8 ideas
7661 | Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (How to Make our Ideas Clear [1878], p.38) | |
A reaction: At least this affirms that truth is an ideal about which we dream, and is not confined merely to what we can actually know. But it rules out anything beyond the reach of all investigation, which seems a misconception of truth. What could angels know? |
8203 | All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets [Quine] |
Full Idea: The arithmetic of ratios and irrational and imaginary numbers can all be reduced by definition to the theory of classes of positive integers, and this can in turn be reduced to pure set theory. | |
From: Willard Quine (Vagaries of Definition [1972], p.53) | |
A reaction: This summarises Quine's ontology of mathematics, which tries to eliminate virtually everything, but has to affirm the existence of sets. Can you count sets and their members, if the sets are used to define the numbers? |
19089 | Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the objects of our conceptions to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (How to Make our Ideas Clear [1878], EP i.132), quoted by Albert Atkin - Peirce 2 'early' | |
A reaction: This is his 1878 version, which was fine-tuned later in life. He seems to have extended his principle to include possibilities, as well as the mere objects. That is, he moved beyond mere nominalism. |
7660 | We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce] |
Full Idea: A belief has just three properties: first, it is something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and, third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a habit. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (How to Make our Ideas Clear [1878], p.28) | |
A reaction: Peirce probably believed that Bismarck breathed oxygen, but was unaware of his belief, and no one ever dreamed of acting on such a belief, unless Bismarck was gasping for air. |
14906 | Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce] |
Full Idea: With Peirce, we endorse a non-positivist version of verificationism - no hypothesis should be taken seriously if apparently beyond our capacity to investigate, and serious metaphysics must concern at least two plausible scientific hypotheses. | |
From: comment on Charles Sanders Peirce (How to Make our Ideas Clear [1878]) by J Ladyman / D Ross - Every Thing Must Go 1.3 | |
A reaction: [compressed] They say this is NOT a theory about meaning, as 'The Big Bang was caused by Elvis' is perfectly meaningful. Verificationism always seems to rule out bold speculation. Don't say 'take string theory seriously', if we can't test it? |
8202 | Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine] |
Full Idea: Meaning is essence divorced from the thing and wedded to the word. | |
From: Willard Quine (Vagaries of Definition [1972], p.51) | |
A reaction: Quine's strategy is that a demolition of essences will be a definition of meaning. Personally I would like to defend essences, though I admit to finding meaning tricky. That is because essences are external, but meanings are in minds. |
8201 | The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine] |
Full Idea: The distinction between what belongs to the meaning of a word and what counts as further information is scarcely clearer than the distinction between the essence of a thing and its accidents. | |
From: Willard Quine (Vagaries of Definition [1972], p.51) | |
A reaction: In lots of cases the distinction between essence and accident strikes me as totally clear. Tricky borderline cases don't destroy a distinction. That bachelors are married is clearly not 'further information'. |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |