9 ideas
| 291 | Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age. | |
| From: Plato (Laches [c.381 BCE], 188b) | |
| A reaction: I have taught teenagers who seemed to me wiser than nearly all the adults I have ever met. |
| 10911 | Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| Full Idea: The most important (ontological) relations holding among truth-makers are the part and whole relations. | |
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §6) | |
| A reaction: Hence Peter Simons goes off and writes the best known book on mereology. Looks very promising to me. |
| 10906 | Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| Full Idea: A 'moment' is an existentially dependent or non-self-sufficient object, that is, an object which is of such a nature that it cannot exist alone, ....... and we suggest that moments could serve as truth-makers. | |
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §2) | |
| A reaction: [These three writers invented the term 'truth-maker'] |
| 10909 | Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| Full Idea: Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true, because sentences with more than one truth-maker would then be ambiguous, and 'a' and 'a exists' would have the same designatum. | |
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3) |
| 10907 | The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| Full Idea: A proposition may have a minimal truth-maker which is not unique, or a sentence may be made true by no single truth-maker but only by several jointly, or again only by several separately. | |
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3) |
| 10912 | Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| Full Idea: Because of negative propositions, investigators of truth-makers have said that they are special non-objectual entities with a logical complexity, but we think a theory is possible in which the truth relation is tied to ordinary and scientific experience. | |
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §6) |
| 10908 | Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| Full Idea: The correspondence theory of truth invokes a special category of non-objectual entities - facts, states of affairs, or whatever - simply to serve as truth-makers. | |
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3) |
| 19387 | Hypotheses come from induction, which is comparison of experiences [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: We construct a hypothesis on the basis of an induction, that is on the basis of a comparison of experiences. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Elements of Law and Justice [1669], p.2) | |
| A reaction: This fits the traditional positivist picture of science (observe-hypothesise-predict-observe). I like the definition of induction as 'comparison of experiences', because it doesn't reduce it to sequences of objects, and points to coherence. |
| 293 | Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato] |
| Full Idea: To be unafraid (like a small child who doesn't understand the danger) and to be brave are two quite different things. | |
| From: Plato (Laches [c.381 BCE], 197b) |