12434
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Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale]
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Full Idea:
We must distinguish between explaining particular necessities and explaining necessity in general; and we ought to distinguish between explaining, in regard to any necessary truth, why it is true, and explaining why it is necessary.
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From:
Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], p.308)
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A reaction:
Useful. The pluralist view I associate with Fine says we can explain types of necessity, but not necessity in general. If we seek truthmakers, there is a special case of what adds the necessity to the truth.
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12433
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If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale]
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Full Idea:
If the alleged necessity, e,g, 2+2=4, really does depend upon a convention governing the use of the words in which we state it, and the existence of that convention is merely a contingent matter, then it can't after all be necessary.
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From:
Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], p.302)
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A reaction:
[Hale is citing Blackburn for this claim] Hale suggests replies, by keeping truth and meaning separate, and involving laws of logic. Blackburn clearly has a good point.
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12436
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Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale]
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Full Idea:
It seems to me that identity-relations among concepts have more to do with explaining how we know that vixens are female foxes etc., than with explaining why it is necessary, and, more generally, with explaining why some necessities are knowable a priori.
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From:
Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], P.313)
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A reaction:
Hale rejects the conceptual and conventional accounts of necessity, in favour of the essentialist view. This strikes me as a good suggestion of Hale's, since I agree with him about the essentialism.
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8120
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Objects can be beautiful which express nothing at all, such as the rainbow [Herbart, by Tolstoy]
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Full Idea:
Objects are often beautiful which express nothing at all, as, for instance, the rainbow, which is beautiful for its lines and colours and not for its mythological connexion with Iris, or Noah's rainbow.
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From:
report of Johann Herbart (works [1830]) by Leo Tolstoy - What is Art? Ch.3
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A reaction:
A nice counterexample to Tolstoy's own theory. The example is one of a natural beauty, but it would be harder to find examples in human art. How much the artist may feel, though, has little to do with the success of a work of art.
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7903
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The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
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Full Idea:
The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
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From:
Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
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A reaction:
What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
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