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18909
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Aristotelian sentences are made up by one of four 'formative' connectors [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
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Full Idea:
For Aristotle there are four formatives for sentences: 'belongs to some', 'belongs to every', 'belongs to no', and 'does not belong to every'. These are 'copulae'. Aristotle would have written 'wise belongs to some man'.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by George Engelbretsen - Trees, Terms and Truth 3
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A reaction:
A rather set-theoretic reading. This invites a Quinean scepticism about whether wisdom is some entity which can 'belong' to a person. It makes trope theory sound attractive, offering a unique wisdom that is integrated into that particular person.
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8080
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Aristotelian identified 256 possible syllogisms, saying that 19 are valid [Aristotle, by Devlin]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle identified four 'figures' of argument, based on combinations of Subject (S) and Predicate (P) and Middle term (M). The addition of 'all' and 'some', and 'has' and 'has not' got the property, resulted in 256 possible syllogisms, 19 of them valid.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2
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A reaction:
[Compressed version of Devlin] What Aristotle did was astonishing, and must be one of the key ideas of western civilization, even though a lot of his assumptions have been revised or rejected.
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13912
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Aristotle replaced Plato's noun-verb form with unions of pairs of terms by one of four 'copulae' [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen/Sayward]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle replaced the Platonic noun-verb account of logical syntax with a 'copular' account. A sentence is a pair of terms bound together logically (not necessarily grammatically) by one of four 'logical copulae' (every, none, some, not some).
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From:
report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C - Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics 8
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A reaction:
So the four copulas are are-all, are-never, are-sometimes, and are-sometime-not. Consider 'men' and 'mortal'. Alternatively, Idea 18909.
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9403
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There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
Since to belong, to belong of necessity, and to be possible to belong are different, ..there will be different deductions for each; one deduction will be from necessary terms, one from terms which belong, and one from possible terms.
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From:
Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 29b29-35)
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A reaction:
Fitting and Mendelsohn cite this as the earliest thoughts on modal logic. but Kneale and Kneale say that Aristotle got into a muddle, and so was unable to create a workable system.
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11148
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Deduction is when we suppose one thing, and another necessarily follows [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
A deduction is a discourse in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from the things supposed results of necessity because these things are so.
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From:
Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE], 24b18)
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A reaction:
Notice that it is modal ('suppose', rather than 'know'), that necessity is involved, which is presumably metaphysical necessity, and that there are assumptions about what would be true, and not just what follows from what.
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8079
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Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some') [Aristotle, by Devlin]
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Full Idea:
Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some'), and two ways to combine the subject with the predicate ('have', and 'have not'), giving four propositions: all-s-have-p, all-s-have-not-p, some-s-have-p, and some-s-have-not-p.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2
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A reaction:
Frege seems to have switched from 'some' to 'at-least-one'. Since then other quantifiers have been proposed. See, for example, Ideas 7806 and 6068.
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7949
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Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
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Full Idea:
Davidson points out that we can only make sense of patterns of behaviour such as excuses if events can have more than one description. So I flip the light switch, turn on the light, illuminate the room, and alert a prowler, but I do only one thing.
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From:
report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.5
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A reaction:
We can distinguish an event as an actual object, and as an intentional object. We can probably individuate intentional events quite well (according to our interests), but actual 'events' seem to flow into one another and overlap.
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18911
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Linguistic terms form a hierarchy, with higher terms predicable of increasing numbers of things [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
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Full Idea:
According to Aristotle, the terms of a language form a finite hierarchy, where the higher terms are predicable of more things than are lower terms.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Prior Analytics [c.328 BCE]) by George Engelbretsen - Trees, Terms and Truth 3
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A reaction:
I would be a bit cautious about placing something precisely in a hierarchy according to how many things it can be predicated of. It is a start, though, in trying to give a decent account of generality, which is a major concept in philosophy.
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20020
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If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
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Full Idea:
Davidson (1980 ess 1) agreed with Anscombe that if a person Fs by G-ing, then her act F = her act G. For example, if someone accidentally alerts a burglar, by deliberately turning on a light, by flipping a switch, these are all the same action.
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From:
report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 1.2
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A reaction:
I would have thought there was obviously a strong conventional element in individuating actions, depending on interest. An electrician is only interest in whether the light worked. The police are only interested in the disturbance of the burglar.
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20045
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Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
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Full Idea:
Whenever someone does something for a reason he can be characterised as (a) having some sort of pro attitude towards action of a certain kind, and (b) believing (or knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering) that his action is of that kind.
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From:
Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963], p.3-4), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 3 'The belief-'
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A reaction:
This is the earlier Davidson roughly endorsing the traditional belief-desire account of action. He is giving a reductive account of reasons. Deciding reasons were not reducible may have led him to property dualism.
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23737
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Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
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Full Idea:
Only the Humean theory is able to make sense of reason explanation as a species of teleological explanation, and one may accept that reason explanations are teleological without accepting that they are causal.
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From:
comment on Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Michael Smith - The Moral Problem 4.6
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A reaction:
That is, reasons can give a purpose to an action, and thereby motivate it, without actually causing it. I agree with Smith. I certainly don't (usually, at least) experience reasons as directly producing my actions. Hume says desires are needed.
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7903
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The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
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Full Idea:
The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
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From:
Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
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A reaction:
What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
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