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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas' and 'fragments/reports'

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11 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason

1813	All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
	Full Idea: Twelfth mode: all reasoning leads on to further reasoning, and this process goes on forever.
	From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10

1811	Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
	Full Idea: Fifteenth mode: proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved.
	From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10

1815	Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
	Full Idea: Fourteenth mode: reasoning requires arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses.
	From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10

1812	All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
	Full Idea: Eleventh mode: all topics of discussion are full of uncertainty and contradiction.
	From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions

19426	'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: A 'nominal' definition is nothing more than an enumeration of the sufficient distinguishing characteristics.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.284)
	A reaction: Not wholly clear. Are these actual distinguishing characteristics, or potential ones? Could DNA be part of a human's nominal definition (for an unidentified corpse, perhaps).

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object

6019	If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus]
	Full Idea: If, for the sake of argument, someone were to mould a horse, squash it, then make a dog, it would be reasonable for us on seeing this to say that this previously did not exist but now does exist.
	From: Mnesarchus (fragments/reports [c.120 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 179.11
	A reaction: Locke would say it is new, because the substance is the same, but a new life now exists. A sword could cease to exist and become a new ploughshare, I would think. Apply this to the Ship of Theseus. Is form more important than substance?

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge

19424	Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear ideas are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are either adequate or inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283)
	A reaction: This is Leibniz's expansion of Descartes's idea that knowledge rests on 'clear and distinct conceptions'. The ultimate target seems to be close to an Aristotelian 'real definition', which is comprehensive and precise. Does 'intuitive' mean coherent?

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma

8850	Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M]
	Full Idea: Agrippa's Trilemma offers three possible outcomes for a regress of justification: the chain goes on for ever (infinite); or the chain stops at an unjustified proposition (arbitrary); or the chain eventually includes the original proposition (circular).
	From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60], §2) by Michael Williams - Without Immediate Justification §2
	A reaction: This summarises Ideas 1911, 1913 and 1914. Agrippa's Trilemma is now a standard starting point for modern discussions of foundations. Personally I reject 2, and am torn between 1 (+ social consensus) and 3 (with a benign, coherent circle).

13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism

1814	Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
	Full Idea: Thirteenth mode: everything is always perceived in relation to something else.
	From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10

18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas

19427	True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: An idea is true if what it represents is possible; false if the representation contains a contradiction.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.287)
	A reaction: Odd in the analytic tradition to talk of a single idea or concept (rather than a proposition or utterance) as being 'true'. But there is clearly a notion of valid or legitimate or useful concepts here. Hilbert said true just meant non-contradictory.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause

19425	In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: In the schools the four causes are lumped together as material, formal, efficient, and final causes, but they have no clear definitions, and I would call such a judgment 'obscure'.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283)
	A reaction: He picks this to illustrate what he means by 'obscure', so he must feel strongly about it. Elsewhere Leibniz embraces efficient and final causes, but says little of the other two. This immediately become clearer as the Four Modes of Explanation.