18 ideas
1564 | True and false statements can use exactly the same words [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: There is no difference between a true statement and a false statement, because they can use exactly the same words. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §4) |
16985 | Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke] |
Full Idea: The main and the original motivation for the 'possible worlds analysis' - and the way it clarified modal logic - was that it enabled modal logic to be treated by the same set theoretic techniques of model theory used successfully in extensional logic. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.19 n18) | |
A reaction: So they should be ascribed the same value that we attribute to classical model theory, whatever that is. |
16982 | A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke] |
Full Idea: Two totally distinct 'historical chains' that be sheer accident assign the same name to the same man should probably count as creating distinct names despite the identity of the referents. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.08 n9) | |
A reaction: A nice puzzle for his own theory. 'What's you name?' 'Alice, and Alice!' |
16981 | With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke] |
Full Idea: It is clear from (x)□(x=x) and Leibniz's Law that identity is an 'internal' relation: (x)(y)(x=y ⊃ □x=y). What pairs (w,y) could be counterexamples? Not pairs of distinct objects, …nor an object and itself. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.03) | |
A reaction: I take 'internal' to mean that the necessity of identity is intrinsic to the item(s), and not imposed by some other force. |
4942 | The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that the Leibnizian principle of the indiscernibility of identicals (not to be confused with the identity of indiscernibles) is as self-evident as the law of contradiction. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.03) | |
A reaction: This seems obviously correct, as it says no more than that a thing has whatever properties it has. If a difference is discerned, either you have made a mistake, or it isn't identical. |
16984 | I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke] |
Full Idea: I do not think of 'possible worlds' as providing a reductive analysis in any philosophically significant sense, that is, as uncovering the ultimate nature, from either an epistemological or a metaphysical view, of modal operators, propositions etc. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.19 n18) | |
A reaction: I think this remark opens the door for Kit Fine's approach, of showing what modality is by specifying its sources. Possible worlds model the behaviour of modal inferences. |
9385 | The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke] |
Full Idea: If a speaker introduced a designator into a language by a ceremony, then in virtue of his very linguistic act, he would be in a position to say 'I know that Fa', but nevertheless 'Fa' would be a contingent truth (provided F is not an essential property). | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.14) | |
A reaction: If someone else does the designation, I seem to have contingent knowledge that the ceremony has taken place. You needn't experience the object, but you must experience the ceremony, even if you perform it. |
4943 | Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke] |
Full Idea: We should remind ourselves the 'possible worlds' terminology can always be replaced by modal talk, such as "It is possible that…" | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.15) | |
A reaction: Coming from an originator of the possible worlds idea, this is a useful reminder that we don't have to get too excited about the ontological commitments involved. It may be just a 'way to talk', and hence a tool, rather than a truth about reality. |
16983 | Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke] |
Full Idea: In studying probabilities with dice, we are introduced at a tender age to a set of 36 (miniature) possible worlds, if we (fictively) ignore everything except the two dice. …The possibilities are abstract states of the dice, not physical entities. | |
From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.16) | |
A reaction: Interesting for the introduction by the great man of the words 'fictional' and 'abstract' into the discussion. He says elsewhere that he takes worlds to be less than real, but more than mere technical devices. |
1559 | Thracians think tattooing adds to a girl's beauty, but elsewhere it is a punishment [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: Thracians think that tattooing enhances a girl's beauty, whereas for everyone else tattooing is a punishment for a crime. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2) |
1560 | Lydians prostitute their daughters to raise a dowery, but no Greek would marry such a girl [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: The Lydians find it acceptable for their daughters to work as prostitutes to raise money for getting married, but no one in Greece would be prepared to marry such a girl. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2) |
1561 | Anything can be acceptable in some circumstances and unacceptable in others [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: Anything can be acceptable under the right circumstances, and unacceptable under the wrong circumstances. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §2) |
1567 | How could someone who knows everything fail to act correctly? [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: If someone knows the nature of everything, how could he fail to be able also to act correctly in every case? | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §8) |
1563 | Every apparent crime can be right in certain circumstances [Anon (Diss), by PG] |
Full Idea: It can be right, in certain circumstances, to steal, to break a solemn promise, to rob temples, and even (as Orestes did) to murder one's nearest and dearest. | |
From: report of Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §3) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: Not sure about the last one! I suppose you can justify any hideousness if the fate of the universe depends on it. It must be better to die than the perform certain extreme deeds. |
1562 | It is right to lie to someone, to get them to take medicine they are reluctant to take [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: It is right to lie to your parents, in order to get them to take a good medicine they are reluctant to take. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §3) | |
A reaction: I dread to think what the medicines were which convinced the writer of this. A rule such as this strikes me as dangerous. Justifiable in extreme cases. House on fire etc. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
1566 | The first priority in elections is to vote for people who support democracy [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: A lottery is not democratic, because every state contains people who are not democratic, and if the lottery chooses them they will destroy the democracy. People should elect those who are observed to favour democracy. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §7) |
1565 | We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it [Anon (Diss)] |
Full Idea: We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it. | |
From: Anon (Diss) (Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments [c.401 BCE], §6) |