man. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.A) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as nonsense, based on a bogus Hegelian notion that history is following some sort of pattern, and that mental reality is fixed by physical conditions. The philosophy of mathematics, for one, won't fit into this definition. |
| 15169 | Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it) [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysics, for the conventionalist, is not a matter of trying to see deeply into the structure of mind-independent reality, but of trying to clarify the way we actually speak and think, and perhaps negotiating ways of doing this to our best advantage. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: Note that he is still allowing space for 'revisionary' as well as for 'descriptive' metaphysics. I can't wholly accept this, as I really do think we can have some deep insights into reality, but Sidelle is articulating a large part of the truth. |
| 15164 | We seem to base necessities on thought experiments and imagination [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: Judgments of necessity seem always to be based on thought experiments and appeals to what we can imagine. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: That is, the denial of this thing seems inconceivable. I would say that they are also based on coherence. The idea that we can think without imagination is nonsense. |
| 10702 | Set theory's three roles: taming the infinite, subject-matter of mathematics, and modes of reasoning [Potter] |
| Full Idea: Set theory has three roles: as a means of taming the infinite, as a supplier of the subject-matter of mathematics, and as a source of its modes of reasoning. | |
| From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], Intro 1) | |
| A reaction: These all seem to be connected with mathematics, but there is also ontological interest in set theory. Potter emphasises that his second role does not entail a commitment to sets 'being' numbers. |
| 10713 | Usually the only reason given for accepting the empty set is convenience [Potter] |
| Full Idea: It is rare to find any direct reason given for believing that the empty set exists, except for variants of Dedekind's argument from convenience. | |
| From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 04.3) |
| 13044 | Infinity: There is at least one limit level [Potter] |
| Full Idea: Axiom of Infinity: There is at least one limit level. | |
| From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 04.9) | |
| A reaction: A 'limit ordinal' is one which has successors, but no predecessors. The axiom just says there is at least one infinity. |
| 10708 | Nowadays we derive our conception of collections from the dependence between them [Potter] |
| Full Idea: It is only quite recently that the idea has emerged of deriving our conception of collections from a relation of dependence between them. | |
| From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 03.2) | |
| A reaction: This is the 'iterative' view of sets, which he traces back to Gödel's 'What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?' |
| 13546 | The 'limitation of size' principles say whether properties collectivise depends on the number of objects [Potter] |
| Full Idea: We group under the heading 'limitation of size' those principles which classify properties as collectivizing or not according to how many objects there are with the property. | |
| From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 13.5) | |
| A reaction: The idea was floated by Cantor, toyed with by Russell (1906), and advocated by von Neumann. The thought is simply that paradoxes start to appear when sets become enormous. |
| 10707 | Mereology elides the distinction between the cards in a pack and the suits [Potter] |
| Full Idea: Mereology tends to elide the distinction between the cards in a pack and the suits. | |
| From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 02.1) | |
| A reaction: The example is a favourite of Frege's. Potter is giving a reason why mathematicians opted for set theory. I'm not clear, though, why a pack cannot have either 4 parts or 52 parts. Parts can 'fall under a concept' (such as 'legs'). I'm puzzled. |
| 10704 | We can formalize second-order formation rules, but not inference rules [Potter] |
| Full Idea: In second-order logic only the formation rules are completely formalizable, not the inference rules. | |
| From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 01.2) | |
| A reaction: He cites Gödel's First Incompleteness theorem for this. |
| 10703 | Supposing axioms (rather than accepting them) give truths, but they are conditional [Potter] |
| Full Idea: A 'supposition' axiomatic theory is as concerned with truth as a 'realist' one (with undefined terms), but the truths are conditional. Satisfying the axioms is satisfying the theorem. This is if-thenism, or implicationism, or eliminative structuralism. | |
| From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 01.1) | |
| A reaction: Aha! I had failed to make the connection between if-thenism and eliminative structuralism (of which I am rather fond). I think I am an if-thenist (not about all truth, but about provable truth). |
| 10712 | If set theory didn't found mathematics, it is still needed to count infinite sets [Potter] |
| Full Idea: Even if set theory's role as a foundation for mathematics turned out to be wholly illusory, it would earn its keep through the calculus it provides for counting infinite sets. | |
| From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 03.8) |
| 17882 | It is remarkable that all natural number arithmetic derives from just the Peano Axioms [Potter] |
| Full Idea: It is a remarkable fact that all the arithmetical properties of the natural numbers can be derived from such a small number of assumptions (as the Peano Axioms). | |
| From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 05.2) | |
| A reaction: If one were to defend essentialism about arithmetic, this would be grist to their mill. I'm just saying. |
