37 ideas
9847 | A contextual definition permits the elimination of the expression by a substitution [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The standard sense of a 'contextual definition' permits the eliminating of the defined expression, by transforming any sentence containing it into an equivalent one not containing it. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: So the whole definition might be eliminated by a single word, which is not equivalent to the target word, which is embedded in the original expression. Clearly contextual definitions have some problems |
11064 | Classes can be reduced to propositional functions [Russell, by Hanna] |
Full Idea: Russell held that classes can be reduced to propositional functions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by Robert Hanna - Rationality and Logic 2.4 | |
A reaction: The exact nature of a propositional function is disputed amongst Russell scholars (though it is roughly an open sentence of the form 'x is red'). |
9820 | In classical logic, logical truths are valid formulas; in higher-order logics they are purely logical [Dummett] |
Full Idea: For sentential or first-order logic, the logical truths are represented by valid formulas; in higher-order logics, by sentences formulated in purely logical terms. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch. 3) |
6407 | The class of classes which lack self-membership leads to a contradiction [Russell, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: The class of teaspoons isn't a teaspoon, so isn't a member of itself; but the class of non-teaspoons is a member of itself. The class of all classes which are not members of themselves is a member of itself if it isn't a member of itself! Paradox. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: A very compressed version of Russell's famous paradox, often known as the 'barber' paradox. Russell developed his Theory of Types in an attempt to counter the paradox. Frege's response was to despair of his own theory. |
9896 | A prime number is one which is measured by a unit alone [Dummett] |
Full Idea: A prime number is one which is measured by a unit alone. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], 7 Def 11) | |
A reaction: We might say that the only way of 'reaching' or 'constructing' a prime is by incrementing by one till you reach it. That seems a pretty good definition. 64, for example, can be reached by a large number of different routes. |
18255 | Addition of quantities is prior to ordering, as shown in cyclic domains like angles [Dummett] |
Full Idea: It is essential to a quantitative domain of any kind that there should be an operation of adding its elements; that this is more fundamental thaat that they should be linearly ordered by magnitude is apparent from cyclic domains like that of angles. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], 22 'Quantit') |
9895 | A number is a multitude composed of units [Dummett] |
Full Idea: A number is a multitude composed of units. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], 7 Def 2) | |
A reaction: This is outdated by the assumption that 0 and 1 are also numbers, but if we say one is really just the 'unit' which is preliminary to numbers, and 0 is as bogus a number as i is, we might stick with the original Greek distinction. |
9852 | We understand 'there are as many nuts as apples' as easily by pairing them as by counting them [Dummett] |
Full Idea: A child understands 'there are just as many nuts as apples' as easily by pairing them off as by counting them. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: I find it very intriguing that you could know that two sets have the same number, without knowing any numbers. Is it like knowing two foreigners spoke the same words, without understanding them? Or is 'equinumerous' conceptually prior to 'number'? |
9829 | The identity of a number may be fixed by something outside structure - by counting [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The identity of a mathematical object may sometimes be fixed by its relation to what lies outside the structure to which it belongs. It is more fundamental to '3' that if certain objects are counted, there are three of them. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as Dummett being pushed (by his dislike of the purely abstract picture given by structuralism) back to a rather empiricist and physical view of numbers, though he would totally deny that. |
9828 | Numbers aren't fixed by position in a structure; it won't tell you whether to start with 0 or 1 [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The number 0 is not differentiated from 1 by its position in a progression, otherwise there would be no difference between starting with 0 and starting with 1. That is enough to show that numbers are not identifiable just as positions in structures. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: This sounds conclusive, but doesn't feel right. If numbers are a structure, then where you 'start' seems unimportant. Where do you 'start' in St Paul's Cathedral? Starting sounds like a constructivist concept for number theory. |
10418 | Type theory seems an extreme reaction, since self-exemplification is often innocuous [Swoyer on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's reaction to his paradox (by creating his theory of types) seems extreme, because many cases of self-exemplification are innocuous. The property of being a property is itself a property. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by Chris Swoyer - Properties 7.5 | |
A reaction: Perhaps it is not enough that 'many cases' are innocuous. We are starting from philosophy of mathematics, where precision is essentially. General views about properties come later. |
10047 | Russell's improvements blocked mathematics as well as paradoxes, and needed further axioms [Russell, by Musgrave] |
Full Idea: Unfortunately, Russell's new logic, as well as preventing the deduction of paradoxes, also prevented the deduction of mathematics, so he supplemented it with additional axioms, of Infinity, of Choice, and of Reducibility. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §2 | |
A reaction: The first axiom seems to be an empirical hypothesis, and the second has turned out to be independent of logic and set theory. |
23478 | Type theory means that features shared by different levels cannot be expressed [Morris,M on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's theory of types avoided the paradoxes, but it had the result that features common to different levels of the hierarchy become uncapturable (since any attempt to capture them would involve a predicate which disobeyed the hierarchy restrictions). | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 2H |
21718 | Ramified types can be defended as a system of intensional logic, with a 'no class' view of sets [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
Full Idea: A defence of the ramified theory of types comes in seeing it as a system of intensional logic which includes the 'no class' account of sets, and indeed the whole development of mathematics, as just a part. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 6.1 | |
A reaction: So Linsky's basic project is to save logicism, by resting on intensional logic (rather than extensional logic and set theory). I'm not aware that Linsky has acquired followers for this. Maybe Crispin Wright has commented? |
9876 | Set theory isn't part of logic, and why reduce to something more complex? [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The two frequent modern objects to logicism are that set theory is not part of logic, or that it is of no interest to 'reduce' a mathematical theory to another, more complex, one. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.18) | |
A reaction: Dummett says these are irrelevant (see context). The first one seems a good objection. The second one less so, because whether something is 'complex' is a quite different issue from whether it is ontologically more fundamental. |
18126 | A set does not exist unless at least one of its specifications is predicative [Russell, by Bostock] |
Full Idea: The idea is that the same set may well have different canonical specifications, i.e. there may be different ways of stating its membership conditions, and so long as one of these is predicative all is well. If none are, the supposed set does not exist. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 8.1 |
18128 | Russell is a conceptualist here, saying some abstracta only exist because definitions create them [Russell, by Bostock] |
Full Idea: It is a conceptualist approach that Russell is relying on. ...The view is that some abstract objects ...exist only because they are definable. It is the definition that would (if permitted) somehow bring them into existence. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 8.1 | |
A reaction: I'm suddenly thinking that predicativism is rather interesting. Being of an anti-platonist persuasion about abstract 'objects', I take some story about how we generate them to be needed. Psychological abstraction seems right, but a bit vague. |
18124 | Vicious Circle says if it is expressed using the whole collection, it can't be in the collection [Russell, by Bostock] |
Full Idea: The Vicious Circle Principle says, roughly, that whatever involves, or presupposes, or is only definable in terms of, all of a collection cannot itself be one of the collection. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908], p.63,75) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 8.1 | |
A reaction: This is Bostock's paraphrase of Russell, because Russell never quite puts it clearly. The response is the requirement to be 'predicative'. Bostock emphasises that it mainly concerns definitions. The Principle 'always leads to hierarchies'. |
9884 | The distinction of concrete/abstract, or actual/non-actual, is a scale, not a dichotomy [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The distinction between concrete and abstract objects, or Frege's corresponding distinction between actual and non-actual objects, is not a sharp dichotomy, but resembles a scale upon which objects occupy a range of positions. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.18) | |
A reaction: This might seem right if you live (as Dummett chooses to) in the fog of language, but it surely can't be right if you think about reality. Is the Equator supposed to be near the middle of his scale? Either there is an equator, or there isn't. |
9869 | Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Fully fledged realism depends on - indeed, may be identified with - an undiluted application to sentences of the relevant kind of straightforwards two-valued semantics. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.15) | |
A reaction: This is the sort of account you get from a whole-heartedly linguistic philosopher. Personally I would say that Dummett has got it precisely the wrong way round: I adopt a two-valued semantics because my metaphysics is realist. |
9880 | Nominalism assumes unmediated mental contact with objects [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The nominalist superstition is based ultimately on the myth of the unmediated presentation of genuine concrete objects to the mind. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.18) | |
A reaction: Personally I am inclined to favour nominalism and a representative theory of perception, which acknowledges some 'mediation', but of a non-linguistic form. Any good theory here had better include animals, which seem to form concepts. |
9885 | The existence of abstract objects is a pseudo-problem [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The existence of abstract objects is a pseudo-problem. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.18) | |
A reaction: This remark follows after Idea 9884, which says the abstract/concrete distinction is a sliding scale. Personally I take the distinction to be fairly sharp, and it is therefore probably the single most important problem in the whole of human thought. |
9858 | Abstract objects nowadays are those which are objective but not actual [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Objects which are objective but not actual are precisely what are now called abstract objects. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.15) | |
A reaction: Why can there not be subjective abstract objects? 'My favourites are x, y and z'. 'I'll decide later what my favourites are'. 'I only buy my favourites - nothing else'. |
9859 | It is absurd to deny the Equator, on the grounds that it lacks causal powers [Dummett] |
Full Idea: If someone argued that assuming the existence of the Equator explains nothing, and it has no causal powers, so everything would be the same if it didn't exist, so we needn't accept its existence, we should gape at the crudity of the misunderstanding. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.15) | |
A reaction: Not me. I would gape if someone argued that latitude 55° 14' (and an infinity of other lines) exists for the same reasons (whatever they may be) that the Equator exists. A mode of description can't create an object. |
9860 | 'We've crossed the Equator' has truth-conditions, so accept the Equator - and it's an object [Dummett] |
Full Idea: 'We've crossed the Equator' is judged true if we are nearer the other Pole, so it not for philosophers to deny that the Earth has an equator, and we see that the Equator is not a concept or relation or function, so it must be classified as an object. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.15) | |
