6019
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If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus]
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Full Idea:
If, for the sake of argument, someone were to mould a horse, squash it, then make a dog, it would be reasonable for us on seeing this to say that this previously did not exist but now does exist.
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From:
Mnesarchus (fragments/reports [c.120 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 179.11
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A reaction:
Locke would say it is new, because the substance is the same, but a new life now exists. A sword could cease to exist and become a new ploughshare, I would think. Apply this to the Ship of Theseus. Is form more important than substance?
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20130
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It is absurd to think you can change your own essence, like a garment [Nietzsche]
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Full Idea:
Man is necessity down to his last fibre, and totally 'unfree', that is if one means by freedom the foolish demand to be able to change one's 'essentia' arbitrarily, like a garment.
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From:
Friedrich Nietzsche (Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks [1873], p.7), quoted by Brian Leiter - Nietzsche On Morality 2 'Realism'
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A reaction:
This is the big difference between the existentialism of Nietzsche and the more famous Sartrean approach, where the idea of being able to remake your essence is the most exciting and glamorous proposal. I'm with Nietzsche.
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23530
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The great danger of democracy is that the oppression of the minority becomes unobjectionable [Hart,HLA]
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Full Idea:
For Mill and De Tocqueville the greatest of the dangers was not that in fact the majority might use their power to oppress a minority, but that, with the spread of democratic ideas, it might come to be thought unobjectionable that they should do so.
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From:
H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], III 'Populism')
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A reaction:
This was vivid in the 2016 Brexit referendum, which was 52-48 in favour of leaving. There were lots voices saying 'you lost, get over it'. It should be a basic (if neglected) principle that the winners of elections now represent the whole population.
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23528
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The value of liberty allows freedom of action, even if that distresses other people [Hart,HLA]
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Full Idea:
Recognition of individual liberty as a value involves, as a minimum, acceptance of the principle that the individual may do what he wants, even if others are distressed when the learn what it is that he does.
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From:
H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Private')
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A reaction:
He notes that there could be other reasons to block the freedom, such as harm done. This idea seems to identify a key component of liberalism - that we must all tolerate actions which we dislike.
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23521
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Do morals influence law? Is morality an aspect of law? Can law be morally criticised? [Hart,HLA]
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Full Idea:
Four questions: 1) Has the development of law been influenced by morals? 2) Must reference to morality enter into an adequate definition of law or legal system? 3) Is law open to moral criticism? 4) Does immorality justify legal punishment?
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From:
H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Enforcement')
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A reaction:
[compressed] Three nice questions, which are his agenda for the book. It is obvious that immoral laws can be created, and that laws can be criticised for being too concerned with morality, so there is no clear general answer to these dilemmas.
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23527
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Moral wickedness of an offence is always relevant to the degree of punishment [Hart,HLA]
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Full Idea:
Leslie Stephen argued that when the question is how severely an offender should be punished, an estimate of the degree of moral wickedness involved in the crime is always relevant.
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From:
H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Moral')
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A reaction:
[Stephen 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' 1873] The degree of responsibility (after excuses etc.) is obviously also highly relevant. If vicious murder is punished more harshly, that seems to be an assessment of the character of the murderer.
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