57 ideas
16295 | Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Tarski's Theorem states that under fairly generally applicable conditions, the assumption that there is a definition of truth within a given theory for the language of that same theory leads to a contradiction. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 1 | |
A reaction: That might leave room for a definition outside the given theory. I take the main motivation for the axiomatic approach to be a desire to get a theory of truth within the given theory, where Tarski's Theorem says traditional approaches are just wrong. |
15342 | Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten] |
Full Idea: Tarski's Theorem on the undefinability of truth says in a language sufficiently rich to talk about itself (which Gödel proved possible, via coding) the liar paradox can be carried out. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 02.2 | |
A reaction: The point is that truth is formally indefinable if it leads inescapably to contradiction, which the liar paradox does. This theorem is the motivation for all modern attempts to give a rigorous account of truth. |
19069 | 'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski] |
Full Idea: The possibility of a consistent use of 'true sentence' which is in harmony with the laws of logic and the spirit of everyday language seems to be very questionable, so the same doubt attaches to the possibility of constructing a correct definition. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933], §1) | |
A reaction: This is often cited as Tarski having conclusively proved that 'true' cannot be defined from within a language, but his language here is much more circumspect. Modern critics say the claim depends entirely on classical logic. |
16296 | Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Tarski's Theorem applies to any sufficient precise version of the correspondence theory of truth, and all the other traditional theories of truth. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 1 | |
A reaction: This is the key reason why modern thinkers have largely dropped talk of the correspondence theory. See Idea 16295. |
15339 | Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten] |
Full Idea: Tarski emancipated truth theory from traditional philosophy, by no longer posing Pilate's question (what is truth? or what is the essence of truth?) but instead 'how is truth used?', 'how does truth function?' and 'how can its functioning be described?'. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 02.2 | |
A reaction: Horsten, later in the book, does not give up on the essence of truth, and modern theorists are trying to get back to that question by following Tarski's formal route. Modern analytic philosophy at its best, it seems to me. |
16302 | Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Tarski did not settle for a definition of truth, taking its adequacy for granted. Rather he proposed an adequacy criterion for evaluating the adequacy of definitions of truth. The criterion is his famous Convention T. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 3 | |
A reaction: Convention T famously says the sentence is true if and only if a description of the sentence is equivalent to affirming the sentence. 'Snow is white' iff snow is white. |
19135 | Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
Full Idea: Tarski does not tell us how to apply his concept of truth to a new case, whether the new case is a new language or a word newly added to a language. This is because enumerating cases gives no clue for the next or general case. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 1 | |
A reaction: His account has been compared to a telephone directory. We aim to understand the essence of anything, so that we can fully know it, and explain and predict how it will behave. Either truth is primitive, or I demand to know its essence. |
19138 | Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski] |
Full Idea: Tarski defined the class of true sentences by giving the extension of the truth predicate, but he did not give the meaning. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 1 | |
A reaction: This is analogous to giving an account of the predicate 'red' as the set of red objects. Since I regard that as a hopeless definition of 'red', I am inclined to think the same of Tarski's account of truth. It works in the logic, but so what? |
4699 | Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Tarski's account doesn't hold for natural languages. The general notion of truth is replaced by "true-in-L", where L is a formal language. Hence truth is relativized to each artificial language. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This is a pretty good indication that Tarski's theory is NOT a correspondence theory, even if its structure may sometimes give that impression. |
19324 | Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski] |
Full Idea: Tarski has to define truths so as not to make explicit the relation between a true sentence and an obtaining state of affairs. ...He has to list each sentence separately, and simply assign it a state of affairs. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.8 | |
A reaction: He has to avoid semantic concepts like 'reference', because he wants a physicalist theory, according to Kirkham. Thus the hot interest in theories of reference in the 1970s/80s. And also attempts to give a physicalist account of meaning. |
10672 | Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack] |
Full Idea: Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence, where a sequence is a set-theoretic individual, a set of ordered pairs each with a natural number as its first element and an object from the domain for its second. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Keith Hossack - Plurals and Complexes 3 |
