Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals' and 'The Method of Truth in Metaphysics'

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4 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
6019 If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus]
     Full Idea: If, for the sake of argument, someone were to mould a horse, squash it, then make a dog, it would be reasonable for us on seeing this to say that this previously did not exist but now does exist.
     From: Mnesarchus (fragments/reports [c.120 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 179.11
     A reaction: Locke would say it is new, because the substance is the same, but a new life now exists. A sword could cease to exist and become a new ploughshare, I would think. Apply this to the Ship of Theseus. Is form more important than substance?
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
12191 Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence [Goodman, by McFetridge]
     Full Idea: Goodman's central idea was: 'If that match had been scratched, it would have lighted' is true if there are suitable truths from which, with the antecedent, the consequent can be inferred by means of a logical, or more typically natural, law.
     From: report of Nelson Goodman (The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals [1947]) by Ian McFetridge - Logical Necessity: Some Issues §4
     A reaction: Goodman then discusses the problem of identifying the natural laws, and identifying the suitable truths. I'm inclined to think counterfactuals are vaguer than that; they are plausible if coherent reasons can be offered for the inference.
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
4042 Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time [Davidson]
     Full Idea: An intelligible metaphysics will assign a central place to the idea of people (= speakers) with a location in public space and time.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Method of Truth in Metaphysics [1977], §III)
     A reaction: The 'location' is the interesting bit, requiring people to be bodies, not abstractions. A big, plausible claim, but hard to prove.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
4041 Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Sentences held true (the linguistic representatives of beliefs) determine the meanings of the words they contain.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Method of Truth in Metaphysics [1977], §II)
     A reaction: Maybe. Historically, truth and belief presumably precede words and sentences. But words separate off from beliefs very easily. I'm not convinced. Words initiate language, not beliefs?