5 ideas
16661 | There are two sorts of category - referring to things, and to circumstances of things [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Is it not now clear what the difference is between items in the categories? Some serve to refer to a thing, whereas others serve to refer to the circumstances of a thing. | |
From: Boethius (Concerning the Trinity [c.518], Ch. 4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.5 |
6900 | A prior understanding of beauty is needed to assert that the Form of the Beautiful is beautiful [Westaway] |
Full Idea: If it were asserted that the Form of the Beautiful was itself beautiful, such a statement would require a prior understanding of the concept of beauty, so would immediately lead to an infinite regress, so the Forms can't be self-predicating. | |
From: Luke Westaway (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This is a nice clear statement of the mess that Plato gets himself into if he wants the Forms to be self-predicating. Clearly the Form of the Beautiful can't be beautiful, but must be that which gives other things their beauty. |
6956 | At what point does an object become 'whole'? [Westaway] |
Full Idea: At what point does an object become 'whole'? | |
From: Luke Westaway (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This nice question strikes me as the central one in mereology. It is tempting to reply that the matter is entirely conventional, but there seems an obvious fact about something missing if one piece is absent from a jigsaw, or a cube is chipped. |
7335 | The Chinese Room should be able to ask itself questions in Mandarin [Westaway] |
Full Idea: If the Chinese Room is functionally equivalent to a Mandarin speaker, it ought to be able to ask itself questions in Mandarin (and it can't). | |
From: Luke Westaway (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: Searle might triumphantly say that this proves there is no understanding in the room, but the objection won't go away, because the room is presumably functionally equivalent to a speaker, and not just a mere translator (who might use mechanical tricks). |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |