4 ideas
6172 | The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands] |
Full Idea: Block's Inverted Earth example (with matching inversion of both colours and colour-language) tries to show a variation of representational properties without a variation of phenomenal properties, so that the latter are not constituted by the former. | |
From: report of Ned Block (Inverted Earth [1990]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.7 | |
A reaction: (The example is actually quite complex). This type of argument - a thought experiment in which qualia are held steady while everything else varies, or vice versa - seems to be the only way that we can possibly get at an assessment of the role of qualia. |
8416 | Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley] |
Full Idea: Reductionist accounts of causation cannot distinguish laws from accidental uniformities, cannot allow for basic uninstantiated laws, can't explain probabilistic laws, and cannot even demonstrate the existence of laws. | |
From: Michael Tooley (Causality: Reductionism versus Realism [1990], 2) | |
A reaction: I am tempted to say that this is so much the worse for the idea of laws. Extensive regularities only occur for a reason. Probabilities aren't laws. Hypothetical facts will cover uninstantiated laws. Laws are just patterns. |
8418 | Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic [Tooley] |
Full Idea: Quantum physics seems to lend strong support to the idea that the basic laws of nature may well be probabilistic. | |
From: Michael Tooley (Causality: Reductionism versus Realism [1990], 3.2.1) | |
A reaction: Groan. Quantum physics should be outlawed from all philosophical discussions. The scientists don't understand it themselves. I'm certainly not going to build my worldview on it. I don't accept that these probabilities could count as 'laws'. |
4398 | An event causes another just if the second event would not have happened without the first [Lewis, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: Lewis gives an account of causation in terms of counterfactual conditionals (roughly, an event c causes an event e iff if c had not happened then e would not have happened either). | |
From: report of David Lewis (works [1973]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation Intro | |
A reaction: This feels wrong to me. It is a version of Humean constant conjunction, but counterfactuals are too much a feature of our minds, and not sufficiently a feature of the world, to do this job. Tricky. |