Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians' and 'Epistemic Justification'

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8 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object

6019	If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus]
	Full Idea: If, for the sake of argument, someone were to mould a horse, squash it, then make a dog, it would be reasonable for us on seeing this to say that this previously did not exist but now does exist.
	From: Mnesarchus (fragments/reports [c.120 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 179.11
	A reaction: Locke would say it is new, because the substance is the same, but a new life now exists. A sword could cease to exist and become a new ploughshare, I would think. Apply this to the Ship of Theseus. Is form more important than substance?

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism

19679	'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
	Full Idea: Strong 'access' internalism says the justification must be accessible to the person holding the belief (for cognitive duty, or blame), and weaker 'mentalist' internalism just says the justification must supervene on mental features of the individual.
	From: Jonathan Kvanvig (Epistemic Justification [2011], III)
	A reaction: [compressed] I think I'm a strong access internalist. I doubt whether there is a correct answer to any of this, but my conception of someone knowing something involves being able to invoke their reasons for it. Even if they forget the source.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism

19678	Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
	Full Idea: Strong foundationalists require truth-preserving inferential links between the foundations and what the foundations support, while weaker versions allow weaker connections, such as inductive support, or best explanation, or probabilistic support.
	From: Jonathan Kvanvig (Epistemic Justification [2011], II)
	A reaction: [He cites Alston 1989] Personally I'm a coherentist about justification, but I'm a fan of best explanation, so I'd vote for that. It's just that best explanation is not a very foundationalist sort of concept. Actually, the strong version is absurd.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function

13195	To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: A house would be badly explained if we were to describe only the arrangement of its parts, but not its use.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.255)
	A reaction: This must partly fall under pragmatics (i.e. what the enquirer is interested in). But function plays a genuine role in artefacts, and also in evolved biological organs.

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving

13193	Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Active force should not be thought of as the simple and common potential [potentia] or receptivity to action of the schools. Rather, active force involves an effort [conatus] or striving [tendentia] toward action.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.252)
	A reaction: This is why Leibniz is lured into making his active forces more and more animistic, till they end up like proto-minds (though never, remember, conscious and willing minds).

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature

13194	God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: To say that, in creation, God gave bodies a law for acting means nothing, unless, at the same time, he gave them something by means of which it could happen that the law is followed.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.253)
	A reaction: This is the beginning of the modern rebellion against the medieval view of laws as imposed from outside on passive matter. Unfortunately for Leibniz, once you have postulated active internal powers, the external laws become redundant.

27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces

13196	All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: All qualities of bodies .....are in the end reduced [revoco] to forces.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.256)
	A reaction: The dots conceal a long qualification, but he is essentially standing by this simple remark. If you substitute the word 'powers' for 'forces', I think that is just about right.

13192	Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The dynamicon or power [potentia] in bodies is twofold, passive and active. Passive force [vis] constitutes matter or mass [massa], and active force constitutes entelechy or form.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians [1702], p.252)
	A reaction: This is explicitly equating the innate force understood in physics with Aristotelian form. The passive force is to explain the resistance of bodies. I like the equation of force with power. He says the entelechy is 'analogous' to a soul.