| 5287 | Philosophical problems are resolved into empirical facts [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: Every profound philosophical problem is resolved quite simply into an empirical fact. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.B) | |
| A reaction: This shows that empirical accounts of metaphysics are not just a branch of British empiricism, but are a basic fact of any materialist view of the world. The influence of David Hume, however, hovers behind this Marxist doctrine. |
| 13043 | A relation is a set consisting entirely of ordered pairs [Potter] |
| Full Idea: A set is called a 'relation' if every element of it is an ordered pair. | |
| From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 04.7) | |
| A reaction: This is the modern extensional view of relations. For 'to the left of', you just list all the things that are to the left, with the things they are to the left of. But just listing the ordered pairs won't necessarily reveal how they are related. |
| 15180 | There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysically, nothing in the actual world seems to be a candidate for determining what is necessarily the case. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: I file this under 'Dispositions' to show what is at stake in the debate about dispositional and categorical properties. I take a commitment to dispositions to be a commitment to modal facts about the actual world. |
| 13042 | If dependence is well-founded, with no infinite backward chains, this implies substances [Potter] |
| Full Idea: The argument that the relation of dependence is well-founded ...is a version of the classical arguments for substance. ..Any conceptual scheme which genuinely represents a world cannot contain infinite backward chains of meaning. | |
| From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 03.3) | |
| A reaction: Thus the iterative conception of set may imply a notion of substance, and Barwise's radical attempt to ditch the Axiom of Foundation (Idea 13039) was a radical attempt to get rid of 'substances'. Potter cites Wittgenstein as a fan of substances here. |
| 13041 | Collections have fixed members, but fusions can be carved in innumerable ways [Potter] |
| Full Idea: A collection has a determinate number of members, whereas a fusion may be carved up into parts in various equally valid (although perhaps not equally interesting) ways. | |
| From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 02.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems to sum up both the attraction and the weakness of mereology. If you doubt the natural identity of so-called 'objects', then maybe classical mereology is the way to go. |
| 15184 | Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: Even if the causal theory of reference proper does not presuppose essentialism, it does presuppose essentialism if it is to be an account of reference to modally extended entities. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.6) |
| 15172 | Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: It is clear, of course, that if there are true essential predications, then they express necessary properties. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: I would certainly want to ask whether essences have to be analysed as properties, and also (more boldly) whether there might not be contingent essences. |
| 15181 | Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: The property of being a deepest explanatory feature is a nonmodal property: it's an actual property. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: I don't accept the existence of properties of the form 'being-F'. The possibility of securing a door may be the deepest explanatory feature of a lock. [To be fair to Sidelle, see context - just for once!] Dispositions are actual. |
| 15173 | That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: The necessity to water of whatever is found out to be the water's microstructure is given by convention, and is not something which is discovered. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: A powerful point. It shows the authority of science that we accept the microstructure as the essence. The essences of statues and people are definitely not their microstructures. One H2O molecule isn't water. Why not? Macro-properties count too! |
| 15185 | We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: Independent of conventions, no definite sense can be given to the notion of 'the same stuff as this'. So reference-fixing must include some principle of individuation to determine the aspects of sameness for the identity referred to. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: Is he really saying that we don't understand 'same stuff as this'? Surely animals can manage that, and they are not famous for their conventions. Sidelle has fallen into the sortalist trap, I think. |
| 10709 | Priority is a modality, arising from collections and members [Potter] |
| Full Idea: We must conclude that priority is a modality distinct from that of time or necessity, a modality arising in some way out of the manner in which a collection is constituted from its members. | |
| From: Michael Potter (Set Theory and Its Philosophy [2004], 03.3) | |
| A reaction: He is referring to the 'iterative' view of sets, and cites Aristotle 'Metaphysics' 1019a1-4 as background. |
| 15175 | Evaluation of de dicto modalities does not depend on the identity of its objects [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: In the evaluation of de dicto modal statements, whether some possible state of affairs is relevant to its truth does not depend on the identity of its objects, as in 'Necessarily, the President of the USA is male'. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This is a more clear-cut and easy to grasp criterion than most that are on offer. |
| 15032 | Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider] |
| Full Idea: Sidelle defends conventionalism against a posteriori necessities by 'factoring' a necessary a posteriori truth into an analytic component and a nonmodal component. The modal force then comes from the analytic part, and the a posteriority from the other. | |
