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12714
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The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (De Mundo Praesenti [1686], A6.4.1507-8), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
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A reaction:
The clearest statement of the modification of Aristotle's hylomorphism which Leibniz preferred in his middle period, and which strikes me as an improvement, and about right. Shame that monads got too much of a grip on him, but he was trying to dig deeper.
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12743
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A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
In a Being one per se a real union is required consisting not in the situation or motion of parts, as in a chain or a house, but in a unique individual principle and subject of attributes and operations, in us a soul and in a body a substantial form.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (De Mundo Praesenti [1686], A6.4.1506), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
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A reaction:
Leibniz is said not to be an essentialist, by making all properties essential, but he is certainly committed to substance, and it sounds like essence here (or one view of essence), when it makes identity possible. This idea is pure Aristotle.
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7903
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The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
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Full Idea:
The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
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From:
Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
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A reaction:
What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
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22808
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Liberalism is minimal government, or individual rights, or equality [Avineri/De-Shalit]
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Full Idea:
Liberalism has been defended as a theory of minimal government, or as a theory of basic individual rights, or as an egalitarian philosophy.
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From:
Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
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A reaction:
Minimal government tends towards anarchist liberalism, but then what grounds the right to be free of government? Presumably any sensible theory of rights has to be egalitarian. What could ground unequal rights?
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22806
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Communitarians avoid oppression for the common good, by means of small mediating communities [Avineri/De-Shalit]
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Full Idea:
Because of the mediating structures of small communities, communitarians are less fearful [than liberals] of the emergence of an oppressive government as a result of the politics of the common good.
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From:
Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
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A reaction:
A politics of the common good has an obvious implicit conservatism because the central consensus is always likely to disapprove of errant individuals, of all sorts. Only individual rights can block an oppressive government.
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22807
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If our values are given to us by society then we have no grounds to criticise them [Avineri/De-Shalit]
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Full Idea:
If communitarians are right that we are not free to choose, but rather that our values are determined by our community, the individualists say, then there is no reason to criticise the values of one's society.
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From:
Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
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A reaction:
This is an obvious challenge, but if one's concept of community is a forum for free debate then it can be overcome. There is no avoiding the fact, though, that a good community always needs a high degree of consensus.
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