52 ideas
| 9542 | The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell, with four axioms and two rules [Russell/Whitehead, by Hughes/Cresswell] |
| Full Idea: The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell. There are four axioms: (p∨p)→p, q→(p∨q), (p→q)→(q∨p), and (q→r)→((p∨q)→(p∨r)), plus Substitution and Modus Ponens rules. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by GE Hughes/M Cresswell - An Introduction to Modal Logic Ch.1 |
| 21720 | Russell saw Reducibility as legitimate for reducing classes to logic [Linsky,B on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: The axiom of Reducibility ...is crucial in the reduction of classes to logic, ...and seems to be a quite legitimate logical notion for Russell. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 6.4 | |
| A reaction: This is an unusual defence of the axiom, which is usually presumed to have been kicked into the long grass by Quine. If one could reduce classes to logic, that would destroy the opposition to logicism in a single neat coup. |
| 10044 | Russell denies extensional sets, because the null can't be a collection, and the singleton is just its element [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Russell adduces two reasons against the extensional view of classes, namely the existence of the null class (which cannot very well be a collection), and the unit classes (which would have to be identical with their single elements). | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Stewart Shapiro - Structure and Ontology p.459 | |
| A reaction: Gödel believes in the reality of classes. I have great sympathy with Russell, when people start to claim that sets are not just conveniences to help us think about things, but actual abstract entities. Is the singleton of my pencil is on this table? |
| 18208 | We regard classes as mere symbolic or linguistic conveniences [Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: Classes, so far as we introduce them, are merely symbolic or linguistic conveniences, not genuine objects. | |
| From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.72), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics III.2 |
| 8204 | Lewis's 'strict implication' preserved Russell's confusion of 'if...then' with implication [Quine on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: Russell call 'if...then' implication, when the material conditional is a much better account; C.I.Lewis (in founding modern modal logic) preserved Russell's confusion by creating 'strict implication', and called that implication. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Willard Quine - Reply to Professor Marcus p.177 | |
| A reaction: [A compession of Quine's paragraph]. All of this assumes that logicians can give an accurate account of what if...then means, when ordinary usage is broad and vague. Strict implication seems to drain all the normal meaning out of 'if...then'. |
| 9359 | Russell's implication means that random sentences imply one another [Lewis,CI on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: In Mr Russell's idea of implication, if twenty random sentences from a newspaper were put in a hat, and two of them drawn at random, one will certainly imply the other, and it is an even bet the implication will be mutual. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by C.I. Lewis - A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori p.366 | |
| A reaction: This sort of lament leads modern logicians to suggest 'relevance' as an important criterion. It certainly seems odd that so-called 'classical logic' should contain a principle so at variance with everyday reasoning. |
| 21707 | Russell unusually saw logic as 'interpreted' (though very general, and neutral) [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
| Full Idea: Russell did not view logic as an uninterpreted calculus awaiting interpretations [the modern view]. Rather, logic is a single 'interpreted' body of a priori truths, of propositions rather than sentence forms - but maximally general and topic neutral. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 1 | |
| A reaction: This is the view which Wittgenstein challenged, saying logic is just conventional. Linsky claims that Russell's logicism is much more plausible, once you understand his view of logic. |
| 10036 | In 'Principia' a new abstract theory of relations appeared, and was applied [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
| Full Idea: In 'Principia' a young science was enriched with a new abstract theory of relations, ..and not only Cantor's set theory but also ordinary arithmetic and the theory of measurement are treated from this abstract relational standpoint. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Kurt Gödel - Russell's Mathematical Logic p.448 | |
| A reaction: I presume this is accounting for relations in terms of ordered sets. |
| 18248 | A real number is the class of rationals less than the number [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: For Russell the real number 2 is the class of rationals less than 2 (i.e. 2/1). ...Notice that on this definition, real numbers are classes of rational numbers. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 5.2 |
| 18152 | Russell takes numbers to be classes, but then reduces the classes to numerical quantifiers [Russell/Whitehead, by Bostock] |
| Full Idea: Although Russell takes numbers to be certain classes, his 'no-class' theory then eliminates all mention of classes in favour of the 'propositional functions' that define them; and in the case of the numbers these just are the numerical quantifiers. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 9.B.4 |
| 10025 | Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Hodes] |
| Full Idea: Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic, ..and came close to identifying numbers with numerical quantifiers. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Harold Hodes - Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic p.148 | |
| A reaction: The point here is 'higher-order'. |
| 8683 | Russell and Whitehead were not realists, but embraced nearly all of maths in logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
| Full Idea: Unlike Frege, Russell and Whitehead were not realists about mathematical objects, and whereas Frege thought that only arithmetic and analysis are branches of logic, they think the vast majority of mathematics (including geometry) is essentially logical. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.1 | |
