90 ideas
| 15447 | We shouldn't always follow where the argument leads! [Lewis on Plato] |
| Full Idea: There comes a time not to go on following where the argument leads! | |
| From: comment on Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 667b) by David Lewis - Against Structural Universals 'Variant' | |
| A reaction: Lewis is a fine one to talk, since he follows argument that take him past innumerable incredulous stares of onlookers. |
| 243 | It is foolish to quarrel with the mind's own reasoning processes [Plato] |
| Full Idea: When the soul quarrels with knowledge or opinion or reason, its natural ruling principles, you have there what I call 'folly'. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 689b) |
| 241 | We ought to follow where the argument leads us [Plato] |
| Full Idea: We ought to follow where the argument leads us. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 667a) |
| 21264 | Mortals are incapable of being fully rational [Plato] |
| Full Idea: We mustn't assume that mortal eyes will ever be able to look upon reason and get to know it adequately. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 897d) | |
| A reaction: This is in the context of the rational control of the whole Cosmos. I presume Plato would be flabbergasted by the findings of recent physics and cosmology. Did Kant believe that he was being completely rational about ethics? |
| 23917 | Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Contrary things can be reasonably held …because the contrary positions will stand if what is said is true in one way, but not true in another. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1235b17) | |
| A reaction: My strategy here is to clarify the unambiguous underlying propositions which are being expressed. There will then be either agreement, or flat contradiction. |
| 251 | Truth has the supreme value, for both gods and men [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Truth heads the list of all things good, for gods and men alike. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 730c) |
| 5869 | The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The thesis that there is a Form either of good or indeed of anything else is verbal and vacuous. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1217b20) | |
| A reaction: This is clear evidence for suggesting that Aristotle is a nominalist. Elsewhere his essentialism suggests otherwise, but clearly on grumpy days he thought that universals were mere verbal conventions. |
| 6019 | If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus] |
| Full Idea: If, for the sake of argument, someone were to mould a horse, squash it, then make a dog, it would be reasonable for us on seeing this to say that this previously did not exist but now does exist. | |
| From: Mnesarchus (fragments/reports [c.120 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 179.11 | |
| A reaction: Locke would say it is new, because the substance is the same, but a new life now exists. A sword could cease to exist and become a new ploughshare, I would think. Apply this to the Ship of Theseus. Is form more important than substance? |
| 21259 | To grasp a thing we need its name, its definition, and what it really is [Plato] |
| Full Idea: There are three elements in any given thing: the first is what the object actually is, the second is the definition of this, and the third is the name. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 895d) | |
| A reaction: I take the importance of this to be its distinction between what it is, and the definition of what it is. Aristotle maintains this distinction, but some modern Aristotelians seem to get the confused. Plato worried a lot more about names than we do. |
| 22505 | The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If it is necessary that, if a triangle contains two right angles, that a quadrilateral has four, it is clear that the cause of this is that a triangle has two. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1222b31) | |
| A reaction: We would not normally use the word 'cause' for this, but 'necessitates' seems to fit, and I like the word 'determines' (because it can be both physical and abstract). An example of what I think of as an Aristotelian necessity maker. |
| 22513 | Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Knowing and understanding is of two kinds, one having and the other using knowledge. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1225b11) | |
| A reaction: This corresponds to potential and actual. We wouldn't say that understanding must be used, but we have some sort of distinction between knowledge as pure and theoretical, and understanding enabling good application. |
| 21260 | Soul is what is defined by 'self-generating motion' [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The entity which we call 'soul' is precisely that which is defined by the expression 'self-generating motion'. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 896a) | |
| A reaction: We may suspect that he defines soul in this way for a particular context, aimed at proving the existence of a First Mover. He must think there is more to soul than the generation of movement. |
| 23906 | Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The courage of spirit is the most natural kind; for spirit is unconquerable, which is why the young are the best fighters. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1229a27) | |
| A reaction: [thumos, presumably, as in Plato] I suppose Aristotle knows better than me, but I suspect the young are just the quickest and strongest. I'd rather be led by someone with experience than by someone who is young. |
