21918
|
Sufficient Reason can't be proved, because all proof presupposes it [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
|
|
Full Idea:
Schopenhauer said the principle of sufficient reason is not susceptible to proof for the simple reason that it is presupposed in any argument or proof.
|
|
From:
report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813], §14 p.32-3) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
|
|
A reaction:
I would have thought it might be disproved by a counterexample, such as the Gödel sentence of his incompleteness proof, or quantum effects which seem to elude causation. Personally I believe the principle, which I see as the first axiom of philosophy.
|
7720
|
Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
|
|
Full Idea:
A problem for resemblance nominalism is that in saying that two particulars 'resemble' one another, it is necessary to specify in what respect they do so (e.g. colour, shape, size), and this threatens to reintroduce what appears to be talk of universals.
|
|
From:
E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
|
|
A reaction:
We see resemblance between faces instantly, long before we can specify the 'respects' of the resemblance. This supports the Humean hard-wired view of resemblance, rather than some appeal to Platonic universals.
|
6019
|
If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus]
|
|
Full Idea:
If, for the sake of argument, someone were to mould a horse, squash it, then make a dog, it would be reasonable for us on seeing this to say that this previously did not exist but now does exist.
|
|
From:
Mnesarchus (fragments/reports [c.120 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 179.11
|
|
A reaction:
Locke would say it is new, because the substance is the same, but a new life now exists. A sword could cease to exist and become a new ploughshare, I would think. Apply this to the Ship of Theseus. Is form more important than substance?
|
21362
|
Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
|
|
Full Idea:
For Schopenauer there are physical necessity, logical necessity, mathematical necessity and moral necessity.
|
|
From:
report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813]) by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 2 'Fourfold'
|
|
A reaction:
These derive from four modes of explanation, by causes, by grounding in truths or facts, by mathematical reality, and by motives. Not clear why mathematics gets its own necessity. I like metaphysics derived from explanations, though. Necessity makers.
|
21361
|
For Schopenhauer, material things would not exist without the mind [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
|
|
Full Idea:
Schopenhauer is not a realist about material things, but an idealist: that is, material things would not exist, for him, without the mind.
|
|
From:
report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813]) by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 2 'Fourfold'
|
|
A reaction:
Janaway places his views as close to Kant's, but it is not clear that Kant would agree that no mind means no world. Did Schopenhauer believe in the noumenon?
|
21917
|
The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
|
|
Full Idea:
There are four forms of explanation, depending on their topic. Causes explain objects. Grounding explains concepts, Points and moments explain mathematics. Motives explain ethics.
|
|
From:
report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813], §43 p.214) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
|
|
A reaction:
[My compression of Lewis's summary. I'm particularly pleased with this. I have done Schopenhauer a huge favour, should anyone ever visit this website]. The quirky account of mathematics derives from Kant. I greatly admire this whole idea.
|
7714
|
Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
|
|
Full Idea:
There is the question of the identity of a person over or across time ('diachronic' personal identity), and there is also the question of what makes for personal identity at a time ('synchronic' personal identity).
|
|
From:
E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.5)
|
|
A reaction:
This seems to me to be the first and most important distinction in the philosophy of personal identity, and they regularly get run together. Locke, for example, has an account of synchronic identity, which is often ignored. It applies to objects too.
|
7715
|
Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
|
|
Full Idea:
'Mentalese' would be neither conventional nor a means of public communication so that even to call it a language is seriously misleading.
|
|
From:
E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
|
|
A reaction:
It is, however, supposed to contain symbolic representations which are then used as tokens for computation, so it seems close to a language, if (for example) symbolic logic or mathematics were accepted as languages. But who understands it?
|