| A reaction: If, in essence, Descartes reduced geometry to algebra (by inventing co-ordinates), then geometry ought to be included. It is characteristic of Russell's hubris to want to embrace everything. |
| 10037 | 'Principia' lacks a precise statement of the syntax [Gödel on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: What is missing, above all, in 'Principia', is a precise statement of the syntax of the formalism. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Kurt Gödel - Russell's Mathematical Logic p.448 |
| 10093 | The ramified theory of types used propositional functions, and covered bound variables [Russell/Whitehead, by George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: Russell and Whitehead's ramified theory of types worked not with sets, but with propositional functions (similar to Frege's concepts), with a more restrictive assignment of variables, insisting that bound, as well as free, variables be of lower type. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: I don't fully understand this (and no one seems much interested any more), but I think variables are a key notion, and there is something interesting going on here. I am intrigued by ordinary language which behaves like variables. |
| 8691 | The Russell/Whitehead type theory was limited, and was not really logic [Friend on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: The Russell/Whitehead type theory reduces mathematics to a consistent founding discipline, but is criticised for not really being logic. They could not prove the existence of infinite sets, and introduced a non-logical 'axiom of reducibility'. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.6 | |
| A reaction: To have reduced most of mathematics to a founding discipline sounds like quite an achievement, and its failure to be based in pure logic doesn't sound too bad. However, it seems to reduce some maths to just other maths. |
| 10305 | In 'Principia Mathematica', logic is exceeded in the axioms of infinity and reducibility, and in the domains [Bernays on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: In the system of 'Principia Mathematica', it is not only the axioms of infinity and reducibility which go beyond pure logic, but also the initial conception of a universal domain of individuals and of a domain of predicates. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.267) by Paul Bernays - On Platonism in Mathematics p.267 | |
| A reaction: This sort of criticism seems to be the real collapse of the logicist programme, rather than Russell's paradox, or Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. It just became impossible to stick strictly to logic in the reduction of arithmetic. |
| 8684 | Russell and Whitehead consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
| Full Idea: Russell and Whitehead are particularly careful to avoid paradox, and consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.1 | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as quite a good argument. It is certainly counterintuitive that reality, and abstractions from reality, would contain contradictions. The realist view would be that we have paradoxes because we have misdescribed the facts. |
| 8746 | To avoid vicious circularity Russell produced ramified type theory, but Ramsey simplified it [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Russell insisted on the vicious circle principle, and thus rejected impredicative definitions, which resulted in an unwieldy ramified type theory, with the ad hoc axiom of reducibility. Ramsey's simpler theory was impredicative and avoided the axiom. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 5.2 | |
| A reaction: Nowadays the theory of types seems to have been given up, possibly because it has no real attraction if it lacks the strict character which Russell aspired to. |
| 22355 | In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The substance of the absolute conception [of external reality] lies in the idea that it could nonvacuously explain how it itself, and the various perspectival views of the world, are possible. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], p.139), quoted by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 2.1 | |
| A reaction: I like this. Explanation and understanding strike me as more important than justified truths, and I am struck by the complete inability of subjectivists, relativists and anti-realists to give any kinds of good explanation. |
| 12033 | An object is identical with itself, and no different indiscernible object can share that [Russell/Whitehead, by Adams,RM] |
| Full Idea: Trivially, the Identity of Indiscernibles says that two individuals, Castor and Pollux, cannot have all properties in common. For Castor must have the properties of being identical with Castor and not being identical with Pollux, which Pollux can't share. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], I p.57) by Robert Merrihew Adams - Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity 2 | |
| A reaction: I suspect that either the property of being identical with itself is quite vacuous, or it is parasytic on primitive identity, or it is the criterion which is actually used to define identity. Either way, I don't find this claim very illuminating. |
| 10040 | Russell showed, through the paradoxes, that our basic logical intuitions are self-contradictory [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
| Full Idea: By analyzing the paradoxes to which Cantor's set theory had led, ..Russell brought to light the amazing fact that our logical intuitions (concerning such notions as truth, concept, being, class) are self-contradictory. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Kurt Gödel - Russell's Mathematical Logic p.452 | |
| A reaction: The main intuition that failed was, I take it, that every concept has an extension, that is, there are always objects which will or could fall under the concept. |
| 4244 | It is very confused to deduce a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration from relativism [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Some people believe a properly relativist view requires you to be equally well disposed to everybody's ethical beliefs, but this is seriously confused, as relativism has led to a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: Good point. This need not stop a relativist from passionately defending tolerance - it is only that the lack of rational support for the passion must be recognised. |