| 20204 | Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It makes no difference if the soul is divided into parts or lacks parts, as it certainly has distinct capacities. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1219b32), quoted by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind II 3.1 | |
| A reaction: I take this to endorse my view that the mind-body problem is of limited interest to philosophers. The focus should be on what the mind does, not how it is constructed. But then I presume the latter issue is revealed by neuroscience. |
| 276 | My individuality is my soul, which carries my body around [Plato] |
| Full Idea: While I am alive I have nothing to thank for my individuality except my soul, whereas my body is just the likeness that I carry around with me. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 959a) |
| 22506 | A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: All those things that are in man's power either to do or not to do he himself is the cause of, and all those things that he is the cause of are in his own power. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1223a08) | |
| A reaction: This is the step which allows us to abandon free will, and replace it with the question of whether a person is the 'cause' of an action. Aristotle carefully delineates the criteria for when an action is within a person's power. Includes failures to act? |
| 22504 | Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A human being is a starting point of some actions, and he alone of animals; for of nothing else should we say that it acted. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1222b19) | |
| A reaction: It is a standard dogma that the idea of free will does not occur in Plato or Aristotle, but this looks awfully like it. I don't agree about animals. You watch them judging whether they can make a leap, and then doing it. |
| 22510 | Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Many classify even love as involuntary, and certain cases of anger and certain natural states as being too strong for human nature; and we regard them as being pardonable, as being of such a nature as to be constrained by nature. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1225b20) | |
| A reaction: Blind terror would presumably count as another such state. An interesting aspect of Aristotle's picture - that human nature contains ingredients that are not part of a natural harmonious whole. |
| 23913 | Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Pretty much all of the praiseworthy or blameworthy states concerned with character are either excesses, deficiencies, or medial conditions in feelings. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1233b16) | |
| A reaction: Suggests that the ideal state of character is the result of long and careful tuning of the feelings - insofar as we can control them. Presumably we can train feelings of hatred or compassion, by appropriate exposures. These states are NOT virtues. |
| 23918 | Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The discord between the good and the pleasant in one's feelings is lack of self-control. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1237a08) | |
| A reaction: A nice clear statement of his view, which opposes the view of Socrates that akrasia is a failure of reason or judgement. Goodness seems to be treated here as a feeling, which is unusual. |
| 22515 | Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Choice is neither simply wish nor opinion, but opinion together with inclination, whenever as a result of deliberation they are brought to a conclusion. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1227a04) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the earliest appearance of the belief-plus-desire theory of action, which is often associated with Hume. A choice does not necessarily result from having the inclination and the appropriate opinion. Laziness! |
| 22508 | Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In inanimate things the starting-point is single, in animate things there is more than one; for inclination and reason are not always in harmony. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224a24) | |
| A reaction: It is important that this seems to include non-human animals. We see animals avoid something which they desire, presumably because they detect a danger. They may be conflicting desires, but it is rational to prioritise dangers. |
| 22514 | The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: That part of the soul is deliberative which is capable of discerning a cause: the reason for the sake of which - which is one of the causes - 'cause' being something because-of-which. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1226b26) | |
| A reaction: I take because-of-which to be the correct explanation. Since my model of practical reasoning is partly forensic detection, this seems right. Sherlock Holmes spots causes. |
| 22507 | An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The voluntary consists in action accompanied by thought of some kind. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224a06) | |
| A reaction: This is thought as opposed to inclination or choice. The controlled person [enkrateia] voluntarily acts against inclinations. The appropriate thought receives carefull analysis in NE 1109b30-1111b4. |
| 23319 | We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle, for us to be responsible for what we do, our action has to somehow reflect our motivation. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224a07) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 2 | |
| A reaction: This sounds like 'mens rea' in law - meaning to do the thing you did. But we can obviously be responsible for things through neglect, for example. |
| 249 | People who value beauty above virtue insult the soul by placing the body above it [Plato] |