15410 | Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski] |
Full Idea: In Tarski's theory of truth, although the notion of truth is applicable only to closed formulas, to define it we must define a more general notion of satisfaction applicable to open formulas. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by John P. Burgess - Philosophical Logic 1.8 | |
A reaction: This is a helpful pointer to what is going on in the Tarski definition. It culminates in the 'satisfaction of all sequences', which presumable delivers the required closed formula. |
18811 | Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: Tarski invoked the notion of a sentential function, where components are replaced by appropriate variables. A function is then satisfied by assigning objects to variables. An assignment satisfies if the function is true of the things assigned. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 3.2 | |
A reaction: [very compressed] This use of sentential functions, rather than sentences, looks like the key to Tarski's definition of truth. |
15365 | We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten] |
Full Idea: The truth predicate, says Tarski, should be defined in terms of the more primitive satisfaction relation: the relation of being 'true of'. The fundamental notion is a formula (containing the free variables) being true of a sequence of objects as values. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 06.3 |
19314 | For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
Full Idea: Tarski, a physicalist, reduced semantics to physical and/or logicomathematical concepts. He defined all semantic concepts, save satisfaction, in terms of truth. Then truth is defined in terms of satisfaction, and satisfaction is given non-semantically. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.1 | |
A reaction: The term 'logicomathematical' is intended to cover set theory. Kirkham says you can remove these restrictions from Tarski's theory, and the result is a version of the correspondence theory. |
19316 | Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
Full Idea: Tarski's great insight is find another property, since open sentences are not truth. It must be had by open and genuine sentences. Clauses having it must generate it for the whole sentence. Truth can be defined for sentences by using it. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.4 | |
A reaction: The proposed property is 'satisfaction', which can (unlike truth) be a feature open sentences (such as 'x is green', which is satisfied by x='grass'), |
19175 | Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson] |
Full Idea: Tarski turned his axiomatic characterisation of satisfaction into an explicit definition of the satisfaction-predicate using some fancy set theoretical apparatus, and this in turn leads to the explicit definition of the truth predicate. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 7 |
10969 | Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read] |
Full Idea: Besides a theory of truth of his own, Tarski developed a theory of theories of truth. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.1 | |
A reaction: The famous snow biconditional is the latter, and the recursive account based on satisfaction is the former. |
17746 | Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki] |
Full Idea: Tarski's analysis of the concept of 'truth' ...is given a precise treatment as a particular relation between syntax (language) and semantics (the world). | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Michal Walicki - Introduction to Mathematical Logic History E.1 | |
A reaction: My problem is that the concept of truth seems to apply to animal minds, which are capable of making right or wrong judgements, and of realising their errors. Tarski didn't make universal claims for his account. |
10904 | Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski] |
Full Idea: The Tarskian account of truth neglects the atomic sentences. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Mulligan/Simons/Smith - Truth-makers §1 | |
A reaction: Yes! The whole Tarskian edifice is built on a foundation which it is taboo even to mention. If truth is just the assignment of 'T' and 'F', that isn't even the beginnings of a theory of 'truth'. |
2571 | Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack] |
Full Idea: Tarski says "we may remain naïve realists or idealists, empiricists or metaphysicians… The semantic conception is completely neutral toward all these issues." | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Susan Haack - Philosophy of Logics 7.5 |
10821 | Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H] |
Full Idea: Tarski work was to persuade physicalist that eliminating semantics was on the wrong track, and that we should explicate notions in the theory of reference nonsemantically rather than simply get rid of them. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Hartry Field - Tarski's Theory of Truth §3 |
10822 | A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski] |
Full Idea: We need to add theories of primitive reference to Tarski's account if we are to establish the notion of truth as a physicalistically acceptable notion. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Hartry Field - Tarski's Theory of Truth §4 | |
A reaction: This is the main point of Field's paper, and sounds very plausible to me. There is something major missing from Tarski, and at some point there needs to be a 'primitive' notion of thought and language making contact with the world, as it can't be proved. |
19134 | Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
Full Idea: Tarski defined various predicates of the form 's is true in L', each applicable to a single language, but he failed to define a predicate of the form 's is true in L' for variable 'L'. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 1 | |
