8 ideas
19518 | Evidentialism says justifications supervene on the available evidence [Conee/Feldman] |
Full Idea: Fundamentally Evidentialism is a supervenience thesis, according to which facts about whether or not a person is justified in believing a proposition supervene on facts describing the evidence the person has. | |
From: E Conee / R Feldman (Introduction to 'Evidentialism' [2004], p.1) | |
A reaction: If facts 'describe', does that make them linguistic? That's not how I use 'facts'. A statement of a fact is not the same as the fact. An ugly fact can be beautifully expressed. I am, however, in favour of evidence. |
3986 | The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett] |
Full Idea: The 'intentional stance' is the tactic of interpreting an entity by adopting the presupposition that it is an approximation of the ideal of an optimally designed (i.e. rational) self-regarding agent. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239) | |
A reaction: This is Dennett's 'instrumentalism', a descendant of behaviourism, which strikes me as a pragmatist's evasion of the ontological problems of mind which should interest philosophers |
3987 | Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Like such abstracta as centres of gravity and parallelograms of force, the beliefs and desires posited by the highest intentional stance have no independent and concrete existence. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239) | |
A reaction: I don't see why we shouldn't one day have a physical account of the distinctive brain events involved in a belief or a desire |
3984 | The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role [Dennett] |
Full Idea: All attributions of content are founded on an appreciation of the functional roles of the items in question. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239) | |
A reaction: This seems wrong to me. How can anything's nature be its function? It must have intrinsic characteristics in order to have the function. This is an evasion. |
19519 | Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman] |
Full Idea: In decision theory, there is a view according to which the rational basis for all decisions is evidential. This kind of decision theory is typically contrasted with causal decision theory. | |
From: E Conee / R Feldman (Introduction to 'Evidentialism' [2004], p.3) | |
A reaction: Your Kantian presumably likes rational reflection on evidence, and your modern reductive scientist prefers causality (which doesn't really sound very rational). |
7903 | The six perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom [Nagarjuna] |
Full Idea: The six perfections are of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, and wisdom. | |
From: Nagarjuna (Mahaprajnaparamitashastra [c.120], 88) | |
A reaction: What is 'morality', if giving is not part of it? I like patience and vigour being two of the virtues, which immediately implies an Aristotelian mean (which is always what is 'appropriate'). |
3983 | Learning is evolution in the brain [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Learning is evolution in the brain. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.238) | |
A reaction: This is a rather non-conscious, associationist view, connected to Dawkins' idea of 'memes'. It seems at least partially correct. |
3985 | Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Biology is not a science like physics, in which one should strive to find 'laws of nature', but a species of engineering. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Daniel Dennett on himself [1994], p.239) | |
A reaction: Yes. This is also true of chemistry, which has always struck me as minitiarised car mechanics. |