Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Introduction to 'Modality'' and 'Without Immediate Justification'

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7 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality

14528	Maybe modal thought is unavoidable, as a priori recognition of necessary truth-preservation in reasoning [Hale/Hoffmann,A]
	Full Idea: There are 'transcendental' arguments saying that modal thought is unavoidable - recognition, a priori, of the necessarily truth-preserving character of some forms of inference is a precondition for rational thought in general, and scientific theorizing.
	From: Bob Hale/ Aviv Hoffmann (Introduction to 'Modality' [2010], 1)
	A reaction: So the debate about the status of logical truths and valid inference, are partly debates about whether out thought has to involve modality, or whether it could just be about the actual world. I take possibilities and necssities to be features of nature.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma

8851	Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M]
	Full Idea: From the point of view of the coherentist, Agrippa's Dilemma fails because it presupposes a 'linear' conception of justifying inference.
	From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §2)
	A reaction: [He cites Bonjour 1985 for this view] Since a belief may have several justifications, and one belief could justify a host of others, there certainly isn't a simple line of justifications. I agree with the coherentist picture here.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism

8849	Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M]
	Full Idea: Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist. The justification-making factors for beliefs, basic and otherwise, are all open to view, and perhaps even actual objects of awareness. I am always in a position to know that I know.
	From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §1)
	A reaction: This is a helpful if one is trying to draw a map of the debate. An externalist foundationalism would have to terminate in the external fact which was the object of knowledge (via some reliable channel), but that is the truth, not the justification.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs

8853	Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M]
	Full Idea: Basic judgements threaten to buy their immunity from error at the cost of being drained of descriptive content altogether.
	From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §4)
	A reaction: This is probably the key objection to foundationalism. As you import sufficient content into basic experiences to enable them to actually justify a set of beliefs, you find you have imported all sorts of comparisons and classifications as well.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations

8855	Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M]
	Full Idea: The fact that experiential contents cannot be other than they are, as far as sensory awareness goes, does not imply that we cannot misdescribe them, as in misreporting the number of speckles on a speckled hen (Chisholm's example).
	From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §4)
	A reaction: [Chisholm 1942 is cited] Such experiences couldn't be basic beliefs if there was a conflict between their intrinsic nature and the description I used in discussing them.

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification

8852	In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M]
	Full Idea: In the peculiar context of the skeptical challenge, it is easy to persuade oneself that externalism is not an option.
	From: Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §3)
	A reaction: This is because externalism sees justification as largely non-conscious, but when faced with scepticism, the justifications need to be spelled out, and therefore internalised. So are sceptical discussions basic, or freakish anomalies?

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').