Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Introduction to 'New Pragmatists'' and 'Possible Worlds'

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3 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Modern pragmatism sees objectivity as possible, despite its gradual evolution [Misak]
     Full Idea: One of the pillars of the new pragmatism is the thought that the standards of objectivity come into being and evolve over time, but that being historically situated in this way does not detract from their objectivity.
     From: Cheryl Misak (Introduction to 'New Pragmatists' [2007], p.2)
     A reaction: This looks to me like pragmatism finally coming to its senses. I would say that being any sort of 'social construct' (beloved of cultural relativists) in no way detracts from its capacity for objectivity and truth.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan]
     Full Idea: Stalnaker suggests talking 'ways things might have been' as sui generis elements of our ontology - actual abstract entities in their own right, not to be reduced to more familiar items.
     From: report of Robert C. Stalnaker (Possible Worlds [1976]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 09
     A reaction: This seems to rest on an ontology of 'states of affairs', favoured by Armstrong, and implied in the Tractatus. How big is a state of affairs? How manys states of affairs can be co-present?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').