Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Sweet Dreams' and 'Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism''

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11 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
7658 Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
     Full Idea: If you define qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences considered in isolation from all their causes and effects, logically independent of all dispositional properties, then they are logically guaranteed to elude all broad functional analysis.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.8)
     A reaction: This is a good point - it seems daft to reify qualia and imagine them dangling in mid-air with all their vibrant qualities - but that is a long way from saying there is nothing more to qualia than functional roles. Functions must be exlained too.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
7655 The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett]
     Full Idea: All the work done by the imagined homunculus in the Cartesian Theater must be distributed among various lesser agencies in the brain, none of which is conscious.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Dennett's account crucially depends on consciousness being much more fragmentary than most philosophers claim it to be. It is actually full of joints, which can come apart. He may be right.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
7657 Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
     Full Idea: As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6)
     A reaction: [Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
7656 I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
     Full Idea: I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)
     A reaction: I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
7654 What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Neuro-science matters because - and only because - we have discovered that the many different neuromodulators and other chemical messengers that diffuse throughout the brain have functional roles that make important differences.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.1)
     A reaction: I agree with Dennett that this is the true ground for pessimism about spectacular breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, rather than abstract concerns about irreducible features of the mind like 'qualia' and 'rationality'.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
7903 The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna]
     Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom.
     From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88)
     A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate').
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
22808 Liberalism is minimal government, or individual rights, or equality [Avineri/De-Shalit]
     Full Idea: Liberalism has been defended as a theory of minimal government, or as a theory of basic individual rights, or as an egalitarian philosophy.
     From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
     A reaction: Minimal government tends towards anarchist liberalism, but then what grounds the right to be free of government? Presumably any sensible theory of rights has to be egalitarian. What could ground unequal rights?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
22803 Can individualist theories justify an obligation to fight in a war? [Avineri/De-Shalit]
     Full Idea: How can an individualist theory justify an obligation to fight for the state in the case of war?
     From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §4)
     A reaction: The most dramatic example of obliging citizens to contribute to the state, the notable other case being taxes. Some imagined ancient 'social contract' doesn't seem sufficient for later generations. Does being naturally sociable create such obligations?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
22804 Autonomy is better achieved within a community [Avineri/De-Shalit]
     Full Idea: Communitarians often argue that personal autonomy is better achieved within the community.
     From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §4)
     A reaction: Hegel is the source of this view. The simplest version of the point is that autonomy can only be asserted if a person has rights, which can be asserted and defended, and only a society can provide that. That is plausible.
22806 Communitarians avoid oppression for the common good, by means of small mediating communities [Avineri/De-Shalit]
     Full Idea: Because of the mediating structures of small communities, communitarians are less fearful [than liberals] of the emergence of an oppressive government as a result of the politics of the common good.
     From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
     A reaction: A politics of the common good has an obvious implicit conservatism because the central consensus is always likely to disapprove of errant individuals, of all sorts. Only individual rights can block an oppressive government.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
22807 If our values are given to us by society then we have no grounds to criticise them [Avineri/De-Shalit]
     Full Idea: If communitarians are right that we are not free to choose, but rather that our values are determined by our community, the individualists say, then there is no reason to criticise the values of one's society.
     From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
     A reaction: This is an obvious challenge, but if one's concept of community is a forum for free debate then it can be overcome. There is no avoiding the fact, though, that a good community always needs a high degree of consensus.