| Full Idea: When a man values beauty above virtue, the disrespect he shows his soul is total and fundamental, because he argues that the body is more to be honoured than the soul. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 727e) |
| 22512 | Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Whatever a man does - not in ignorance, and through his own agency - when it is in his power not to do it, must be voluntary, and that is what voluntary is. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1225b08) | |
| A reaction: This is the conclusion of the Eudemian discussion of responsibility. This is a definition by necessary and sufficient conditions. How can you be sure that something is in your power not to do? |
| 22509 | What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: By these marks we distinguish what comes naturally: everything that is there straightaway as soon as something comes to be, and all that occurs to us if growth is allowed to proceed normally - such as greying hair, ageing, and the like. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224b32) | |
| A reaction: The word 'normal' has to do a lot of work here. Presumably jaundice in a neonate is not included. Or later hereditary diseases. |
| 18230 | No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If we put together all the things that are ....not done or undergone for their own sake ...no one would choose, in order to have them, to be alive rather than not. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1215), quoted by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Finality' | |
| A reaction: Debatable. Roughly his question is whether you would rather be dead than be a slave, since slaves work for means, but have no ends. Aristotle would rather die, but those who surrendered in ancient battles preferred slavery. |
| 23909 | Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There is intrinsic use of a possession, such as of a shoe or a cloak, and its coincidental use - not of course when using a shoe as a weight, but as, for example, selling it or hiring it out (for then a shoe is used as a shoe). | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1231b37) | |
| A reaction: This seems to need a third label, for using the shoe as a weight. 'Inessential use' perhaps, since the intrinsic use points towards the essential nature or function of the shoe. |
| 5870 | Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is not true that everything that there is seeks some single good: each thing has an inclination for its own good, the eye for sight, the body for health, and so on. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1218a30) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle's pluralism. Elsewhere this pluralism arises from his function argument - that the good of each thing is the successful fulfilment of its function, which is different for each thing. This is basic to virtue theory, and has my approval. |
| 265 | An action is only just if it is performed by someone with a just character and outlook [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The description 'just' is applicable only to the benefit conferred or injury inflicted by someone with a just character and outlook. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 862b) | |
| A reaction: How should we describe the occasional administering of good justice by a generally wicked judge. Greeks focus on character, but moderns focus on actions. |
| 5877 | We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is because it is not easy to discern what sort of choice it is that we are forced to judge from the deeds what sort of person someone is; the activity is more worth having, but the choice is commended more. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1228a15) | |
| A reaction: This shows why Aristotle is the most important opponent of consequentialism. It is hard to see how one could praise a self-interested deed simply because it benefited others. Greed is never good. |
| 269 | Attempted murder is like real murder, but we should respect the luck which avoided total ruin [Plato] |
| Full Idea: An attempted murder should be treated like a successful one, but with respect shown for the luck which saved him from total ruin. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 877a) | |
| A reaction: The earliest reference to moral luck, I think. 'Repect' sounds vague, but it is asking judges to 'take it into consideration', which is quite practical. Attempted murderers are just as dangerous. |
| 5868 | Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: No horse or bird or fish is happy, nor any other thing that there is which does not have a share by its nature in the divine. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1217a26) | |
| A reaction: Pet owners will all feel their beloved companions have been insulted, but I agree with this. 'Happy' does not here mean 'in a state of pleasure'. A fully successful bird does little more than the four f's (feed, fornicate, flee, fight). |
| 5865 | Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: To be happy, and to live the fine and divinely-happy life, would seem to reside in three things above all, ..for some say that wisdom is the greatest good, others virtue, others pleasure. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1214a30) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle is well-known for his pluralist answer to this question: virtue is crucial, wisdom is perhaps the greatest of the virtues, and pleasure improves everything in life. |
| 240 | It would be strange if the gods rewarded those who experienced the most pleasure in life [Plato] |
| Full Idea: It would be strange if the gods gave the greatest rewards in heaven to those who led the most pleasant life, rather than the most just. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 662c) | |
