6 ideas
| 4038 | Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Lewis agrees that properties cannot be sets of their actual instances, but claims they can be sets of their possible instances. This would distinguish coextensive properties like being cordate and renate, since they might be separated. | |
| From: report of David Lewis (Modal Realism at Work: Properties [1986]) by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §10 | |
| A reaction: Sounds wrong. Two properties could be obviously different even if they could never be separated. In this world a creature might briefly survive without kidneys. |
| 8830 | A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman] |
| Full Idea: A characteristic case in which a belief is justified though the cognizer doesn't know that it's justified is where the original evidence for the belief has long since been forgotten. | |
| From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], II) | |
| A reaction: This is a central problem for any very literal version of internalism. The fully rationalist view (to which I incline) will be that the cognizer must make a balanced assessment of whether they once had the evidence. Were my teachers any good? |
| 8832 | If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman] |
| Full Idea: If one shares my view that justified belief is, at least roughly, well-formed belief, surely animals and young children can have justified beliefs. | |
| From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], III) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be a key hallmark of the externalist view of knowledge. Personally I think we should tell the animals that they have got true beliefs, but that they aren't bright enough to aspire to 'knowledge'. Be grateful for what you've got. |
| 8829 | Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman] |
| Full Idea: The justificational status of a belief is a function of the reliability of the processes that cause it, where (provisionally) reliability consists in the tendency of a process to produce beliefs that are true rather than false. | |
| From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], II) | |
| A reaction: Goldman's original first statement of reliabilism, now the favourite version of externalism. The obvious immediate problem is when a normally very reliable process goes wrong. Wise people still get it wrong, or right for the wrong reasons. |
| 8831 | Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman] |
| Full Idea: Introspection should be regarded as a form of retrospection. Thus, a justified belief that I am 'now' in pain gets its justificational status from a relevant, though brief, causal history. | |
| From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], II) | |
| A reaction: He cites Hobbes and Ryle as having held this view. See Idea 6668. I am unclear why the history must be 'causal'. I may not know the cause of the pain. I may not believe an event which causes a proposition, or I may form a false belief from it. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |