Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'The Nature of Thought' and 'Pragmatism in Retrospect'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
2764 Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J]
     Full Idea: Blanshard says that in a fully coherent system there would not only be consistency, but every proposition would be entailed by the others, and no proposition would stand outside the system.
     From: report of Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought [1939], 2:265) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 8.1
     A reaction: Hm. If a proposition is entailed by the others, then it is a necessary truth (given the others) which sounds deterministic. You could predict all the truths you had never encountered. See 1578:178 for quote.
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
19080 Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO]
     Full Idea: Blanshard said that coherent justification leads to coherence truth. It might be said that coherence is a test for truth, but truth is correspondence. But coherence doesn't guarantee correspondence, and coherence is a test, so truth is not correspondence.
     From: report of Brand Blanshard (The Nature of Thought [1939], Ch.26) by James O. Young - The Coherence Theory of Truth §2.2
     A reaction: [compression of Young's summary] Rescher (1973) says that Blanshard's argument depends on coherence being an infallible test for truth, which it isn't.
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
15335 Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce]
     Full Idea: Peirce's anti-realist theory of a truth is a verificationist theory. Truth is judged to be an epistemic notion. But the way things are is independent of the evidence we may be able to obtain for or against a judgement.
     From: comment on Charles Sanders Peirce (Pragmatism in Retrospect [1906]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 02.1
     A reaction: This criticism doesn't quite capture the point that Peirce's theory is that truth is an ideal, not the set of opinions that miserable little humans eventually settle for when they get bored. Truth is an aspect of rationality, perhaps.
14796 Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce]
     Full Idea: I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so far as there is any 'truth') to its being the predestined result to which sufficient enquiry would ultimately lead.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Pragmatism in Retrospect [1906], p.288)
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
14795 Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Pragmatism is no doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine the truth of things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Pragmatism in Retrospect [1906], p.271)
     A reaction: Suddenly I recognise a prominent strand of modern philosophy of language (especially in America) for what it is.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').