| A reaction: All of philosophy is just footnotes to Plato.... See Idea 1454. |
| 264 | The conquest of pleasure is the noblest victory of all [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The conquest of pleasure is the noblest victory of all. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 840c) | |
| A reaction: Plato's puritanical streak. Even Aristotle doesn't agree with this. Self-control does not imply conquest of pleasure. Has a good professional wine taster conquered pleasure? |
| 5876 | Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is different from continence. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1227b17) | |
| A reaction: Basic to Aristotle - in that continence leads to right action, but that is not enough for virtue, which requires inner harmony, reason, and pleasure in doing what is right. Hence Aristotle is quite distinct from deontological or consequentialist views. |
| 5872 | Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Excellence is the best disposition, state or capacity of anything that has some employment or function; this is evident from induction. For example, a cloak has an excellence - and a certain function and employment also; its best state is its excellence. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1219a02) | |
| A reaction: 'Employment' will be an assigned function, and 'function' will be a natural or intrinsic function, I presume. This is a nice clear illustration of the fact that for Aristotle virtue runs continuously from people to cloaks. See Idea 1663, though. |
| 263 | The only worthwhile life is one devoted to physical and moral perfection [Plato] |
| Full Idea: A life devoted to every physical perfection and every moral virtue is the only life worth the name. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 807c) |
| 4332 | Virtue is a concord of reason and emotion, with pleasure and pain trained to correct ends [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is the general concord of reason and emotion, but there is one key element, which is the correct formation of our feelings of pleasure and pain, which makes us hate what we ought to hate, and love what we ought to love. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 653c) | |
| A reaction: An important truth, taken up by Aristotle. To see another person humiliated gives some people pleasure and other people pain. |
| 248 | A serious desire for moral excellence is very rare indeed [Plato] |
| Full Idea: People who are anxious to attain moral excellence with all possible speed are pretty thin on the ground. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 718e) |
| 253 | Every crime is the result of excessive self-love [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The cause of each and every crime we commit is precisely this excessive love of ourselves. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 731e) |
| 235 | Virtue is the aim of all laws [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is the aim of the laws the legislator lays down. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 631a) |
| 5875 | Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Character (éthos), as the word itself indicates, is developed from habit (ethos). | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1220a36) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle goes in for dubious etymologies, but this one sounds quite significant, and supports his view that habit is central to virtue. We would lose nothing in English if we said 'what are her habits?' instead of 'what is her character?'. |
| 5874 | Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The virtues of character belong to the part that is non-rational, but whose nature is to follow the rational part; we do not say what a man's character is like when we say that he is wise or clever, but when we say that he is gentle or daring. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1220a11) | |
| A reaction: In the Nichomachean Ethics it appears that good character is the 'harmony' between the two parts; here it sounds more like obedience. It seems to me that our rational part is a failure if it is not sensitive to the needs of the irrational part. |
| 22516 | Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is that state of character which chooses the mean, relative to us, in things pleasant and unpleasant, all those in respect of which a man is said to have a certain sort of character according as he enjoys or suffers pain from them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1227b08) | |
| A reaction: The 'mean' should be understood as what is appropriate, rather than the mere average. Strong anger, for example, is sometimes appropriate. Does Aristotle rule out wild laughter, or frenetic dancing? Is a state of ecstasy wicked? |
| 22517 | We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is from his choosing that we judge what sort of person someone is; that is, what that for whose sake he does something is, not what he does. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1228a03) | |
| A reaction: Not entirely true. It can be sufficient to reveal their character that a person does some particular thing, as novelists know. When Hud parks his car in her flowerbed, we don't need to enquire about his reason. But see 1228a16! |
| 23914 | People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The mean is more contrary to the extremes than the extremes are to each other, because it does not occur with either of them, whereas the extremes often occur with each other. People can be rash cowards, or wasteful in some things and generous in others. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1234a33) | |
