Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description-1' and 'Conspectus libelli (book outline)'

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7 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
21710 We know a universal in 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does' [Russell]
     Full Idea: We are aware of the universal 'yellow'; this universal is the subject in such judgements as 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does'.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description-1 [1911], 154), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 2.3
     A reaction: This still seems one of the strongest examples in support of universals. You could hardly be talking about yellow tropes in such instances (even if the world does contain yellow tropes).
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
12699 A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Without soul or form of some kind, a body would have no being, because no part of it can be designated which does not in turn consist of more parts. Thus nothing could be designated in a body which could be called 'this thing', or a unity.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1988), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
     A reaction: The locution 'soul or form' is disconcerting, and you have to spend some time with Leibniz to get the hang of it. The 'soul' is not intelligent, and is more like a source of action and response.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
12700 Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Substantial form, or soul, is the principle of unity and duration, matter is that of multiplicity and change
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1398-9), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 2
     A reaction: Leibniz was a fan of the unfashionable Aristotle, and tried to put a spin on his views consonant with contemporary Hobbesian mechanistic views. Oddly, he likes the idea that 'form' is indestructable, which I don't understand.
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
12736 If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber]
     Full Idea: Insofar as we have some insight into how God chooses, we can know a priori the laws of nature that God chooses for this best of all possible worlds. In this way, it is possible to have genuine a priori knowledge of contingent truths.
     From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1998-9) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
     A reaction: I think it would be doubtful whether our knowledge of God's choosings would count as a priori. How do we discover them? Ah! We derive God from the ontological argument, and his choosings from the divine perfection implied thereby.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
8854 My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell]
     Full Idea: My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York.
     From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description-1 [1911]) by Michael Williams - Without Immediate Justification §4
     A reaction: This pinpoints a nice difficulty for Russell. Williams may misrepresent Russell's account of acquaintance, but that is probably because Russell is unclear, or uncertain. The problem is when Russell claims that his acquaintance gives knowledge.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
12698 Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I believe that there is in every body a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.2010), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 1
     A reaction: Note that he never says that there is any intelligence present. This eventually becomes his monadology, but Leibniz is the most obvious post-Greek philosopher to flirt with panpsychism.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').