| From: report of Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989]) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 12.8 | |
| A reaction: [I note that Sidelle refers, it seems, to the nonmodal component as a 'deep explanatory feature', which is exactly what I take an essence to be]. |
| 15179 | To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: What we need to know, in order to know what is empirically necessary, is some empirical fact plus our conventions that tell us which truths are necessary given which empirical facts. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: I take this attack on a posteriori necessities to be the most persuasive part of Sidelle's case, but you can't just put all of our truths down to convention. There are stabilities in the world, as well as in our conventions. |
| 15171 | The necessary a posteriori is statements either of identity or of essence [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: The necessary a posteriori crudely divides into two groups - (synthetic) identity statements (between rigid designators), and statements of essential properties. The latter is either statements of property identity, or of the essences of natural kinds. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: He cites Kripke's examples (Hesperus,Cicero,Truman,water,gold), and divides them into the two groups. Helpful. |
| 15167 | Empiricism explores necessities and concept-limits by imagining negations of truths [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: In the traditional empiricist picture, we go about modal enquiry by trying to see whether we can imagine a situation in which it would be correct to assert the negation of a proposed necessary truth. Thus we can find out the limits of our concepts. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1) |
| 15177 | Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: Contradictoriness is the boundary both of what is possible and also of what is imaginable. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: Of course we may see contradictions where there are none, and fail to grasp real hidden contradictions, so the two do not coincide in the practice. I think I would say it is 'a' boundary, not 'the' boundary. |
| 15176 | The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: It is not merely the modal facts that result from our conventions, but the individuals and kinds that are modally involved. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: I am beginning to find Sidelle's views very sympathetic - going over to the Dark Side, I'm afraid. But conventions won't work at all if they don't correspond closely to reality. |
| 15174 | A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: For a term to be rigid, it is said there must be real transworld identity prior to our use of the rigid term, ..but this may only be because we have conventional principles for individuating across worlds. 'Let's call him Fred' - perhaps explicitly rigid. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This seems right. An example might be a comic book character, who retains a perfect identity in all the comics, with no scars, weight change, or ageing. |
| 15183 | 'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: 'Dthat' is Kaplan's indexical operator; it operates on a given singular term, φ, and makes it into a rigid designator of whatever φ designates in the original context. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.6 n11) | |
| A reaction: I like this idea a lot, because it strikes me that referring to something rigidly is a clear step beyond referring to it in actuality. I refer to 'whoever turns up each week', but that is hardly rigid. The germ of 2-D semantics is here. |
| 15165 | A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: The a priori method yields a priori knowledge, and the objects of this knowledge are not facts about the world, but analytic truths. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: Are we not allowed any insights at all into how the world must be, independent of how we happen to conceptualise it? |
| 23872 | 'Society determines consciousness' is contradictory; society only exists in minds [Weil on Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: In the Marxist formula 'social existence determines consciousness' there are more contradictions than words. Since 'social' can only exist in human minds, 'social existence' is already consciousness. It cannot determine consciousness, which is undefined. | |
| From: comment on K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846]) by Simone Weil - Fragments p.126 | |
| A reaction: I'm not convinced that society only exists in minds. Many children in Victorian London had never heard of 'London', but that didn't stop it existing. Our problems are often social substrata of which we are unaware. |
| 5277 | Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.A) | |
| A reaction: This slogan is the heart of Marxism. It begs the obvious question of what determines (social) life? Aristotle is at least partly right - that some activities and social organisation are 'unnatural', going against the grain of the human 'given'. |
| 15168 | That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: If water is essentially H2O, this is going to have something to do with our intentions in using 'water'. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This very simple point looks to be correct, and raises very important questions about the whole Twin Earth thing. When new discoveries are made, words shift their meanings. We're not quite sure what 'jade' means any more. |
| 5280 | Language co-exists with consciousness, and makes it social [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness that exists also for other men. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.A) | |
| A reaction: Dennett takes a similar view - that consciousness is more-or-less a consequence of the development of consciousness. This is understandable if you make intentional rather than phenomenal consciousness central. Otherwise ants may well have it. |
| 15166 | Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: The causal theory of reference appears to give us a way to get at an object while leaving it undetermined what its essence or necessary features might be. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: This pinpoints why the direct/causal theory of reference seems to open the doors to scientific essentialism. Sidelle, of course, opposes the whole programme. |
| 15182 | Because some entities overlap, reference must have analytic individuation principles [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: The phenomenon of overlapping entities requires that if our reference is to be determinate (as determinate as it is), then there must be analytic principles of individuation. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: His point is that there is something inescapably conventional about the way in which our reference works. It isn't just some bald realist baptism. |
| 5281 | Consciousness is a social product [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: Consciousness is from the very beginning a social product. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.A) | |
| A reaction: This slogan has produced the sociological view of truth which has stood opposed to philosophy for the last 150 years. It would be silly to deny that there is a good point here, but equally silly to think that all consciousness is explicable in this way. |
| 5276 | The nature of an individual coincides with what they produce and how they produce it [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: As individuals express their life, so they are; what they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.A) | |
| A reaction: This appears to be contradicted by their subsequent idea that 'alienation' from the means of production is possible. Presumably intellectuals (in all ages) are to some extent exempt from this rule. It is, in fact, not true. |
| 5289 | When aristocracy or the bourgeoisie dominate, certain values dominate with them [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: During the time that the aristocracy was dominant, the concepts honour, loyalty etc. were dominant, and during the dominance of the bourgeoisie the concepts of freedom, equality etc. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.B) | |
| A reaction: This is a very anti-Aristotelian view, based on a very different idea of human nature. It must, to some extent, be true, but freedom and equality will be a value for the proletariat, and loyalty will be a key value if the family is central. |
| 5274 | Young Hegelians proposed changing our present consciousness for liberating critical consciousness [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: The Young Hegelians logically put to men the moral postulate of exchanging their present consciousness for human, critical or egoistic consciousness, and thus removing their limitations. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.A) | |
| A reaction: It seems there are three views here: this one (that we can change our consciousness), the Aristotelian view (that consciousness is 'given'), and the Marxist view (that society determines consciousness). The truth is somewhere between them. |
| 5275 | Men distinguish themselves from animals when they begin to produce their means of subsistence [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: Men begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.A) | |
| A reaction: This seems a rather external criterion. Presumably we can ask what biological or mental feature made it possible for men to produce their own means of subsistence, and why it evolved. Darwin puts a different perspective on this idea. |
| 21992 | Producing their own subsistence distinguishes men from animals [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: Men begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], p.160), quoted by Sydney Shoemaker - Some varieties of functionalism 6 | |
| A reaction: At the very least, we must say that there had to be some intrinsic distinctiveness in place before men could do this. I like meta-thought. |
| 5292 | Individuals are mutually hostile unless they group together in competition with other groups [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: Separate individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a battle against another class; otherwise they are on hostile terms with each other as competitors. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.D) | |
| A reaction: Beneath the Marxist view that consciousness is a social creation lies a Hobbesian pessimism about basic human nature. This idea bodes ill for ultimate communism, because class struggle will have been abolished. What, then, can unite people? |
| 5293 | Only in community are people able to cultivate their gifts, and therefore be free [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: Only in community with others has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in the community, therefore, is personal freedom possible. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.D) | |
| A reaction: This is where Aristotle and Marx agree, and I agree too. I think we could drop the word "free", which is to some degree a necessary right and precondition of human happiness, but is not the real target. |
| 5273 | Young Hegelians think consciousness is chains for men, where old Hegelians think it the bond of society [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: The Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the real chains of men (just as the Old Hegelians declared them the true bonds of human society). | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.A) | |
| A reaction: Marx and Engels will attack both views. The Young Hegelians seem potential existentialists, and the Old Hegelians followers of Aristotle. The correct view is somewhere in the middle. Self-criticism is an option given to us by our culture. |
