Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Grounding: an opinionated introduction' and 'Introduction to German Philosophy'

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10 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
17266 Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder]
     Full Idea: In the heyday of modal logic, philosophers typically tried to account for any metaphysical notions in modal terms.
     From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.4)
     A reaction: Lewisian realism about possible worlds actually gets rid of purely 'modal' terms, but I suppose they include possible worlds in their remark. Annoying for modal logicians to be told they had a 'heyday' - a nice example of the rhetoric of philosophy.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
20955 Art can make reason more all-inclusive, by articulating what seemed inexpressible [Bowie]
     Full Idea: The early German Romantics argued that art pointed to a more all-inclusive conception of reason, which can offer ways of articulating what is not conceptually accessible.
     From: Andrew Bowie (Introduction to German Philosophy [2003], 5 'Reason')
     A reaction: [This is Novalis, F.Schlegel, Schleiermacher, and Hölderlin] I'm in favour of expanding reason, to include assessment of situations and coherence, rather than just stepwise reasoning. Not sure that art 'articulates' something new.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
17263 Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder]
     Full Idea: What is most puzzling about the rationalist tradition is the steadfast certainty with which the Principle of Sufficient Reason was often accepted, since it in effect denies that there are fundamental facts.
     From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.2)
     A reaction: A very simple and interesting observation. The principle implies either a circle of reasons, or an infinite regress of reasons. Nothing can be labelled as 'primitive' or 'foundational' or 'given'. The principle is irrational!
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
17270 Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder]
     Full Idea: We may take existential dependence to be a relation induced by certain cases of grounding, but one may also think that facts about existential dependence are prior to corresponding ground claims, and in fact ground those claims.
     From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.3)
     A reaction: I would vote for grounding, since dependence seems more abstract, and seems to demand explanation, whereas grounding seems more like a feature of reality, and to resist further intrinsic explanation (on the whole).
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17268 Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder]
     Full Idea: To us it seems advisable to separate the objective notion of grounding, which belongs to the field of metaphysics, from the epistemically loaded notion of explanation.
     From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.2)
     A reaction: Paul Audi is the defender of the opposite view. I'm with Audi. The 'epistemically loaded' pragmatic aspect is just contextual - that we have different interests in different aspects of the grounding on different occasions.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
17267 The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]
     Full Idea: There is a disagreement on the issue of factual identity, concerning the 'granularity' of facts, the question of how fine-grained they are.
     From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 3.3)
     A reaction: If they are very fine-grained, then no two descriptions of a supposed fact will capture the same details. If we go broadbrush, facts become fuzzy and less helpful. 'Fact' was never going to be a clear term.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
20950 German Idealism says our thinking and nature have the same rational structure [Bowie]
     Full Idea: German Idealism aims to demonstrate that our thinking relates to a nature which is intelligibly structured in the same way as our thinking is structured.
     From: Andrew Bowie (Introduction to German Philosophy [2003], 3 'Limits')
     A reaction: Now that's an idealism I might buy into. Frege thought his logic was mapping rational reality. My angle is that we are a product of this 'reality', so we should expect our thinking to be similarly structured. Reason is derived from nature.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
20942 Nazis think race predetermines the self [Bowie]
     Full Idea: The Nazi idea is that the self is predetermined primarily by its race.
     From: Andrew Bowie (Introduction to German Philosophy [2003], Intro)
     A reaction: I suspect that I occasionally encounter this view, in very patriotic people. But then you meet people who feeling that their self is mainly determined by support of a football team. Note, though, 'pre-'determined. Hegel makes this idea possible?
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
20946 Rhetoric is built into language, so it cannot be stripped from philosophy [Bowie]
     Full Idea: The attempt to rid philosophy of rhetoric falls prey precisely to that fact that what is involved in rhetoric is inherent in what is built into all natural languages by their genesis in the real historical world.
     From: Andrew Bowie (Introduction to German Philosophy [2003], 2 'Hamann')
     A reaction: Rhetoric can range from charming to bullying, and it is the latter which is the problem. The underlying issue is dogma versus dialectic. Some analytic philosophers have a good shot at being non-rhetorical.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').