A reaction: You might say that no one defines 'tree' to be just 'in English', but we might define 'multiplies' to be in Peano Arithmetic. This indicates the limited and formal nature of what Tarski was trying to achieve. |
16303 | Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Tarski's proof of the definability of truth allowed him to establish truth as a respectable notion by his standards. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 3 |
16304 | Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski] |
Full Idea: Every really adequate theory of truth should also prove the law of non-contradiction. Therefore Tarski's notion of adequacy in Convention T fails to capture the intuitive notion of adequacy he is after. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 3 | |
A reaction: Tarski points out this weakness, in a passage quoted by Halbach. This obviously raises the question of what truth theories should prove, and this is explored by Halbach. If they start to prove arithmetic, we get nervous. Non-contradiction and x-middle? |
15322 | Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Tarski, by Horsten] |
Full Idea: Tarski's work is the earliest axiomatic theory of truth that meets minimal adequacy conditions. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 01.1 | |
A reaction: This shows a way in which Tarski gave a new direction to the study of truth. Subsequent theories have been 'stronger'. |
16306 | Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Tarski, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Tarski preferred a definition of truth, but from that an axiomatisation can be extracted. His induction clauses can be turned into axioms. Hence he opened the way to axiomatic theories of truth. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 3 |
18759 | Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term [Tarski, by McGee] |
Full Idea: Tarski showed that the only binary relations invariant under arbitrary permutations are the universal relation, the empty relation, identity and non-identity, thus giving us a reason to include '=' among the logical terms. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Vann McGee - Logical Consequence 6 | |
A reaction: Tarski was looking for a criterion to distinguish logical from non-logical terms, since his account of logical validity depended on it. This idea lies behind whether a logic is or is not specified to be 'with identity' (i.e. using '='). |
10823 | A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski] |
Full Idea: To say that the name x denotes a given object a is the same as to stipulate that the object a ... satisfies a sentential function of a particular type. | |
From: Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933], p.194) |
18756 | Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions [Tarski, by McGee] |
Full Idea: Tarski discovered how to give a compositional semantics for predicate calculus, defining truth in terms of satisfaction, and showing how satisfaction for a complicated formula depends on satisfaction of the simple subformulas. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Vann McGee - Logical Consequence 4 | |
A reaction: The problem was that the subformulas may contain free variables, and thus not be sentences with truth values. 'Satisfaction' can handle this, where 'truth' cannot (I think). |
19313 | Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
Full Idea: Tarski invented a formal semantics for quantified predicate logic, the logic of reasoning about mathematics. The heart of this great accomplishment is his theory of truth. It has been called semantic 'theory' of truth, but Tarski preferred 'conception'. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Richard L. Kirkham - Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction 5.1 |
16323 | The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
Full Idea: Tarski's distinction between object and metalanguage forms the basis of model theory. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Volker Halbach - Axiomatic Theories of Truth 11 |
8940 | Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Tarski, by Fisher] |
Full Idea: In Tarski's account of truth, self-reference (as found in the Liar Paradox) is prevented because the truth predicate for any given object language is never a part of that object language, and so a sentence can never predicate truth of itself. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Jennifer Fisher - On the Philosophy of Logic 03.I | |
A reaction: Thus we solve the Liar Paradox by ruling that 'you are not allowed to say that'. Hm. The slightly odd result is that in any conversation about whether p is true, we end up using (logically speaking) two different languages simultaneously. Hm. |
10154 | Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics [Feferman/Feferman on Tarski] |
Full Idea: Tarski's theory of truth has been most influential in eventually creating a shift from the entirely syntactic way of doing things in metamathematics (promoted by Hilbert in the 1920s, in his theory of proofs), towards a set-theoretical, semantic approach. | |
From: comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic Int III |
22744 | Parts are not parts if their whole is nothing more than the parts [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If the whole is nothing more than the sum of the parts, the parts will not be parts. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.343) | |
A reaction: Nice. Bricks lying on the ground are not parts of a wall. For them to be parts of a wall there has to be a wall which is not just the bricks. Nihilists like Van Inwagen can deny the wall in ontology, but in thought we need walls. Conceptual dependence. |
