6 ideas
8000 | He who is ignorant of the history of philosophy is doomed to repeat it [Santayana, by MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: Santayana remarked that he who is ignorant of the history of philosophy is doomed to repeat it. | |
From: report of George Santayana (The Life of Reason [1906]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Santayana's remark seems to have been about history in general, so this is a Macintyre thought. It obviously has a lot of truth, and most great philosophers seem hugely knowledgeable. However, ignorance brings a kind of freedom. |
14779 | I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce] |
Full Idea: I do not reason for the sake of my delight in reasoning, but solely to avoid disappointment and surprise. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Criterion of Validity in Reasoning [1903], I) | |
A reaction: Hence Peirce places more emphasis on inductive and abductive reasoning than on deductive reasoning. I have to agree with him. Anyone account of why we reason must have an evolutionary framework. What advantage does reason bestow? It concerns the future. |
14777 | That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Either J and the judgment 'I say that J is true' are the same for all judgments or for none. But if identical, their denials are identical. These are 'J is not true' and 'I do not say that J is true', which are different. No judgment judges itself true. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Criterion of Validity in Reasoning [1903], I) | |
A reaction: If you are going to espouse the Ramseyan redundancy view of truth, you had better make sure you are not guilty of the error which Peirce identifies here. |
14780 | Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is foolish to study logic unless one is persuaded that one's own reasonings are more or less bad. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Criterion of Validity in Reasoning [1903], II) |
14778 | Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Facts are hard things which do not consist in my thinking so and so, but stand unmoved by whatever you or I or any man or generations of men may opine about them. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Criterion of Validity in Reasoning [1903], I) | |
A reaction: This is my view of facts, with which I am perfectly happy, for all the difficulties involved in individuating facts, and in disentangling them from our own modes of thought and expression. Let us try to establish the facts. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |