Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Reality is Not What it Seems' and 'Transworld Heir Lines'

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21 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan]
     Full Idea: Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity.
     From: David Kaplan (Transworld Heir Lines [1967], p.97)
     A reaction: An important observation, which explains why the modern obsession with logic has often led us down the metaphysical primrose path to ontological hell.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
Zeno assumes collecting an infinity of things makes an infinite thing [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: One possible answer is that Zeno is wrong because it is not true that by accumulating an infinite number of things one ends up with an infinite thing.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 01)
     A reaction: I do love it when deep and complex ideas are expressed with perfect simplicity. As long as the simple version is correct.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Quantum mechanics deals with processes, rather than with things [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: Quantum mechanics teaches us not to think about the world in terms of 'things' which are in this or that state, but in terms of 'processes' instead.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04)
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Quantum mechanics describes the world entirely as events [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: The world of quantum mechanics is not a world of objects: it is a world of events.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04)
     A reaction: I presume a philosopher is allowed to ask what an 'event' is. Since, as Rovelli tells it, time is eliminated from the picture, events seem to be unanalysable primitives.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan]
     Full Idea: The use of models is so natural to logicians ...that they sometimes take seriously what are only artefacts of the model, and adopt a bare particular metaphysics. Why? Because the model so nicely separates the bare particular from its clothing.
     From: David Kaplan (Transworld Heir Lines [1967], p.97)
     A reaction: See also Idea 11970. I think this observation is correct, and incredibly important. We need to keep quite separate the notion of identity in conceptual space from our notion of identity in the actual world. The first is bare, the second fat.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan]
     Full Idea: If we adopt the bare particular metaphysical view, we have a simple solution to the transworld identification problem: we identify by bare particulars.
     From: David Kaplan (Transworld Heir Lines [1967], p.98)
     A reaction: See Ideas 11969 and 11970 on this idea. The problem with bare particulars is that they can change their properties utterly, so that Aristotle in the actual world can be a poached egg in some possible world. We need essences.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan]
     Full Idea: An extremely vivid person might have no counterparts, and Da Vinci seems to me to have more than one essence. Bertrand Russell is clearly the counterpart of at least three distinct persons in some more plausible world.
     From: David Kaplan (Transworld Heir Lines [1967], p.100)
     A reaction: Lewis prefers the notion that there is at most one counterpart, the 'closest' entity is some world. I think he also claims there is at least one counterpart. I like Kaplan's relaxed attitude to these things, which has more explanatory power.
Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan]
     Full Idea: I prefer to think of essence as a transworld heir line, rather than as the more familiar collection of properties, because the latter too much suggests the idea of a fixed and final essential description.
     From: David Kaplan (Transworld Heir Lines [1967], p.100)
     A reaction: He is sympathetic to the counterpart idea, and close to Lewis's view of essences, as the intersection of counterparts. I like his rebellion against fixed and final descriptions, but am a bit doubtful about his basic idea. Causation should be involved.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan]
     Full Idea: Among the proposals for conditions under which two sentences have the same ordinary sense, the most liberal (Carnap and Church) is that they be logically equivalent, and the most restrictive (Benson Mates) is that they never have the same sense.
     From: David Kaplan (Transworld Heir Lines [1967], p.89)
     A reaction: Personally I would move the discussion to the level of the propositions being expressed before I attempted a solution.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are probably no infinities, and 'infinite' names what we do not yet know [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: 'Infinite', ultimately, is the name that we give to what we do not yet know. Nature appears to be telling us that there is nothing truly infinite.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 11)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
The basic ideas of fields and particles are merged in quantum mechanics [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: The notions of fields and particles, separated by Faraday and Maxwell, end up merging in quantum mechanics.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04)
     A reaction: This sounds to me just like Anaximander's 'apeiron' - the unlimited [Rovelli agrees! p.168]. Anaximander predicted the wall which enquiry would hit, but we now have more detail.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
Because it is quantised, a field behaves like a set of packets of energy [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: Since the energy of the electromagnetic field can take on only certain values, the field behaves like a set of packets of energy.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04)
There are about fifteen particles fields, plus a few force fields [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: There are about fifteen fields, whose quanta are elementary particles (electrons, quarks, muons, neutrinos, Higgs, and little else), plus a few fields similar to the electromagnetic one, which describe forces at a nuclear scale, with quanta like photons.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04)
     A reaction: According to Rovelli, this sentence describes the essence of physical reality.
The world consists of quantum fields, with elementary events happening in spacetime [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: The world is not made up of fields and particles, but of a single type of entity: the quantum field. There are no longer particles which move in space with the passage of time, but quantum fields whose elementary events happen in spacetime.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04)
     A reaction: If you are not a scientist, there is (I find) a strong tendency to read and digest stuff like this, and then forget it the next day, because it so far from our experience. Folk like me have to develop two parallel views of the nature of reality.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons are not waves, because their collisions are at a point, and not spread out [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: Schrödinger's wave is a bad image for an electron, because when a particle collides with something else, it is always at a point: it is never spread out in space like a wave.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04 note)
     A reaction: And yet there is the diffusion in the two-slit experiment, which Thomas Young discovered for light. I must take Rovelli's word for this.
Electrons only exist when they interact, and their being is their combination of quantum leaps [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: Electrons don't always exist. They exist when they interact. They materialize when they collide with something. The quantum leap from one orbit to another constitutes their way of being real. An electron is a combination of leaps between interactions.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04)
     A reaction: If a philosopher with an Aristotelian interest in the nature of matter wants to grasp the modern view, the electron looks like the thing to focus on. You can feel Rovelli battling here to find formulations that might satisfy a philosopher.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum Theory describes events and possible interactions - not how things are [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: Quantum Theory does not describe things as they are: it describes how things occur and interact with each other. It doesn't describe where there is a particle but how it shows itself to others. The world of existence is reduced to possible interactions.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04)
     A reaction: Fans of 'process philosophy' should like this, though he is not denying that there may be facts about how things are - it is just that this is not mentioned in the theory. There is not much point in philosophers yearning to know the reality.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Nature has three aspects: granularity, indeterminacy, and relations [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: I think that quantum mechanics has revealed three aspects of the nature of things: granularity, indeterminacy, and the relational structure of the world.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04)
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The world is just particles plus fields; space is the gravitational field [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: The world is made up of particles + fields, and nothing else; there is no need to add space as an extra ingredient. Newton's space is the gravitational field.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 03)
     A reaction: I get the impression that particles are just bumps or waves in the fields [yes! Rovelli p.110], which would mean there are fields and nothing else. And no one seems to know what a field is.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Only heat distinguishes past from future [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: It is always heat and only heat that distinguishes the past from the future.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 12)
     A reaction: I can remember the past but not the future - so can that fact be reduced to facts about heat?