22748 | Some say motion is perceived by sense, but others say it is by intellect [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Some assert that motion is perceived by sense, but others that it is not perceived at all by sense but by the intellect through sensation. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], II.062) | |
A reaction: Descartes' wax argument defends the idea that change is perceived by intellect. The intellect has to distinguish the relative aspect of each motion, such as when someone is walking around on a moving ship. Even sense also need memory. |
22746 | If we try to conceive of a line with no breadth, it ceases to exist, and so has no length [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: When we have gone so far as to deprive the length of its breadth altogether, we no longer conceive even the length, but along with the removal of the breadth the conception of the length is also removed. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.392) | |
A reaction: The only explanation of our retaining an understanding of a line even after we have removed its breadth is that we have abandoned experience and conceptualised the line - by idealising it. |
22741 | The incorporeal is not in the nature of body, and so could not emerge from it [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The incorporeal will never come into existence from body because the nature of the incorporeal does not exist in body. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.225) | |
A reaction: So nothing high could be made of pebbles because pebbles are not high? His argument depends on incorporeality having an intrinsically incorporeal nature. Pebbles have some height which can be extended. |
20407 | Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful [Tarski, by Schellekens] |
Full Idea: Taste is the faculty for judging an object or a kind of representation through a satisfaction or a dissatisfaction, ...where the object of such a satisfaction is called beautiful. | |
From: report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Elizabeth Schellekens - Immanuel Kant (aesthetics) 1 | |
A reaction: We usually avoid the word 'faculty' nowadays, because it implies a specific mechanism, but 'capacity' will do. Kant is said to focus specifically on beauty, whereas modern aestheticians have a broader view of the type of subject matter. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
22747 | A man walking backwards on a forwards-moving ship is moving in a fixed place [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If a ship moves forward and a man carries a rod backwards on it, then it is possible for an object to move without quitting its place. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], II.056) | |
A reaction: [summary of a verbose paragraph] The point is that you cannot define movement as change of place (contrary to Russell's proposal!). The concept of a place seems to be relative. Walking on a treadmill. |
22749 | Time doesn't end with the Universe, because tensed statements about destruction remain true [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: It is absurd to say that when the Universe is destroyed time does not exist; for the statement that it was destroyed once and that it is being destroyed are indicative of times. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], II.188) | |
A reaction: Intriguing. He takes it that a proposition can be true even though nothing exists. This is not merely an affirmation of the tensed A-series view of time, but he even offers tenses as evidence that the A-series is correct. That time could cease was a view. |
22750 | Time is divisible, into past, present and future [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Time cannot be indivisible, since it is divided into past, present and future. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], II.193) | |
A reaction: Does the fact that you can name the parts of something prove that it is divisible? Do electrons have left and right-hand sides? |
22742 | Socrates either dies when he exists (before his death) or when he doesn't (after his death) [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Socrates either dies when existing, or when not existing. …He does not die when he exists, for he is alive, and he does not die when he has died, for then he will be dying twice, which is absurd. So then, Socrates does not die. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.269) | |
A reaction: A nice dramatisation of a major dilemma. The present moment is just the boundary between the past and the future, and so has no magnitude, and hence nothing can occur during the present. Perhaps my favourite philosophical dilemma. |
22751 | If the present is just the limit of the past or the future, it can't exist because they don't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If the present is the limit of the past, and the limit of the past has passed away together with that of which it is the limit, the present no longer exists. And if the present begins the future, which doesn't exist, the present does not yet exist. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], II.201) | |
A reaction: If I mark a line on the ground where the wall will begin, the limit seems prior to the object. The gun starts the race, but is not part of it. That said, I cannot think of any more mysterious entity than the present moment. It isn't a line or a bang. |
22730 | All men agree that God is blessed, imperishable, happy and good [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: All men have one common preconception about God, according to which he is a blessed creature and imperishable and perfect in happiness and receptive of nothing evil. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.033) | |
A reaction: He observes this after he has pointed the enormous variety of religious beliefs. He offers this unanimity as a reason to believe that it is true. |