| 4243 | Our ability to react to an alien culture shows that ethical thought extends beyond cultural boundaries [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The fact that people can and must react when confronted with another culture, and do so by applying existing notions, seems to show that ethical thought of a given culture can always stretch beyond its boundaries. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: Hardly conclusive, but it does seem to show that there is an element of universalising in values, no matter how local you may consider them to be. |
| 21725 | The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
| Full Idea: The multiple relations theory of judgement proposes that assertions about propositions are dependent upon genuine facts involving belief and other attitude relations, subjects of those attitudes, and the constituents of the belief. | |
| From: report of B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 7.2 | |
| A reaction: This seems to require a commitment to universals (especially relations) with which we can be directly acquainted. I prefer propositions, but as mental entities, not platonic entities. |
| 23474 | A judgement is a complex entity, of mind and various objects [Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: When a judgement occurs, there is a certain complex entity, composed of the mind and the various objects of the judgement. | |
| From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44) | |
| A reaction: This is Russell's multiple-relation theory of judgement, which replaced his earlier belief in unified propositions (now 'false abstractions'). He seems to have accepted Locke's view, that the act of judgement produces the unity. |
| 23455 | The meaning of 'Socrates is human' is completed by a judgement [Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: When I judge 'Socrates is human', the meaning is completed by the act of judging. | |
| From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44), quoted by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus | |
| A reaction: Morris says this is Russell's multiple-relations theory of judgement. The theory accompanies the rejection of the concept of the unified proposition. When I hear 'Socrates had a mole on his shoulder' I get the meaning without judging. |
| 23480 | The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences [Morris,M on Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: When Russell moved to his multiple relation theory of judgement …he then faced difficulties making sense of the unity of sentences. | |
| From: comment on B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44) by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 3A | |
| A reaction: Roughly, he seems committed to saying that there is only unity if you think there is unity; there is no unity in a sentence prior to the act of judgement. |
| 18275 | Only the act of judging completes the meaning of a statement [Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: When I judge 'Socrates is human', the meaning is completed by the act of judging, and we no longer have an incomplete symbol. | |
| From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap | |
| A reaction: Personally I would have thought that you needed to know the meaning properly before you could make the judgement, but then he is Bertrand Russell and I'm not. |
| 23453 | Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead] |
| Full Idea: A 'proposition', in the sense in which a proposition is supposed to be the object of a judgement, is a false abstraction, because a judgement has several objects, not one. | |
| From: B Russell/AN Whitehead (Principia Mathematica [1913], p.44), quoted by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 2E | |
| A reaction: This is the rejection of the 'Russellian' theory of propositions, in favour of his multiple-relations theory of judgement. But why don't the related objects add up to a proposition about a state of affairs? |
| 4114 | Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: If there is a truth about the subject matter of ethics, why should it be simple? ..I shall argue that philosophy should not try to produce ethical theories. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 1) | |
| A reaction: Bizarrely defeatist - in parallel with Mysterians about the mind like McGinn. Is there any point in thinking at all? I suggest the aim of life as the best starting point. |
| 4128 | Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Intuitionism in ethics has been demolished by a succession of critics, and the ruins of it that remain above ground are not impressive enough to invite much history of what happened to it. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: Why does intuitionism have such appeal to beginners in moral philosophy? There is a truth buried in it somewhere. See 'Sources of the Self' by Charles Taylor. |
| 4132 | The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The category of person is a poor foundation for ethical thought, because it looks like a sortal or classificatory notion while in fact it signals characteristics that almost all come in degrees (responsibility, self-reflection etc). | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: On the contrary, it must be the basis of moral theory, and its shifting character is strong support for Aristotle's approach to moral growth and responsibility. |
| 4134 | The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: That "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" is intelligible brings out the basic weakness of prescriptive accounts of the evaluative. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 7) | |
| A reaction: This might be an elision of two different prescriptions, mine and most people's. In what sense do I think the hotel good, as opposed to other people? |
| 4135 | Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Some 'thicker' ethical notions, such as 'treachery', 'promise', 'brutality' and 'courage', seem to express a union of facts and values. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 8) | |
| A reaction: The onus does seem to be on the followers of Hume to disentangle what the rest of us have united. They may, of course, manage it. |
| 4120 | It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: We do not merely want the world to contain certain states of affairs (it is a deep error of consequentialism to believe that this is all we want). Among the things we basically want is to act in certain ways. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 4) | |
| A reaction: A key objection. Does it matter whether Hiroshima is destroyed by earthquake or bombing? |
| 4252 | Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The institution of promise keeping operates to provide portable reliability, by offering a formula that will confer high deliberative priority on what might not otherwise receive it. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: This is a bit pessimistic. We do not perceive promise keeping as a mere suggestion that we should bear something in mind when making a decision. 'May I rot in hell if I fail you'. |
| 4116 | A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: A particular weakness of the contractual theory is that it is unstable with respect to a superior agent, one more intelligent and resourceful and persuasive than the rest. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: The very weak are equally a problem. Democratic societies produce fewer inequalities. Hierarchical societies are miserable (I expect..). |
| 4112 | A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Recently there has been much emphasis on the importance of our capacity to have second-order desires - the desire to have certain desires - and its significance for ethical reflection and the practical consciousness. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 1) | |
| A reaction: This is a crucial point if we are to defend a reasonably rational view of morality against (say) emotivism. I agree that it is crucial to morality. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
| 4113 | 'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: There is no ancient Greek word for duty; the word 'deon' (the basis of 'deontology') means what one must do. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 1) | |
| A reaction: Presumably it covered compulsions which were not duties, such as the need to eat or drink. Greeks thought morally, but lacked a good moral vocabulary? |
| 4250 | The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: The only person who can offer a rebuttal of this is Aristotle. With the magnet of the Platonic Form of the Good, I can perceive the natural excellences of which I am capable, and feel a duty to pursue them. |
| 4110 | Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Obligation and duty look backwards; the acts they require lie in the future, but the reasons for those acts lie in the fact that I have already promised, the job I have undertaken, the position I am already in. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 1) | |
| A reaction: Maybe the central issue in morality is forwards versus backwards. It reflects two types of human temperament. Tomorrow is another day. Spilt milk. |
| 4249 | "Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: "Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: Williams says it is true in particular instances, but is not generally true of 'ought'. Maybe you 'ought' before you know whether you 'can'. |
| 4248 | Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Not every conclusion of moral deliberation expresses an obligation; for example, some moral conclusions merely announce that you 'may' do something. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: An important point for any deontological ethics. It may be possible to translate what 'may' be done into some form of duty, but it will probably involve contortions. |
| 4121 | Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Why should I think of myself as a legislator and at the same time a citizen of a republic governed by some notional laws? | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 4) | |
| A reaction: Kant's answer is supposed to be 'because you are rational, and hence must want consistency'. If we were all rational, Kant would be right. |
| 4122 | If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: How can an 'I' that has taken on the perspective of impartiality be left with enough identity to live a life that respects its own interests? | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 4) | |
| A reaction: Not a big problem. Thought constantly flips between objective and subjective, as Nagel has shown us. Compare Nagel in Idea 6446. |
| 4124 | Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and it is immune to the inverse square law. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 5) | |
| A reaction: Nicely put. The point is that the theory is inhuman, but Mill says it tells us what we should do, not what we actually tend to do. |
| 4245 | Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: The view that the only alternative to the intellect is the will, and the source of ethical conviction is decisions about principles and ways of life, cannot be right; ethical conviction, like any conviction, must to some extent come to you passively. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: Seems right. We cannot choose our factual beliefs (look at the sun and believe it is cloudy!). Could I 'decide' that it was right to betray my family just for fun? |
| 4246 | Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: If ethics is a matter of decision, and we must face the responsibility and burden of those decisions, this ignores the obvious point that if we are uncertain, then we are uncertain what to decide. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: Good point. The defence would be that the decision itself contains the seeds of certainty. Do something rather than nothing, and the sense of it will emerge. Modify as you go along. |
| 4247 | It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: Maybe beliefs imply education. A commitment to truth is an aspiration that others will agree, especially those over whom we have the greatest influence. |
| 4131 | Most women see an early miscarriage and a late stillbirth as being very different in character [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Few women see a spontaneous abortion or early miscarriage as the same thing as having a child who is stillborn or who dies very soon after birth. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: This implies a theory about the nature of what is lost. Everyone sees the difference between potential and actual. |
| 4133 | Speciesism isn't like racism, because the former implies a viewpoint which belongs to no one [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Speciesism is falsely modelled on racism and sexism, which really are prejudices; ..our arguments have to be founded on the human point of view; they cannot be derived from a point of view that is no one's point of view at all. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: This must be wrong. How else are we going to judge cruelty to animals as wrong? The 'point of view of the Universe' (Sidgwick) is not an empty concept. |