Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier' and 'The Dappled World'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object

6019	If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus]
	Full Idea: If, for the sake of argument, someone were to mould a horse, squash it, then make a dog, it would be reasonable for us on seeing this to say that this previously did not exist but now does exist.
	From: Mnesarchus (fragments/reports [c.120 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 179.11
	A reaction: Locke would say it is new, because the substance is the same, but a new life now exists. A sword could cease to exist and become a new ploughshare, I would think. Apply this to the Ship of Theseus. Is form more important than substance?

14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory

17503	Theories can never represent accurately, because their components are abstract [Cartwright,N, by Portides]
	Full Idea: Cartwright objects that the claim that theories represent what happens in actual situations is to overlook that the concepts used in them (such as 'force functions' and 'Hamiltonians') are abstract.
	From: report of Nancy Cartwright (The Dappled World [1999]) by Demetris Portides - Models 'Current'
	A reaction: I'm not convinced by this. The term 'abstract' is too loose. In a sense most words are abstract because they are universals. If I say 'that's a cat', that is a very accurate remark, despite the generality of 'cat'.

27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces

12719	Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The notion of force is as clear as that of action and passion, because it is that from which action follows when nothing prevents it.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
	A reaction: For Leibniz, force seems to be a metaphysical notion, rather than a feature of the physical world. I take it to be the bottom level of explanation, and it equates with Aristotelian form and essence.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time

12720	Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Time never exists, since all of its parts never exist together.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
	A reaction: The problem here is that he seems to be admitting that time has 'parts'. Can something have parts and not exist? Events will also fail to exist by this criterion, though we could hardly deny that events (or some such) 'happen'.