Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Occasions of Identity' and 'On the Nature of Acquaintance'

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential

6410	The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling]
	Full Idea: Russell argued that the only 'logically proper' names are those which denote particular entities with which one can be acquainted. The best examples are 'this' and 'that'; other apparent names turn out, when analysed, to be definite descriptions.
	From: report of Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Acquaintance [1914]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
	A reaction: This view is firm countered by the causal theory of reference, proposed by Kripke and others, in which not only people like Aristotle are 'baptised' with a name, but also natural kinds such as water. It is hard to disagree with Kripke on this.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail

13437	A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois]
	Full Idea: At t1 there is a whole CAR, and a PART of it, which is everything except the right front wheel. At t2 the wheel is removed, leaving just PART, so that CAR is now PART. But PART was a proper part of CAR, and CAR had the front wheel. Different properties!
	From: André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998], 1.II)
	A reaction: [compressed summary] The problem is generated by appealing to Leibniz's Law. My immediate reaction is that this is the sort of trouble you get into if you include such temporal truths about things as 'properties'.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time

16233	Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois]
	Full Idea: A problem for Gallois is that he leaves us no way to talk about questions of genuine identity through time, and thus undercuts one motivation for his own position.
	From: comment on André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.8
	A reaction: Gallois seems to need a second theory of identity to support his Occasional Identity theory. Two things need an identity each, before we can say that the two identities coincide. (Time to read Gallois!)

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity

14755	Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
	Full Idea: Gallois's core claim is that the identity relation holds with respect to times, ...and he must claim that there is no such thing as the relation of identity simpliciter.
	From: report of André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.5
	A reaction: Gallois is essentially responding to the statue and clay problem, but it seems a bit drastic to entirely change our concept of two things being identical, such as Hesperus and Phosphorus. 'Identity' seems to have several meanings; let's sort them out.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects

16231	Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley]
	Full Idea: Gallois' Occasional Identity Thesis is that objects can be identical at one time without being identical at all times.
	From: report of André Gallois (Occasions of Identity [1998]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.4
	A reaction: The analogy is presumably with two crossing roads being identical at one place but not at others. It is a major misunderstanding to infer from Special Relativity that time is just like space.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').