| A reaction: This rather undermines the neat visual metaphor of a sliding scale, but gives a more accurate account of the mean. The diagram needs three dimensions, instead of two. |
| 23911 | Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Each virtue makes its possessor tend to despise great things that are contrary to reason - for example, courage does this of dangers, …a temperate person of many pleasures, and a generous one of many sorts of wealth. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1232a37) | |
| A reaction: I like the observation that the generous tend to despise wealth, implying that those who love wealth tend to lack generosity. Christianity has encouraged us to reject the idea of despising anything - but that seems to iron out common sense values. |
| 277 | The Guardians must aim to discover the common element in the four cardinal virtues [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The guardians of the state should aim to get an exact idea of the common element in all the four virtues. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 965d) |
| 23910 | Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: All the virtues will follow along with greatness of soul, or it will follow along with all of them | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1232a36) | |
| A reaction: This is obviously similar in some respects to Nietzsche's 'higher' man, though that suggests greater independence, rather than being an ideal citizen. |
| 23908 | If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If someone looks at a beautiful statue, or horse, or human being, or listens to someone singing …just to look at or listen to beautiful things, he would not be thought to be intemperate, any more than those beguiled by the Sirens would. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1230b31) | |
| A reaction: He says that intemperance mainly concerns taste and touch, rather than mere looking or listening. I think obsessive collectors of beautiful objects might drift into intemperance. |
| 254 | Excessive laughter and tears must be avoided [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Excessive laughter and tears must be avoided. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 732c) |
| 266 | Injustice is the mastery of the soul by bad feelings, even if they do not lead to harm [Plato] |
| Full Idea: My general description of injustice is this: the mastery of the soul by anger, fear, pleasure, pain, envy and desires, whether they lead to actual damage or not. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 863e) |
| 23905 | Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Courage is a following of reason, and reason orders us to choose what is noble. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1229a01) | |
| A reaction: This sounds right to me. Courage, in all sorts of contexts, seems to arise in people who sustain their focus on what is the right thing to do. |
| 23912 | Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It makes a difference whether the honour comes from many random people or from those worthy of note, and again so does by whom and for what the honor is conferred. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1232b18) | |
| A reaction: He tends to play down honour because of its relativism, but this quotation implies that if an honour was bestowed by the worthy, for something of agreed high value, then it would be at quite a different level from mere popular esteem. Celebrity v peerage? |
| 5871 | Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: All goods are either in the soul or outside it, and it is those in the soul that are more worthy of choice; for wisdom, virtue and pleasure are in the soul, and some or all of these seem to be an end for everyone. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1218b34) | |
| A reaction: An interesting reason for this assertion - that it is true because everybody agrees on it. See Idea 95. I would think that he might claim that our soul is our essence, whereas external goods pander to the non-essential in us. |
| 242 | The best people are produced where there is no excess of wealth or poverty [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The community in which neither wealth nor poverty exists will produce the finest characters. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 679b) |
| 256 | Virtue and great wealth are incompatible [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Virtue and great wealth are quite incompatible. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 742e) |
| 23920 | Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is possible for a decent person to be friends with a base one. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1238b01) | |
| A reaction: This is on the basis of being useful, or of having something in common. Presumably friendship can come in degrees, as well as being of different kinds. Even the finest people can differ a lot, and only have a limited friendship. |
| 23919 | Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Just as if people wish to be healthy they do not become healthy, so if they wish to be friends they are not immediately in fact friends. …[1237b40] For a friend is not to be had without a test or in a single day, but needs time. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1237b21) | |
| A reaction: The voice of experience, I think. Obviously trust is basic, and it would be unwise to trust a possible friend on the first day. Since politics aims at friendship, I presume the support of the rule of law helps to achieve trust. |
| 23915 | The main function of politics is to produce friendship [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It seems to be most of all the function of politics to produce friendship. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1245b22) | |
| A reaction: Lovely! Most people would probably cite wealth and security as the main aims. This function seems to require quite a high degree of equality, though Aristotle doesn't think it essential. |
| 245 | Totalitarian states destroy friendships and community spirit [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Excessively authoritarian government destroys all friendship and community of spirit in the state. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 697d) |
| 239 | Education in virtue produces citizens who are active but obedient [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Education in virtue produces a keen desire to become a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and be ruled as justice demands. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 643e) |
| 1402 | Friendship is impossible between master and slave, even if they are made equal [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Even if you proclaim that a master and a slave shall have equal status, friendship between them is inherently impossible. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 757a) |
| 262 | Men and women should qualify equally for honours on merit [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Men and women who have shown conspicuous merit should qualify for all honours without distinction of sex. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 802a) |
| 236 | Sound laws achieve the happiness of those who observe them [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Sound laws achieve the happiness of those who observe them. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 631b) |
| 259 | Justice is granting the equality which unequals deserve [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Justice consists of granting the 'equality' which unequals deserve to get. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 757d) | |
| A reaction: Beautifully simple, and hard to improve on. It shows the close link between equality and justice, but shows why they are not the same. The main debate about justice concerns the criteria for 'deserving'. |
| 23916 | The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If one wishes to make it so that people do not commit injustices to each other, it is enough to make them friends; for true friends do not commit injustice. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1245b28) | |
| A reaction: This, along with Idea 23915, offers a beautiful vision of what a society should try to achieve. There can be duplicitous apparent friends, but on the whole the best way to cure unjust relations is friendship. Imagine Jews and Arabs being friends (2023). |
| 257 | Mathematics has the widest application of any subject on the curriculum [Plato] |
| Full Idea: For domestic and public purposes, and all professional skills, no branch of a child's education has as big a range of applications as mathematics. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 747a) |
| 260 | Control of education is the key office of state, and should go to the best citizen [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The Minister of Education is by far the most important of all the supreme offices of the state; the best all-round citizen in the state should be appointed. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 765e) |
| 238 | Children's games should channel their pleasures into adult activity [Plato] |
| Full Idea: We should use children's games to channel their pleasures and desires towards activities in which they will have to engage when they are adult. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 643c) |
| 250 | The best way to educate the young is not to rebuke them, but to set a good example [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The best way to educate the younger generation (as well as yourself) is not to rebuke them but patently to practise all your life what you preach to others. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 729c) |
| 4331 | Education is channelling a child's feelings into the right course before it understands why [Plato] |
| Full Idea: I call 'education' the initial acquisition of virtue by the child, when the feelings of pleasure and affection, pain and hatred, are channelled in the right courses before he can understand the reason why. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 653b) | |
| A reaction: A precursor of Aristotle's view (Ethics 1104b11). A profound, simple and important insight. |
| 275 | Creation is not for you; you exist for the sake of creation [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Creation is not for your benefit; you exist for the sake of the universe. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 903c) |
| 5866 | It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Not to have ordered one's life in relation to some end is a mark of extreme folly. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1214b10) | |
| A reaction: A most interesting claim, not found in the Nichomachean Ethics. There the teleology is descriptive, but here it is prescriptive. It is tempting to rebel against Aristotle's injuncture. He was a driven workaholic. Why not float through life like gossamer? |
| 5878 | Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One might wonder if it is possible to use each thing both for its natural purpose and otherwise - and that as itself or incidentally. E.g. twisting an eye so that one thing appears two, but also using an eye as something to sell or eat. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1246a26) | |
| A reaction: The important idea here is the core notion that there is a 'natural' purpose. Sceptics might say that all purposes derive from how a mind wishes to use something; otherwise there would be processes, but no 'functions' or 'purposes'. |