| 5282 | If the common interest imposes on the individual, his actions become alienated and enslaving [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: As long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally divided, man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.A) | |
| A reaction: An isolated individual could feel 'alienated' doing menial tasks for themselves when they yearned to get on with their poetry. Alienation is not all-or-nothing. Compare working for a good employer with working for Nazi conquerors. |
| 5283 | In communist society we are not trapped in one activity, but can act freely [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: In communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates production, and I can hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon and criticise after dinner. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.A) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a hopeless daydream, and Plato would be appalled. It now (2004) looks as if this aspiration is more likely to be met in a liberal capitalist democracy than it is under any state-controlled communism. |
| 5288 | The class controlling material production also controls mental production [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.B) | |
| A reaction: This is mostly true, because the wealthy will control both the media and most of the educational institutions, but in a world of universal education and underground presses it doesn't seem to be a necessary truth. Wide dissemination of ideas needs money. |
| 5290 | The revolutionary class is opposed to 'class', and represents all of society [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: The class making a revolution appears from the very start, if only because it is opposed to a 'class', not as a class but as the representative of the whole of society. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.B) | |
| A reaction: This appears to be the source of most of the troubles of the last 150 years. Aristotle thought a benevolent tyrant could represent all of society. It looks to me as if a representative democracy has the best chance, but control of the media is tricky. |
| 5294 | To assert themselves as individuals, the proletarians must overthrow the State [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: In order to assert themselves as individuals, the proletarians must overthrow the State. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.D) | |
| A reaction: By the 'State' is here meant the centralised power of the owners of the means of production. They are not aiming at anarchism, but at a more fluid 'society' or 'community'. Most of us have an Orwellian fear of violent 'overthrowing'. |
| 5285 | Slavery cannot be abolished without the steam-engine [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: Slavery cannot be abolished without the steam-engine. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.B) | |
| A reaction: In Britain and its colonies it does appear that the rise of factories and the abolition of slavery coincided. It is hard to see why this should be a necessity, though. Did the early Christians keep slaves? Some ancient Greeks objected to slavery. |
| 5284 | Communism abolishes private property and dissolves the powerful world market [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: It is empirically established that by the overthrow of the existing state of society by the communist revolution, and the abolition of private property, which is identical with it, the power of the world market will be dissolved. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.A) | |
| A reaction: They later dropped the abolition of private property as an aim. They were very early in spotting the problem of global capitalism. As long as there are scarcities of anything (e.g. Rembrandts) it is hard to imagine the disappearance of the market. |
| 5291 | The law says private property is the result of the general will [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: In civil law the existing property relations are declared to be the result of the general will. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.C) | |
| A reaction: In other words, the 'general will' is open to endless abuse, because it is defined by the current power group, which nowadays is whoever controls the mass media. Even a 'free' election doesn't prove the general will, which is a cultural thing. |
| 5279 | Human history must always be studied in relation to industry and exchange [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: The 'history of humanity' must always be studied and treated in relation to the history of industry and exchange. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.A) | |
| A reaction: There is a lot of truth in this, but why did the Greeks produce Pythagoras, or the Jews produce Jesus, or the British produce Sid Vicious? Two very similar industrial societies can produce very different cultures. Individuals can make a difference. |
| 5286 | Most historians are trapped in the illusions of their own epoch [Marx/Engels] |
| Full Idea: Most historians see in history just the political actions of princes and states, religious and all sorts of theoretical struggles, and in particular in each historical epoch have had to share the illusion of that epoch. | |
| From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.B) | |
| A reaction: Is it an illusion of our epoch that we share the illusions of our epoch? It seems unfair to say that Marx and Engels can see beyond the illusions of their epoch, but some historian writing about the Wars of the Roses can't. Princes were important. |
| 15178 | Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle] |
| Full Idea: Is there anything in the procedures of scientists that could reveal to them that water is necessarily H2O or that gold necessarily has atomic number 79. | |
| From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This is Leibniz's is view, that empirical evidence can never reveal necessities. Given that we know some necessities, you have an argument for rationalism. |