Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Review: Meinong 'Uber die Stellung...'' and 'Natural Kinds and Biological Realism'

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5 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
21547 On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist [Russell]
     Full Idea: To my contention that, on his principles, 'the existent round square' exists, Meinong replies that it is existent but does not exist. I must confess that I see no difference between existing and being existent, and I have no more to say on this head.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Uber die Stellung...' [1907], p.93)
     A reaction: Russell is obviously invoking the famously dubious ontological argument for God's existence. Normally impossible objects are rejected because of contradictions, but there might also be category mistakes. 'The slow square'.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
17371 Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
     Full Idea: Explanatory significance, hence naturalness, comes in degrees: positing some kinds may be very explanatory, positing others, only a little bit explanatory, positing others still, not explanatory at all.
     From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 4)
     A reaction: He mentions 'cousin' as a natural kind that is not very explanatory of anything. It interests us as humans, but not at all in other animals, it seems. ...Nice thought, though, that two squirrels might be cousins...
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17372 The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
     Full Idea: The signs are that the higher categories are not natural kinds and so the Linnaean hierarchy must be abandoned. ...This is not abandoning a hierarchy altogether, it is not abandoning a tree of life.
     From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 6)
     A reaction: Devitt's underlying point is that the higher and more general kinds do not have an essence (a specific nature), which is the qualification to be a natural kind. They explain nothing. Essence is the hallmark of natural kinds. Hmmm.
17373 Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]
     Full Idea: Species pluralism is the view that there are several equally good accounts of what it is to be a species.
     From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 7)
     A reaction: Devitt votes for it, and cites Dupré, among many other. Given the existence of rival accounts, all making good points, it is hard to resist this view.