| 5873 | Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Each thing's function is its end. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1219a08) | |
| A reaction: Function and end are not the same, but this confirms how closely related they are for Aristotle. Can an inanimate object have an end, without having any apparent function? Could I construct a set of cogwheels which each had a function, but no end? |
| 273 | Movement is transmitted through everything, and it must have started with self-generated motion [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Motion is transmitted to innumerable things, and this must spring from some initial principle, which must be the change effected by self-generated motion. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 895a) |
| 8004 | In 'The Laws', to obey the law is to be obey god [Plato, by MacIntyre] |
| Full Idea: The divine is important in 'The Laws' because it is identified with law; to be obedient before the law is to be obedient before god. | |
| From: report of Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: Christian conservativism in a nutshell. Plato is rejecting his view in Euthyphro that piety (etc.) must precede the will of the gods. The obvious problem is bad laws, made by corrupt rulers. |
| 21257 | Self-generating motion is clearly superior to all other kinds of motion [Plato] |
| Full Idea: We can't resist the conclusion that the motion which can generate itself is infinitely superior, and all the others are inferior to it. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 894d) | |
| A reaction: Who said you can't get values from facts! Not that the argument depends on superiority. There could be an inferior First Mover, as a bus driver is subservient to the passengers, or (my favourite) a head teacher is inferior to the pupils. |
| 21261 | Self-moving soul has to be the oldest thing there is [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Soul, being the source of motion, is the most ancient thing there is. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 896b) | |
| A reaction: Plato seems to assume that the First Mover must still exist, which doesn't follow from anything in the argument. The First Pusher could be dead before the last domino falls. Why can't activity be the default state of everything? |
| 21258 | The only possible beginning for the endless motions of reality is something self-generated [Plato] |
| Full Idea: When the motion in reality is transmitted to thousands of things one after another, the entire sequence of their movements must surely spring from some initial principle, which can hardly be anything except the change effected by self-generated motion. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 895a) | |
| A reaction: This gives a domino picture of reality, with all of reality responding inertly to a first kick. Much better is to see self-generated motion in the active qualities of all matter, as seen in the sea of virtual subatomic particles at the smallest level. |
| 274 | Soul must be the cause of all the opposites, such as good and evil or beauty and ugliness [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Soul must be cause of good and evil, beauty and ugliness, justice and injustice, and all the opposites. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 896d) |
| 21263 | If all the motions of nature reflect calculations of reason, then the best kind of soul must direct it [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If the movement of the heavens and all that is in them reflects the motion and revolution and calculation of reason ...then clearly we have to admit that it is the best kind of soul that cares for the entire universe and directs it along the best path. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 897c) | |
| A reaction: Most of this passage reflects the cosmological argument - that without some initiating source natural events could not occur - but this slides into the design argument. So who designed mud (which is too inferior to have a Form)? |
| 278 | If astronomical movements are seen as necessary instead of by divine will, this leads to atheism [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If a man studying astronomy sees events apparently happening by necessity rather than being directed by the intention of a benevolent will, he will turn into an atheist. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 967a) |
| 21265 | The heavens must be full of gods, controlling nature either externally or from within [Plato] |
| Full Idea: A soul or souls have been shown to be cause of all the phenomena, and whether it is by their living presence in matter that they direct all the heavens, or by some other means, we insist that these souls are gods. So 'everything is full of gods'. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 899b) | |
| A reaction: This seems to have little to do with the pagan gods on Olympus. It is also notably not monotheistic. It is somewhere between animism and panpsychism. Does he think the rivers and woods contain gods? Probably not. Just the orderly heavens. |
| 21262 | There must be at least two souls controlling the cosmos, one doing good, the other the opposite [Plato] |
| Full Idea: There must be more than one soul (not fewer than two) controlling movement and the heavens: that which does good, and that which has the opposite capacity. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 896e) | |
| A reaction: [Wording compressed - as often with the dialogues] This idea of controlling opposites is found in Empedocles. Presumably this good soul defers to the Form of the Good, as implied by the Euthyphro Question. |