22739 | God must suffer to understand suffering [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: God cannot have a notion of suffering if he has not experience it. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.163) | |
A reaction: Christians like to portray God as suffering because of his son's horrible death. We can imagine experiences we have never had, and presumably God is better at that than we are. |
22738 | The Divine must lack the virtues of continence and fortitude, because they are not needed [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If the Divine is all-virtuous, it possesses all the virtues. But it does not possess the virtues of continence and fortitude unless there are certain things which are hard for God to abstain from and hard to endure. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.151) | |
A reaction: Courage would also be unnecessary, we assume. Good people are not tempted to steal, and hence do not need to resist it. It is a mistake to attribute human virtues to the Divine. Humans lack the virtues of a good frog. |
22734 | God is defended by agreement, order, absurdity of denying God, and refutations [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Arguments for God have four modes: from universal agreement, from the orderly arrangement of the universe, from the absurd consequences of denying God, and from undermining the opposing arguments. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.060) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The loss of status of the argument from universal agreement has had a huge influence. We now realise that a very wide consensus is no guarantee of truth in anything. |
22736 | God's sensations imply change, and hence perishing, which is absurd, so there is no such God [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If God has sensation he is altered, …so he is receptive of change, including change for the worse. If so, he is also perishable, but that is absurd; therefore it is absurd also to claim that God exists. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.146) | |
A reaction: [compressed] It is certainly paradoxical to think that God is eternal and unchanging, but also capable of perception and thought, which necessitate change. Some theological ingenuity is needed to explain this. |
22740 | God without virtue is absurd, but God's virtues will be better than God [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If the Divine exists it either has or has not virtue. If it has not it is base and unhappy, which is absurd. But if it has it, there will exist something which is better than God, just as a virtue of a horse is better than the horse itself. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.176) | |
A reaction: It is obviously better to think of a virtue as some mode of a thing, rather than as a separate attachment. This is an ontological argument, because it is inferred from the concept of God. |
22735 | The original substance lacked motion or shape, and was given these by a cause [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: They say that the substance of existing things being of itself motionless and shapeless must be put in motion and shape by some cause. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.075) | |
A reaction: Interestingly, Sextus doesn't seem to think that the existence of the original substance also needs a cause. This substance sounds like a relative of Aristotle's Prime Matter. The source of motion isn't really a 'design' argument. |
22732 | The perfections of God were extrapolations from mankind [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: It is said that …the idea that God is eternal and imperishable and perfect in happiness was introduced by way of transference from mankind. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.045) | |
A reaction: This view is found in Hume, and in Feuerbach. I presume 'transference' means extrapolation and idealisation. If God exists, we may have no option but to think of God anthropomorphically. |
22728 | Gods were invented as watchers of people's secret actions [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: It is asserted that those who first led mankind …invented gods as watchers of all the sinful and righteous acts of men, so that none should dare to do wrong even in secret. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.016) | |
A reaction: Sextus is a sceptic about everything, so this scepticism about the gods is nothing special. I'm not sure if this is why the gods were invented, but it seems to be the main role assigned to God by the Christian church, as the basis of religious morality. |
22737 | An incorporeal God could do nothing, and a bodily god would perish, so there is no God [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The Divine is not incorporeal, since that is inanimate and insensitive and incapable of any action; nor is it a body, since that is subject to change and perishable; so the Divine does not exist. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.151) | |
A reaction: I find this quite persuasive. An incorporeal God has to be ascribed magical powers in order to interact with what is corporeal. A corporeal God is subject to entropy and all the depredations of the physical world. |
22731 | It is mad to think that what is useful to us, like lakes and rivers, are gods [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: To suppose that lakes and rivers, and whatsoever else is of a nature to be useful to us, are gods surpasses the height of lunacy. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists (two books) [c.180], I.040) | |
A reaction: He also points out the what is useful to us decays and changes. Sextus lived in a time when monotheism was becoming dominant. |