Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Wittgenstein' and 'The Same F'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry]
     Full Idea: Statements of 'relative' identity are not identity statements at all, but what I would prefer to call 'statements of resemblance' or 'common property staztements'.
     From: John Perry (The Same F [1970], n12)
     A reaction: This seems like a neat way to sweep the problem from our sight. There remains a nervous metaphysical problem, though, because something seems to be identical when we spot a resemblance. Even two shades of red have something identical in them.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
The argument from analogy is not a strong inference, since the other being might be an actor or a robot [Grayling]
     Full Idea: The argument from analogy is a weak one, because it does not logically guarantee the inference I draw to the other's inner states, for he might be dissimulating or acting, or may even be a cleverly contrived robot which feels nothing.
     From: A.C. Grayling (Wittgenstein [1988], Ch.3)
     A reaction: This gives the impression that for an argument to be strong it must logically guarantee its inference. It strikes me that analogy is a good reason for believing in other minds, but that is because I am looking for the best explanation, not logical proof.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').