Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Papers of 1918' and '10: Ephesians'

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3 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Don't be tossed to and fro with every wind of doctrine, by cunning deceptive men [Paul]
     Full Idea: Henceforth be no more children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive.
     From: St Paul (10: Ephesians [c.55], 4:14)
     A reaction: One quoted to me by a learned religious friend, in response to Idea 23767. I sympathise. I find it extraordinary the nonsense that students of philosophy can be led into, when they swallow some specious argument.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Propositions don't name facts, because two opposed propositions can match one fact [Russell]
     Full Idea: It is perfectly evident that a proposition is not the name for a fact, from the mere circumstance that there are two propositions corresponding to each fact. 'Socrates is dead' and 'Socrates is not dead' correspond to the same fact.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Papers of 1918 [1918], VIII.136), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 42 'Prop'
     A reaction: He finally reaches in 1918 what now looks fairly obvious. The idea that a proposition is part of the world is absurd. We should call the parts of the world 'facts' (despite vagueness and linguistic dependence in such things). Propositions are thoughts.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').