Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Academica' and 'Events and Their Names'

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10 ideas

2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument [Cicero]
     Full Idea: Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], I.viii.32)
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero]
     Full Idea: There cannot be more than one truth.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xlviii.147)
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem [Cicero]
     Full Idea: It is a fundamental principle of dialectic that every statement is either true or false. So is this a true proposition or a false one: "If you say that you are lying and say it truly, you lie"?
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xxix.95)
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
     Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
     A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus]
     Full Idea: If, for the sake of argument, someone were to mould a horse, squash it, then make a dog, it would be reasonable for us on seeing this to say that this previously did not exist but now does exist.
     From: Mnesarchus (fragments/reports [c.120 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 179.11
     A reaction: Locke would say it is new, because the substance is the same, but a new life now exists. A sword could cease to exist and become a new ploughshare, I would think. Apply this to the Ship of Theseus. Is form more important than substance?
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us? [Cicero]
     Full Idea: If human nature were interrogated by some god as to whether it was content with its own senses in a sound and undamaged state or demanded something better, I cannot see what more it could ask for.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.vii.19)
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero]
     Full Idea: How can there possibly be a memory of what is false?
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.vii.22)
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality [Cicero]
     Full Idea: [The sceptical Academics say] what is false cannot be perceived, but every true presentation is such that there can be a false presentation of the same quality.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.40)
     A reaction: It was the stoics who focused the discussion on 'presentations'. This claim is purely theoretical; no one has ever experienced a false presentation of talking to a family member that was as vivid as the real thing.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure [Cicero]
     Full Idea: None of the virtues can exist unless they are disinterested, for virtue driven to duty by pleasure as a sort of pay is not virtue at all but a deceptive sham and pretence of virtue.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xlvi.140)
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
     Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
     A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out).