Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning' and 'Extrinsic Properties'

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13 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
5784 In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell]
     Full Idea: We call a belief true when it is belief in a true proposition, ..but it is to propositions that the primary formal meanings of 'truth' and 'falsehood' apply.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §IV)
     A reaction: I think this is wrong. A proposition such as 'it is raining' would need a date-and-time stamp to be a candidate for truth, and an indexical statement such as 'I am ill' would need to be asserted by a person. Of course, books can contain unread truths.
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
5777 The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell]
     Full Idea: I take it as evident that the truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers'.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], p.285)
     A reaction: A nice bold commitment to a controversial idea. The traditional objection is to ask how you are going to formulate the 'facts' except in terms of more beliefs, so you ending up comparing beliefs. Facts are a metaphysical commitment, not an acquaintance.
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
5783 Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell]
     Full Idea: The correspondence of proposition and fact grows increasingly complicated as we pass to more complicated types of propositions: existence-propositions, general propositions, disjunctive and hypothetical propositions, and so on.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §IV)
     A reaction: An important point. Truth must not just work for 'it is raining', but also for maths, logic, tautologies, laws etc. This is why so many modern philosophers have retreated to deflationary and minimal accounts of truth, which will cover all cases.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
14979 Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
     Full Idea: The property of 'being alone in the world' is an extrinsic property, even though it has had by an object that is alone in the world.
     From: report of David Lewis (Extrinsic Properties [1983]) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 01.2
     A reaction: I always choke on my cornflakes whenever anyone cites a true predicate as if it were a genuine property. This is a counterexample to Idea 14978. Sider offers another more elaborate example from Lewis.
15454 Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Properties may be more or less intrinsic; being a brother has more of an admixture of intrinsic structure than being a sibling does, yet both are extrinsic.
     From: David Lewis (Extrinsic Properties [1983], I)
     A reaction: I suppose the point is that a brother is intrinsically male - but then a sibling is intrinsically human. A totally extrinsic relation would be one between entities which shared virtually no categories of existence.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
15455 Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The way something is is given by the totality of its intrinsic properties.
     From: David Lewis (Extrinsic Properties [1983], I)
     A reaction: No. Some properties are intrinsic but trivial. The 'important' ones fix the identity (if the identity is indeed 'fixed').
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
5780 The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell]
     Full Idea: There are three issues about belief: 1) the content which is believed, 2) the relation of the content to its 'objective' - the fact which makes it true or false, and 3) the element which is belief, as opposed to consideration or doubt or desire.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
     A reaction: The correct answers to the questions (trust me) are that propositions are the contents, the relation aimed at is truth, which is a 'metaphysical ideal' of correspondence to facts, and belief itself is an indefinable feeling. See Hume, Idea 2208.
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
5778 If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell]
     Full Idea: If privacy is the main objection to introspective data, we shall have to include among such data all sensations; a toothache, for example, is essentially private; a dentist may see the bad condition of your tooth, but does not feel your ache.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §II)
     A reaction: Russell was perhaps the first to see why eliminative behaviourism is a non-starter as a theory of mind. Mental states are clearly a cause of behaviour, so they can't be the same thing. We might 'eliminate' mental states by reducing them, though.
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
5779 There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell]
     Full Idea: There do seem to be psychological and physical causal laws which are distinct from each other.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §II)
     A reaction: This sounds like the essence of 'property dualism'. Reductive physicalists (like myself) say there is no distinction. Davidson, usually considered a property dualist, claims there are no psycho-physical laws. Russell notes that reduction may be possible.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
5781 Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
     Full Idea: The important beliefs, even if they are not the only ones, are those which, if rendered into explicit words, take the form of a proposition.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
     A reaction: This assertion is close to the heart of the twentieth century linking of ontology and epistemology to language. It is open to challenges. Why is non-propositional belief unimportant? Do dogs have important beliefs? Can propositions exist non-verbally?
5782 A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
     Full Idea: I shall distinguish a proposition expressed in words as a 'word-proposition', and one consisting of images as an 'image-proposition'.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], §III)
     A reaction: This, I think, is good, though it raises the question of what exactly an 'image' is when it is non-visual, as when a dog believes its owner called. This distinction prevents us from regarding all knowledge and ontology as verbal in form.
5776 A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell]
     Full Idea: A proposition may be defined as: what we believe when we believe truly or falsely.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], p.285)
     A reaction: If we define belief as 'commitment to truth', Russell's last six words become redundant. "Propositions are the contents of beliefs", it being beliefs which are candidates for truth, not propositions. (Russell agrees, on p.308!)
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').