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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Problem of Possibilia' and 'Aristotle and the Metaphysics'

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7 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions

11257	The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis]
	Full Idea: Aristotle praises the Pythagoreans for being the first to offer definitions.
	From: report of Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4
	A reaction: This sounds like a hugely important step in the development of Greek philosophy which is hardly ever mentioned.

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth

11235	'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis]
	Full Idea: It is crucial not to confuse 'true' with 'true of'. 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words.
	From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 1.4)
	A reaction: A beautifully simple distinction which had never occurred to me, and which (being a thoroughgoing realist) I really like.

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing

11277	Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis]
	Full Idea: We may be unfamiliar with the question 'What is being?' because there appear to be no contrastive questions of the form: how do beings differ from things that are not beings?
	From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 4.1)
	A reaction: We can, of course, contrast actual beings with possible beings, or imaginary beings, or even logically impossible beings, but in those cases 'being' strikes me as an entirely inappropriate word.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object

6019	If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus]
	Full Idea: If, for the sake of argument, someone were to mould a horse, squash it, then make a dog, it would be reasonable for us on seeing this to say that this previously did not exist but now does exist.
	From: Mnesarchus (fragments/reports [c.120 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 179.11
	A reaction: Locke would say it is new, because the substance is the same, but a new life now exists. A sword could cease to exist and become a new ploughshare, I would think. Apply this to the Ship of Theseus. Is form more important than substance?

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities

11248	Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis]
	Full Idea: An essence is true in virtue of what the thing is in itself, but a necessary truth may be relational, as the consequence of the relation between two things and their essence. The necessary relation may be two-way, but the essential relation one-way.
	From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 2.3)
	A reaction: He is writing about Aristotle, but has in mind Kit Fine 1994 (qv). Politis cites Plato's answer to the Euthyphro Question as a good example. The necessity comes from the intrinsic nature of goodness/piety, not from the desire of the gods.

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility

9212	Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Possible states of affairs have often been taken to be propositions, but this cannot be correct, since any possible state of affairs is possibly a state of affairs, but no proposition is possibly a state of affairs.
	From: Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2)
	A reaction: The point is, presumably, that the state of affairs cannot be the proposition itself, but (at least) what the proposition refers to. I can't see any objection to that.

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds

9213	The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: A possible world can't be defined (by Stalnaker and Plantinga) as a way the world might have been, because a possible world is possibly the world, yet no way the world might have been is possibly the world.
	From: Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2)
	A reaction: His point is that any definition of a possible world must cover the actual world, because that is one of them. 'Might have been' is not applicable to the actual world. It seems a fairly important starting point for discussion of possible worlds.