7 ideas
| 1554 | Contradiction is impossible, since only one side of the argument refers to the true facts [Prodicus, by Didymus the Blind] |
| Full Idea: Prodicus insists that contradiction is impossible, since if two people are contradicting each other, they cannot both be speaking of the same fact. Only the one who is speaking the truth is speaking of facts as they are; the other does not speak facts. | |
| From: report of Prodicus (fragments/reports [c.423 BCE]) by Didymus the Blind - Commentary on Ecclesiastes (frags) | |
| A reaction: cf. Kant's 100 thalers example |
| 7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Libet himself points out that the conscious decisions still have the power to 'endorse' or 'cancel', so to speak, the processes initiated by the earlier cortical activity: no action will result if the action's execution is consciously countermanded. | |
| From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.4 | |
| A reaction: This is why Libet's findings do not imply 'epiphenomenalism'. It seems that part of a decisive action is non-conscious, undermining the all-or-nothing view of consciousness. Searle tries to smuggle in free will at this point (Idea 3817). |
| 6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Libet found that a subject's conscious choice to move was about a fifth of a second before movement, and thus later than the onset of the brain's so-called 'readiness potential', which seems to imply that unconscious processes initiates action. | |
| From: report of Benjamin Libet (Unconscious Cerebral Initiative [1985]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9 | |
| A reaction: Of great interest to philosophers! It seems to make conscious choices epiphenomenal. The key move, I think, is to give up the idea of consciousness as being all-or-nothing. My actions are still initiated by 'me', but 'me' shades off into unconsciousness. |
| 7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
| Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
| From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
| A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
| 1555 | People used to think anything helpful to life was a god, as the Egyptians think the Nile a god [Prodicus] |
| Full Idea: In the old days people regarded the sun, the moon, rivers, springs, and everything else which is helpful for life as gods, because we are helped by them, just as the Egyptians regard the Nile as a god. | |
| From: Prodicus (fragments/reports [c.423 BCE], B05), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 9.18 |
| 1543 | He denied the existence of the gods, saying they are just exaltations of things useful for life [Prodicus] |
| Full Idea: He says that the gods worshipped by men neither exist nor have knowledge, but that the ancients exalted crops and everything else which is useful for life. | |
| From: Prodicus (fragments/reports [c.423 BCE]), quoted by Anon (Herc) - fragments 1428 19.12 |
| 535 | The gods are just personified human benefits [Prodicus] |
| Full Idea: Things from which benefits to human life have been derived have come to be considered deities, such as Demeter and Dionysus. | |
| From: Prodicus (fragments/reports [c.423 BCE], B5), quoted by (who?) - where? |