Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Papers of 1906' and 'Reason, Emotions and Good Life'

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3 ideas

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing [Russell]
     Full Idea: To explain belief in what is false we shall have to regard what is called belief in a proposition as not a thought related to the proposition, but rather as a thought related to the constituents of the proposition.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Papers of 1906 [1906], V.321), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 40 '1906'
     A reaction: Russell proposed a new theory of judgement, in order to explain erroneous judgements, given that true propositions are identical with facts. Of course there might be errors about the constituents, as well as about their structure. Othello is his example.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham]
     Full Idea: We can distinguish rational exclusivism (all activity is guided by reason - Plato and Spinoza), rational hegemonism (all action is dominated by reason), and rational instrumentalism (reason assesses means rather than ends - Hume).
     From: John Cottingham (Reason, Emotions and Good Life [2000])
     A reaction: The idea that reason is the only cause of actions seems deeply implausible, but I strongly resist Hume's instrumental approach. Action without desire is not a contradiction.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').