6 ideas
13437 | A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois] |
Full Idea: At t1 there is a whole CAR, and a PART of it, which is everything except the right front wheel. At t2 the wheel is removed, leaving just PART, so that CAR is now PART. But PART was a proper part of CAR, and CAR had the front wheel. Different properties! | |
From: André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998], 1.II) | |
A reaction: [compressed summary] The problem is generated by appealing to Leibniz's Law. My immediate reaction is that this is the sort of trouble you get into if you include such temporal truths about things as 'properties'. |
6019 | If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus] |
Full Idea: If, for the sake of argument, someone were to mould a horse, squash it, then make a dog, it would be reasonable for us on seeing this to say that this previously did not exist but now does exist. | |
From: Mnesarchus (fragments/reports [c.120 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 179.11 | |
A reaction: Locke would say it is new, because the substance is the same, but a new life now exists. A sword could cease to exist and become a new ploughshare, I would think. Apply this to the Ship of Theseus. Is form more important than substance? |
16233 | Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois] |
Full Idea: A problem for Gallois is that he leaves us no way to talk about questions of genuine identity through time, and thus undercuts one motivation for his own position. | |
From: comment on André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.8 | |
A reaction: Gallois seems to need a second theory of identity to support his Occasional Identity theory. Two things need an identity each, before we can say that the two identities coincide. (Time to read Gallois!) |
14755 | Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider] |
Full Idea: Gallois's core claim is that the identity relation holds with respect to times, ...and he must claim that there is no such thing as the relation of identity simpliciter. | |
From: report of André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.5 | |
A reaction: Gallois is essentially responding to the statue and clay problem, but it seems a bit drastic to entirely change our concept of two things being identical, such as Hesperus and Phosphorus. 'Identity' seems to have several meanings; let's sort them out. |
16231 | Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley] |
Full Idea: Gallois' Occasional Identity Thesis is that objects can be identical at one time without being identical at all times. | |
From: report of André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.4 | |
A reaction: The analogy is presumably with two crossing roads being identical at one place but not at others. It is a major misunderstanding to infer from Special Relativity that time is just like space. |
21132 | Domination is probable obedience by some group of persons [Weber] |
Full Idea: Domination is the probability that a command with a specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons. | |
From: Max Weber (Economy and Society [1919], p.53), quoted by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 06 | |
A reaction: Said to be an 'influential definition'. In principle you might have no domination, but be regularly obeyed because your commands were so acceptable to a very independent-minded group of people. That said, good definition! |