Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Pragmatism in Retrospect' and 'Summa'

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6 ideas

3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth

14796	Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce]
	Full Idea: I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so far as there is any 'truth') to its being the predestined result to which sufficient enquiry would ultimately lead.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Pragmatism in Retrospect [1906], p.288)

15335	Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce]
	Full Idea: Peirce's anti-realist theory of a truth is a verificationist theory. Truth is judged to be an epistemic notion. But the way things are is independent of the evidence we may be able to obtain for or against a judgement.
	From: comment on Charles Sanders Peirce (Pragmatism in Retrospect [1906]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 02.1
	A reaction: This criticism doesn't quite capture the point that Peirce's theory is that truth is an ideal, not the set of opinions that miserable little humans eventually settle for when they get bored. Truth is an aspect of rationality, perhaps.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance

16616	Substances 'substand' (beneath accidents), or 'subsist' (independently) [Eustachius]
	Full Idea: It is proper to substance both to stretch out or exist beneath accidents, which is to substand, and to exist per se and not in another, which is to subsist.
	From: Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], I.1.3b.1.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 06.2
	A reaction: This reflects Aristotle wavering between 'ousia' being the whole of a thing, or the substrate of a thing. In current discussion, 'substance' still wavers between a thing which 'is' a substance, and substance being the essence.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism

16585	Prime matter is free of all forms, but has the potential for all forms [Eustachius]
	Full Idea: Everyone says that prime matter, considered in itself, is free of all forms and at the same time is open to all forms - or, that matter is in potentiality to all forms.
	From: Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], III.1.1.2.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1
	A reaction: This is the notorious doctrine developed to support the hylomorphic picture derived from Aristotle. No one could quite figure out what prime matter was, so it faded away.

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism

14795	Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce]
	Full Idea: Pragmatism is no doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine the truth of things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Pragmatism in Retrospect [1906], p.271)
	A reaction: Suddenly I recognise a prominent strand of modern philosophy of language (especially in America) for what it is.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').