A reaction: A lovely example of linguistic philosophy in action (and so much the worse for that, I would say). A useful label here, I suggest (unoriginally, I think), is that we should label such an item a 'semantic object', rather than a real object in our ontology. |
9872 | Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly [Dummett] |
Full Idea: To recognise that there is no objection in principle to abstract objects requires acknowledgement that some form of the context principle is correct, since abstract objects can neither be encountered nor presented. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.16) | |
A reaction: I take this to be an immensely important idea. I consider myself to be a philosopher of thought rather than a philosopher of language (Dummett's distinction, he being one of the latter). Thought connects to the world, but does it connect to abstracta? |
9848 | Content is replaceable if identical, so replaceability can't define identity [Dummett, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Husserl says the only ground for assuming the replaceability of one content by another is their identity; we are therefore not entitled to define their identity as consisting in their replaceability. | |
From: report of Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.12 | |
A reaction: This is a direct challenge to Frege. Tricky to arbitrate, as it is an issue of conceptual priority. My intuition is with Husserl, but maybe the two are just benignly inerdefinable. |
9842 | Frege introduced criteria for identity, but thought defining identity was circular [Dummett] |
Full Idea: In his middle period Frege rated identity indefinable, on the ground that every definition must take the form of an identity-statement. Frege introduced the notion of criterion of identity, which has been widely used by analytical philosophers. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: The objection that attempts to define identity would be circular sounds quite plausible. It sounds right to seek a criterion for type-identity (in shared properties or predicates), but token-identity looks too fundamental to give clear criteria. |
9849 | Maybe a concept is 'prior' to another if it can be defined without the second concept [Dummett] |
Full Idea: One powerful argument for a thesis that one notion is conceptually prior to another is the possibility of defining the first without reference to the second. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: You'd better check whether you can't also define the second without reference to the first before you rank their priority. And maybe 'conceptual priority' is conceptually prior to 'definition' (i.e. definition needs a knowledge of priority). Help! |
9850 | An argument for conceptual priority is greater simplicity in explanation [Dummett] |
Full Idea: An argument for conceptual priority is greater simplicity in explanation. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: One might still have to decide priority between two equally simple (or complex) concepts. I begin to wonder whether 'priority' has any other than an instrumental meaning (according to which direction you wish to travel - is London before Edinburgh?). |
9873 | Abstract terms are acceptable as long as we know how they function linguistically [Dummett] |
Full Idea: To recognise abstract terms as perfectly proper items of a vocabulary depends upon allowing that all that is necessary for the lawful introduction of a range of expressions into the language is a coherent account of how they are to function in sentences. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.16) | |
A reaction: Why can't the 'coherent account' of the sentences include the fact that there must be something there for the terms to refer to? How else are we to eliminate nonsense words which obey good syntactical rules? Cf. Idea 9872. |
9993 | There is no reason why abstraction by equivalence classes should be called 'logical' [Dummett, by Tait] |
Full Idea: Dummett uses the term 'logical abstraction' for the construction of the abstract objects as equivalence classes, but it is not clear why we should call this construction 'logical'. | |
From: report of Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991]) by William W. Tait - Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind n 14 | |
A reaction: This is a good objection, and Tait offers a much better notion of 'logical abstraction' (as involving preconditions for successful inference), in Idea 9981. |
9857 | We arrive at the concept 'suicide' by comparing 'Cato killed Cato' with 'Brutus killed Brutus' [Dummett] |
Full Idea: We arrive at the concept of suicide by considering both occurrences in the sentence 'Cato killed Cato' of the proper name 'Cato' as simultaneously replaceable by another name, say 'Brutus', and so apprehending the pattern common to both sentences. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: This is intended to illustrate Frege's 'logical abstraction' technique, as opposed to wicked psychological abstraction. The concept of suicide is the pattern 'x killed x'. This is a crucial example if we are to understand abstraction... |
9833 | To abstract from spoons (to get the same number as the forks), the spoons must be indistinguishable too [Dummett] |
Full Idea: To get units by abstraction, units arrived at by abstraction from forks must the identical to that abstracted from spoons, with no trace of individuality. But if spoons can no longer be differentiated from forks, they can't differ from one another either. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Dummett makes the point better than Frege did. Can we 'think of a fork insofar as it is countable, ignoring its other features'? What are we left thinking of? Frege says it must still be the whole fork. 'Nice fork, apart from the colour'. |
9836 | Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett] |
Full Idea: A Fregean semantics assumes a domain already determinately articulated into individual objects. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: A more interesting criticism than most of Dummett's other challenges to the Frege/Davidson view. I am beginning to doubt whether the semantics and the ontology can ever be divorced from the psychology, of thought, interests, focus etc. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
18257 | Why should the limit of measurement be points, not intervals? [Dummett] |
Full Idea: By what right do we assume that the limit of measurement is a point, and not an interval? | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], 22 'Quantit') |