Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Response to David Armstrong' and 'On the Nature of Acquaintance'

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3 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: Russell argued that the only 'logically proper' names are those which denote particular entities with which one can be acquainted. The best examples are 'this' and 'that'; other apparent names turn out, when analysed, to be definite descriptions.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Acquaintance [1914]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
     A reaction: This view is firm countered by the causal theory of reference, proposed by Kripke and others, in which not only people like Aristotle are 'baptised' with a name, but also natural kinds such as water. It is hard to disagree with Kripke on this.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Space, time, and some other basics, are not causal powers [Ellis]
     Full Idea: Spatial, temporal, and other primary properties and relationships are not causal powers.
     From: Brian Ellis (Response to David Armstrong [1999], p.42), quoted by David M. Armstrong - Truth and Truthmakers 10.4
     A reaction: It is hard to see how time and space could actually be powers, but future results in physics (or even current results about 'fields') might change that.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').