Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'The Facts of Causation' and 'External and Internal Relations'

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5 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths

10365	We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Mellor offers a distinction between 'facts' and 'facta' (the latter being the truth-makers for facts).
	From: report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1
	A reaction: The idea is that 'facta' can do the work in causation, because 'facts' are not part of the world. This seems a very helpful terminology, which should be encouraged, since 'fact' is plainly ambiguous in current usage.

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations

21342	A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil]
	Full Idea: Moore characterises internal relations modally, as those essential to their relata. If a and b are related R-wise, and R is an internal relation, a and b could not fail to be so related; otherwise R is external.
	From: report of G.E. Moore (External and Internal Relations [1919]) by John Heil - Relations 'Internal'
	A reaction: I don't think of Moore as an essentialist, but this fits the essentialist picture nicely, and is probably best paraphrased in terms of powers. Integers are the standard example of internal relations.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

7903	The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
	Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
	From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
	A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata

4785	Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos]
	Full Idea: Mellor argues that causal statements relate facts, where facts may be seen as whatever true propositions express.
	From: report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.6
	A reaction: Choose between 'facts', 'objects', 'conserved quantities, 'events' (the usual one) or 'processes'. I rather like processes (Salmon) as they are a better prospect as the building blocks of an ontology.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation

8408	Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley]
	Full Idea: The basic idea of probabilistic causation is that a sufficient condition of C's being a cause of E is that C and E are actual, individual events, and the objective chance of E's occurring is greater given the occurrence of C than it would be without C.
	From: report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience 5.3
	A reaction: Mellor has to include objective 'chances' in his ontology to support his theory. As it stands this looks like a weak theory, since the event might not occur despite C happening, and some less likely event might turn out to be the actual cause.