Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'On Political Reactions' and 'Moral Relativism'

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6 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
22449 When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
     Full Idea: One might think that 'is red' means the same as 'seems red to most people', forgetting that when asked if an object is red we look at it to see if it is red, and not in order to estimate the reaction that others will have to it.
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.23)
     A reaction: True, but we are conscious of our own reliability as observers (e.g. if colourblind, or with poor hearing or eyesight). I don't take my glasses off, have a look, and pronounce that the object is blurred. Ordinary language philosophy in action.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
22451 All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
     Full Idea: There is a great deal that all men have in common; all need affection, the cooperation of others, a place in a community, and help in trouble.
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.33)
     A reaction: There seem to be some people who don't need affection or a place in a community, though it is hard to imagine them being happy. These kind of facts are the basis for any sensible cognitivist view of ethics. They are basic to Foot's view.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
22452 Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
     Full Idea: Do we know what we mean by saying that anything has value, or even that we value it, as opposed to wanting it or being prepared to go to trouble to get it?
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.35)
     A reaction: Well, I value Rembrandt paintings, but have no aspiration to own one (and would refuse it if offered, because I couldn't look after it properly). And 'we' don't want to move the Taj Mahal to London. She has not expressed this good point very well.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
22439 There are only duties if there are rights, so truth is only for those with a right to it [Constant]
     Full Idea: A duty is that on the part of one being which corresponds to the rights of another. Where there are no rights there are no duties. To tell the truth is therefore a duty, but only to the one who has the right to the truth.
     From: Benjamin Constant (On Political Reactions [1797], p.123), quoted by Immanuel Kant - On a supposed right to lie p.28
     A reaction: We can't claim a right to have all questions answered truthfully (because there is a right to privacy), but we might claim a right not to be lied to (as long as we accept a refusal to answer). Kant rejected this idea.
22440 Unconditional truth-telling makes a society impossible [Constant]
     Full Idea: The moral principle 'it is a duty to tell the truth' would, if taken unconditionally and singly, make any society impossible.
     From: Benjamin Constant (On Political Reactions [1797], p.124), quoted by Immanuel Kant - On a supposed right to lie p.28
     A reaction: He gives the well known example of the murderer at the door asking if your friend is inside. Compare everyone becoming perfectly telepathic. Our society would collapse, but a new society would learn to live with it.